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INTRODUCTION 
In many societies the mystio experience has been 
regarded as al{in to madness and prophet and 
schizophrenic have been bound in a queer relat-
ionship (like of course Joan of Arc herselfj. 
1 
Stephen Rose 
The fact of her being schizophrenic in the dimen-
sion of psychiatry does not in the least detract 
from her significance in other dimensions. And 
vice versa. Even if we took it for grRnted that 
she was a saint, this would not change the f ac t 
that she was also a schizophrenic. 
Victor Frankl 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the "queer relat-
ionship'" existing between mysticism and madness as it 
emerges from psychological writings and to examine and 
re-eva.luate the life of Joan of Arc in terms of the 
conceptual framework that emerges. 
An immediate difficulty arises with the defini t .ion of 
mysticism. It is problematic whether Joan sough t "by 
contemplation and self-surrender to obtain union with 
or absorption into the dei ty" or believed "in spiritual 
apprehension of truths beyond the 'understanding" (O.E.D.). 
There is at first glance a considerable difference be-
tween Joan's experiences and those of the mystio studied 
predominantly today, who obtains his state of unity 
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within a higr1ly structured framework. Joan's frame of 
reference was Christianity but her experience was hard-
ly typical of everybody within it nor the result of a 
conscious technique employed by all as a meaDS t o a de-
sirable end. Her voices came spontaneously, apparently 
as a side effect of her devotions. Eastern mysLicism 
is the most accessible to modern investiga tors and is 
more in keeping with the quasi-humanistic spirit of 
modern scientism by virtue of its adaptability to a soc-
ial milieu which in general scorns intercourse with dis-
carnate personalities and feels interest in vague 
philosophies of spiritual enlightenment, love and peace. 
For these redsons it is expedient for the purposes of 
this thesis to extend the definition of mysticism to 
include potentially all those who ha ve consistent and/or 
spontaneous "hallucinatory" or paranormal experien0e 
but who are not certifiable, though they may as a matter 
of opinion be deemed 't Inad" by some persons. 
The example of Joan of Arc has the further difficulty 
that she lived in late mediaeval France, a citizen of 
another age, the daughter of another oosmology. Henoe 
she is no longer available for questioning or testing; 
one oannot observe her beha viour at first hand. That 
she can be labelled "'SOhizophrenic'" or "'mad" on the 
strength of her voices aDd visions alone is obviously 
believed by the authors of the quotations above. IL is 
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the contention of this thesis that on this limited evi-
dence, it is possible to question whether she was a 
schizophrenic or a mystic and to pOint out the diffi-
culties inherent in this sort of evaluation. A l '!ck of 
access to the original douuments concerning Joan (which 
are written in Mediaeval French and Latin) and the need 
to rely on th.e diSCipline of history as represented by 
five studies can be defended on the basis that those 
writers who label her SC11izophrenic can be relying on 
nothing more. In the case of Joan, the investigator is 
fortunate in that, not only are there records of her 
trial, but also a rehabilitation set in motion at the 
instiga tion of her mother some twenty years after her 
execution, and a canonisation in this century. As one 
of her biographers paints out: 
We know practiually every detail of her passive 
existence as a child and, as to the few months of 
her active career, they are so thoroughly docu-
mented that we know exactly where she s pent each 
day, and in whose company; what she Vlore, wha t 
horse she rode, what arms she bore, what she ate 
and drank; and, more importantly still, what words 
she uttered. (Sackville-West, 1948.p. 21) 
According to F.W.H. Myers. a founder of the British Psy-
chical Research SOCiety, "few pieces of his tory so re-
mote as this can be so accurately known" (ci ted in r,:oss, 
1976,p.200). 
The disadvantages are counterbalanced by the major ad van-
tage that it is only with the distancinB that time pro-
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vides that she (or any ~erson of her kind) can be asses-
sed. Bernard Shaw suggests, in a lively preface to his 
play St Joan (1957), that she was the first nationalist 
(and in this ahead of her time) because she believed un-
compromisingly in France for the French; and tlJe first 
Protestant martyr in that slJe died because she refused 
to acknowledge the Pope's and therefore the Catholic 
Church's, authority as greater than that of her voioes, 
which she believed were her direct link with God. Though 
Shaw's comments are open to criticism it is possible to 
see that Joan's refusal can be eQuated with the refusal 
of Luther, for example, to accept the authority of the 
Catholic Church, taking into consideration that Joan was 
uneduoated and Luther was not. It is the voice of per-
sonal experience and independent thought versus dogma 
and the establishment. 
It would indeed be a trap to decide that Joan must be a 
mystic because of her political and religious signific-
ance alone - a clear indication of the stigma attached 
to the label "schizophrenic" (though let it be added 
that in some circles of psyohological thought, the label 
"mystic" is hardly more respectable). If she is to be 
ev~luated at all, it must be on her behaviour and speech, 
her autonomy and competence, rather than the honours 
that have accrued to tler. It is significant to note 
that she was not merely a passive figurehead caught up 
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in circumstances beyond her control; nor can it be said 
that she was a schizophrenic shrewd enough to find a role 
for herself in a more gullible age. (The synchronicity 
of her appearance at such a pertinent moment in history 
would be astonishing indeed.) . Joan accom[lished much 
of what she set out to do, sublimely ignorant of theolog-
ical or historical repercussions and naively innocent 
of any desire for self-aggrandisement, despite her ac-
ceptance and enjoyment of the pleasures incurred and 
honours accorded her by her early success. 
In presenting his concept of ontological dimensions as 
a means of doing justice to man's ontological differ-
ences and anthropological unity, (from which discussion 
the quotation above is taken), Frankl (1971) makes the 
point that the danger of specialisation is that special-
ists often fall into the trap of generalising from their 
own discipline and reducing many phenomena so that they 
fit into the frame of reference within which the spec-
ialists are working. Unless the totality of the per-
son's life is taken into account when the so-called 
"symptoms'. are evaluated, there is the danger that what 
is normal may be mistaken for pathology. In most cases 
- and exceptions will be discussed later - it seems ex-
tremely unlikely that a person . who experiences events 
not generally accessible will be incarcerated in a ment-
al hospital as long as he/she maintains appropriate be-
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haviour sociolly or, to express it another w~y, is able 
to incorporate his/her experiences into the warp and 
woof of everyday life, that is, find a meaning for them. 
But the psychiatrist may succumb to the temptation of 
labelling all unusual experience as pathological, with 
the result that great and creative persons like C.G. Jung 
and William Blake are assigned to the ranks of paranoid 
schizophrenics who got aWay. This argues either a very 
limi ted defini tion of wlla t is normal or Liesirdble exper-
ience in this culture, in which case the argument for 
psychiatry and mental hospitals as a traumatic instrument 
of social control becomes relevant; or a remarkably wide 
definition of schizophrenia, which would seem to be the 
result of anti-psychiatry taken to extremes. At a psych-
ology seminar, for instance, Harry Stack Sullivan's re-
markably accurate statement in a public lecture was 
mentioned (Sullivan, 1962). The remark WaS not intended 
as a prediction but as an illustration merely. He spoke 
of his death at the age of 57 years as the result of a 
cerebral haemorrhage, which occurred eighteen years later, 
when Sullivan was 56 years, 10 months and 24 days old. 
The supervisor's comment was that he had heard that 
Sullivan was a schizophrenic, which he, the supervisor, 
appeared to feel explained the coincidence adequately. 
This wide definition of schizophrenia seems based on 
those observ'.;1 tions which show tha t the concept of madness 
is relative to the social milieu, th",t "psychotiC" behav-
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iour is envied and given status in some tribes and tha t 
the hospitalisation of ohronio sohizophrenia oan be seen 
as a punishment for sooial devianoe. These ideas will 
be disoussed later. 
It is the faot of man's ontologioal differenoes and 
today's aoademio speoialisation that makes the oonoep-
tual analysis of mystioism and sohizophrenia a hazardous 
task. The study involves theories of oonsoiousness and 
altered states of oonsoiousness (often physiologioally 
based), psyohiatry, religion, and oultural dnd time gaps. 
For this reason, just as a study of the "meohanios" of 
belief aids the sooiologist in analysing the belief sys-
tems of men, many of whioh systems overlap and oontra-
diot one dnother in both the individual and his oulture, 
so a means of reoonoiling apparently oontradiotorydis-
oiplines must be sought so that the meohanios of mysti-
oism and sohizophrenia beoome the main foous and the 
oontent of the belief or delusional system and the form 
of its resultant overt behaviour largely irrelevant. 
PAR T I 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
He said to them, 'When, therefore, a teacher 
of the law has become a learner in the 
Kingdom of Heaven, he is like a householder 
who can produce from his store both the new 
and the old.' 
The Gospel according to St Matthew 
CHAPTER 1 
TEE RISE OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY 
AND 
THE FALL OF 1JATERIALISl\Il 
This feeling of being lonely and very temporary 
visitors in the universe is in flat oontradio-
tion to everything known about man (and·all 
other living organisms) in the soienoes. We do 
not 'oome into' this world; we oome out of it, 
as leaves from a tree. As the ooean 'waves,' 
the universe 'peoples,' LSi07 Every individual 
is an expression of the whoTe realm of nature, 
a uni<;.ue aotion of the total universe. This 
fact is T<u"ely, if ever, experienoed by most in-
dividuals. Even tho::;e who know it to be true in 
theory do not sense or feel it, but continue to 
be aware of themselves as isolated 'egos' in 
bags of skin. 
Alan Watts 
1. INTRODUCTION 
9 
Koestler (1967) has written that orttJOdox sOienoe rests 
ohiefly on· "four pillars of unwisdom", whioh he summar-
i ses in siroplifi ed form. These are: 
(a) that biological evolut.ion is the result of 
rand om mutations preserved by na tur'otl seleo-
tion; 
(b) tha t mental evolution is the result of random 
tries preserved by 'reinforoements' (rewards); 
(0) that all organisms, inoluding man, are essen-
tially passive automata oontrolled by the en-
vironment, Wl10S8 sale purj:,ose in life is the 
reduotion of tensions by adaptive responses: 
LSiy 
(d) that the only scientific method worth th,n 
n2.me is quantitative measurement; and, 
consequently, thd t comvlex phenor:1eno. rCU3 t 
be reduced to simple elements accessible to 
suct treatment, v"i thout undue worry ,'lhether 
the specifio characteristics of a cocplex 
phenoC1enon, for instance man , rr:ay Oe lost 
in the process. (K.oestler, 1967, p. 3) 
In defendine: his earlier and su·osequent attack en tc-
haviourism, he makes the pOint that tl1e model of man 
as a machine has hOid a profcund influenoe on our Vihole 
culture, permea ting our attitude to disciflines like 
philosophy and the social sCiences. Ornstein (1973), 
amone 0 thE:rs, concurs, pOj.Dti ne ou t tha t there h~i.s 
been a confusion between behOiviourism as a useful tool 
and behaviourism as the total extent of knowledge. 
Psycholoei sts have tended to i gnore anQ even deny the 
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phenomena whi ch do no t lenel themsel ves to i twes tiga ti on 
by behaviouristic methods. 
Granted thGlt the conditioned response seems woefully 
inad equa te as an explanation of how great wo rks of hrt, 
for example, come into beine, the folloY/ing questicn 
about Joan of Arc becomes relevant. What is it about 
Joan • saudi tory and visual "hallucina tions" and tile 
beliefs engendered by them that particularly affronts 
the modern mind? Is it not that, conditioned by the 
scientific approach, nurtured in materialism and skillc'd 
in reductionism, it cannot perforce acoept thut Jo~n 
W3.S in direc t communic[1 tion wi th disembodied en ti ti es 
calling t temselves St Michael, St Catherine and 
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St riiargaret? If the emphasis is shifted, however, it 
can be stated that Joan received information and in-
spiration from an unknovm source, which she iden tified 
as these three saints. L. Rhine (1962) observed tha t 
information of this sort l'resents itself' to the recip-
ient in a manner congruent with his/her frame of refer-
ence. l,joss (1976) concurs tha t beliefs and interes ts 
affect the form in which precognitive material presents 
itself to a person and has this to say about Joan. 
It was recorded that Joan saw in a vision, and 
heard her voices tell her, that the siege of 
Orleans would be raised; that the Dauphin would 
be crowned King of France at the cathedral in 
Rheims; and that she would be wounded in battle. 
These pro pheoi es were fu lfilled . She also receiv-
ed the messal're that Frcmce would win a R"reat vic-
tory over Ene land within seven years. This pro -
pr,ecy was not fulfill ed. Thi s i s an important 
item. l'TObCJ.bly very few yeople in histoI"j have 
-Deen as gift.ed , psychically, a s Joan of Arc, yet 
she, toc, Vias apparently sometimes wrong in !ler 
interpretations of the visions and VOices. 
(p. 200) 
In the onLOlogieal dimension of para1?syehology, ti:en, 
Joan was a psychic sensitive. Admittedly, thi~ is hard-
ly more acee.;'ltable to the scientifically oriented mind, 
although interest in the study of "pSi" is growing fast. 
1.1 THE 
i'IC 
N ,:£RGi:; l'WE OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY 
DI3CIrUNIi 
SCI£1\'1'1-
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, F. W. H. ;:.yers 
founded, with arilong others Henry S1dgwiok and Sir 
William Barrett, the Society for Psychical ReseareD, 
which came into existence as a result. of their di ssatis-
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faction with the prevailing view cf man as a mere mach-
ine. When Myers published Human Personali ty and its 
Survival of Bodily Death in 1903, William James, in his 
review (1903), commented~ 
Anyone with a healthy sense of evidence, a S8nSB 
not methodically blu,nted by the sectarianism of 
'science' ought now ... to feel that exalted sen-
sibilities and memories, veridical phantasms, 
haunted houses , trances with supernorlI'al faculty, 
and even experimental thought-transference, are 
natural kinds of phenomena which ought, just like 
other natural events, to be followed UP with scien-
tific curiosity •..• the existence all about us of 
thousands ••. of persons, not perceptibly hysteric 
or unhealthy, who are mediumistic ... is a oheno-
menan of human life which ipsychologistij do not 
even attempt to connect with any of the other facts 
of nature. Add the fact that the mediumship often 
gives supernormal information, and itoeccmes evi-
dent that the phenomenon cannot consist of pure 
eccentrioity and isolation ...• It cries aloud for 
serious investigation. (cited in S. Smith, 1961) 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Society conducted lab-
oratory experiments on hypnosis, automatic wri ting,. doV1-
Sing and olairvoyance by methods comparable to the 
prevailing standards of the day, it became unwise for 
young psychol08ists to show interest in the fiela. 
It took the efforts of two biologists, Dr Joseph Banks 
Rhine and his wife, LoUisa, to confer on parapsychology 
some measure of respectability. With the use of Zenar 
cards and statistical probability theory, they set out 
to investigate telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition 
and psychokinesis, which appear to be the princiyles 
operating in a host of vivid, spontaneous paranormal 
experiences universally present, apparently sinoe the 
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beginning of reoorded history. Their endeavours were 
successful to such an extent that in 1955 Dr George R. 
Price (cited in Randall, 1975) put two alternatives to 
the scientific world. Either it had to accept that ESP 
existed and so undermine the very foundations of modern 
sCienco, the mechanistic tlleory, or it had to call in 
question the honesty of the experimenters. As Dr Hans 
Eysenok has pOinted out, this would suggest a "gigantic 
ccnspiracy involving some thirty University departner,ts 
allover the world, and several hundred highly res~ected 
scientists in various fields, many of them originally · 
hostile to the claims of the psychical researchers" 
(cited in Randall, 1975, p. Ill). 
1. 2 THE UNDERMINING OF MECHA1TJ:S1'IC THEORY 
The mechanistiC theory has not been undermined by para-
psychology a lone. The field of physics ha s found the 
need to widen its philosophical boundaries to accommo-
date its d~scoveries. Dr Hen~' Marg~nau, Profess or of 
Physics and Natural Philosophy at Yale University, 
observed that: 
This decline of materialism occurred first because 
various discoveries culminating in t £i e demons tra-
tion of t rle Relativity PrinCiple, made untenable 
the notion of a continuous material medium u pon 
whose postulation materialism was dependent. Next, 
the atom, which had been conceived as a solid pel-
let of stuff, turned out to be wholly empty, con-
taining nothing that could .be called 'matter' at 
all. It had degenera ted into a series of Singu-
larities haunting space. This rather disposed of 
matter. Furthermore .•• there has been a change 
in the old-style dogmatism that imbued the whole 
of physioal soienoe.(oited in S. Smith, 1961, p . 15) 
The most intriguing development in physios oomes from 
quantum theory. One of the fundamenta l prinoi.ples of 
quantum theory, the Prinoiple of Complementarity, stCites 
that electrons, photons eto. are "Janus-faoed " entities 
(Janus in mythology had two faoes, eaoh looking in a 
different direotion), wl1iol1 oan behave like via V E:S in one 
set of oiroumstdnoes and like grains in anoti1er. Thoue;h 
t hes e modes of behaviour are oon tradiotory, physiois ts 
are foroed to t rea t them as if they are olJmplementary. 
Mon:oveI', gUantum theory shows that the obs"rver i:1nu 
the prooess observed are inseparably linked. 1'his oar-
ries the in'l,lioation thaG, any definite statement about 
a prooess is valid only for the observer of that prooess, 
so that wl1at we oall objeotive reality is questionable 
~oestler, 1973). If then at the atomio level, the world 
in time a nd spaoe no longer eXists, Koestler suggests 
an analogy may be drawn with (and a resolution reaohed 
of) the mind-body oontinuum problem in that the ocntents 
of mental experienoes may also be seen to exist outside 
the framework of spaoe, time and substance, yet be link-
ed wi t .h the rna terial brain. 
An inoreasing tendenoy to 1101ism, that the understanJing 
of the whole is as neoessary to· ~he understanding of 
the parts as tile parts are for t!1e understanding of ~he 
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whole, makes it possible to conce:ptualise a transcen-
dence of physical causality and admit into man's under-
standing of his life an a-causal principle, a principle 
similar to that of Formative cause, outlined by 
Aristotle in contrast to Effective Cause when events 
are linked by a definite, strong, causal chain. Form-
ative cause deals with relationships between the parts 
of a system im:;Josed by the structure of the system as 
a whole. This, in the opinion of F.D. Peat> (cited in 
Koestler, 1973>, may be a more sui table frar~lework of 
causality in which to obtain understanding of such 
reactions as perception, personal reactions, experiences 
and, in particular, "psi" phenomena. 
Evolution, man's descent from the apes, the result of 
a chance cosmic occurrence which caused life to assemble 
itself, is another basic tenet of the deterrninistic 
faith. It too is being questioned in the light of new 
discoverie!3. 
In 1953 Stanley Miller passed an electrical discharge 
through a mixture of hydrogen, methane, ammonia and 
I'la ter vapour and obte,ined traces of fifteen amino acids. 
This result led to the assumption that physical forces 
acting upon a mixture of gases ;produced a "prebiotic 
soup" cont':l.inine the materials necessary for life to 
>generate itself. Yet evidence for this cannot be fountl., 
1 6 
although compounds of nitrogenous matter like amino 
acids and purines are readily absorbed by rock and clay. 
Another requirement for the spontaneous emergence of 
life, a reducing atmosphere i.e. conta ini :'1g g;:,.se ;3 like 
methane rather than oxygen, has also left no trs.ce be-
hind it despite the fact that this spontaneous gener-
ation would have talcen millions of years. Reduced iron 
bells, sometimes used as evidence for the presence of 
this atmosphere, were deposited after living systems had 
come into being and are probably the result of tl1e ac t-
ivity of living organisms. A Cambridge zoologist, 
W.H. Thorpe, reasons thus: 
The event which produced living matter must have 
been highly improbable even under primordial condi-
tions. Assuming that an aqueous solution of amino-
acids had aeen formed •..• and that the concentration 
of each free amino-acid is kept at one M, the eqUi-
librium concentration of 3. ,protein with 100 re:;idues 
(MW ab()u ~ 12,000 ) iS010 99r., which represents 1 mole-
cule in a volume 10 times the volume of t he earth . 
This appears to rule out the possibility of the 
formation of any protein by mass action, even in the 
presence of a catdlyst .••. Thus the f ormation of two 
or more r:!o lecules of any enzyme purely by ch ... nce is 
fantastiua lly improbable .( ci ted in Randall , 1975, 
p. 205) 
The spontaneous and mindless generation of life can be 
doubted in terms of the Second Law of Ther:nodynamics, 
which states that closed physical systems tend towar(i s 
a state of maximum entropy, or maximum disorder. The 
scientist is confronted with the paradox of living 
organisms which apparently feed on nega tive entropy, 
showing a tendency to organise themselves into highly 
complex and harmonious patterns. If a new law of 
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thermodynamics is formulated for open systems (like liv-
ing organisms), the difficulty is still how such open 
systems originated, except in the presence of some hypo-
thetical organising force . (Randall, 1975). 
Information theory also tends to cast doubt upon the 
mindless and random origin of life. A patterned system 
requires that there be a certain amount of information 
available for the materials to be assembled in the cor-
rect order. The quantity of information is expressed 
in binary units or "bits". It has been estirr:.ated that 
the store of information in an amoeba alone must be sev-
eral times that of the most advanced cor.:puter. If, then, 
life originated in gas, the most random substance known 
to SCience, containing negligible information, how was 
this lack of information transmuted into the incredible 
complexity found in living creatures (Randall, 1975)? 
One of the most fundamental prinCiples of evolution is 
that of homologous organs, which can no longer b~ ex-
plained in terms of biological theory. The proponents 
of evolution made much of the resemblances between the 
skeletons of the limbs of different animals. This 
would be acceptable if these structures were tra nsmit-
teJ by the same gene-complex, albeit subject to the 
processes of natural selection. Homologous organs have, 
however, been shown to originate in totally different 
gene-complexes, undermining the simple concept of homo-
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logy in terms or similar genes inherited rrom a oommon 
anoestor. There is evidenoe to suggest that genes are, 
instead, organised in eaoh speoies aooording to an over-
all plan. The latter idea is supported by D'Aroy Tho~p­
son IS '.':ork whioh suggests that the shapes or anirr:als be-
longing to the same zoologioal group are related in a 
simple mathematioal way and that the shape or one speoies 
oan be obtained rrom the shape or another by distorting 
the spatial oo-ordinates (Randall, 1975). 
1.3 "lUND" AS THE ORGANISING PRINCIPLE OF LIFE 
These indioations that living things have developed ao-
oording to a pre-ordained plan have leu Randall (1975) 
to assert that the only way in whioh para~sycholo8Y can 
be ritted into our present cosmology is by a return to 
dualism. He postulates a hypothetical oons true t, ~Lind, 
as the roroe behind the organising principle in organio 
matter and indeed in the universe. There is a fai~t 
eoho of agreement in the realm or astronomy and :tJhysics. 
For instanoe, Sir James Jeans's reaotion to one of the 
fundamental principles of quantur.J theory is that "the 
uni verse begins to loole more like ~ great thought than 
a great machine" (cited in Koestler, 1975, pp. 224 - 225). 
While some scientists believe that consciousnes~ is a 
mere epiphenomenon of brain funotion, that there is no 
"ghost in the machine", others do not feel that the ex-
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periencing self can be identified solely with brain 
activity on the physiological level. According to Berg-
son (cited in Heywood, 1968a), the brain is an organ 
of limitation, allowing man to focus attention, causing 
manto perceive what is exterior as divisible objects 
which can be manipulated - a phenomenon which has given 
rise to the mechanistic interpretation of nature. Sir 
Cyril Burt saw the brain as an organ deSigned, not to 
generate consciousness, but for detecting or transmit-
ting conscious acti vi ty (cited in Heywood, 1968a). 
Hence man is not a creature upon which the environment 
acts to produce a socially conditioned automaton, though 
clearly there is an interaction between person and en-
vironment to produce the unique being in time and space 
postulated here. 
In view of these developments and the increased interest 
in mental, "subjective" events, the nature of conscious-
ness and altered states of consciousness (ASCs) which 
has rclsulted from oroeen given impetus by drug-
experimentation and meditation, it appears to be an 
appropriate time for psychologists to adopt a new model 
of man, which will accommodate not only objective and 
subjective events but also the many disciplines dir-
ected and operating at various levels of his experience. 
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1. 4 WILBER' 3 MODEL OF THE "SPECTRmr. OF CONSCIOUS-
NESS" 
Huxley (1958) describes a universal doctrine as to the 
nature of m~n and reality which lies at the core of 
every major metaphysical tradition. This represents 
an unchanging reality untouched by time and place, al-
ways true. Wilber (1975) pOints out that there is a 
psychologia perennis or perennial psychology which re-
flecLs the same insights, that is, a universal agree-
ment as to the nature of human consciousness. He sets 
out to present a model of consciousness which will ac-
commodate both eastern and Western insights. Within 
the framework of this "spectrum of consciousness" the 
human personality is a multi-levelled manifestation or 
expression of a single consciousness, each level repre-
senting a different and easily recognised sense of in-
dividual identity, ranging from cosmic consciousness to 
the infinitely narrower sense of identity represented 
by egoic consoiousness. 
Wilber presents the concept of the Spectrum of Conscious-
ness as it applies to man, diagrammatically in a figure, 
which in its adapted form is given below. 
~IIAI )(IW 
Penon" 
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FIGURE I. The broad lines indica te t he major 
levels of identity. The three line groupings 
represent the auxiliary bands. The diagona l 
line represents the self/not-self boundary 
which breaks at the Tra nsper sona l Bands and 
vanishes at the Level of Mind. l~ote . Adap t.., 
ed fro m "Psychologia Per ennis: Tlle Spectrum 
of Cons ciousness" by Ken Wilber, Journa l of 
Transpersona l PsyChology, 1975, 1 l2} , 107. 
1.4.1 THE LEVEL OF W~ND 
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Man's innermo s t consciousness is identical to the ulti-
mate reality of the universe, which in various relig-
ions is represented by a deity, but which Wilber calls 
Mind (not to be confused with the apparent. plurality of 
minds). Here man is identified with the Absolute. This 
level is the only sta te of consciousness, all other 
states being illusions. 
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1.4.2 THE TRANSPERSONAL BANDS 
This is the area of the spectrum where man is not con-
scious of his Supreme Identity, nor yet confined to the 
boundaries of a single organism. It is here that para-
normal phenomena could be expected to take place. 
1. 4.3 THE &USTENTIAL LEVEL 
At this level man is identified only with his total 
psychophysical organism, for it is here that the distinc-
tion between self and others, organism and environment, 
is firmly drawn. This is where the rational processes 
and personal will first come into being. The Buddhist 
terms this the level of the manas and defines it as the 
persistent source of existential, rational, volitional 
awareness. 
1.4.4 THE BIOSOCIAL BANDS 
These are located at the upper limits of the EXistential 
Level, being composed of "the internalised matrix of 
cultural premises, familial relationships, and social 
glosses, as well as the all-pervading social institutions 
of language, logiC, ethics and law .... those aspects of 
the organistl's social environment that it has introject-
ed across the organism-environment boundary" (p. 109) -
the internalised society, Wllich profoundly colours and 
moulds t .he organism's basic sense of existence. As 
anthropologist Edward Hall (cited in Wilber, 1975) ex-
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plains: 
Selective screening of sensory data admits some 
things while filtering others, so that experience 
as it is perceived through one set of culturally 
patterned sensory screens is qUite different from 
the experience perceived through another. (p. 109) 
1.4.5 THE EGO LEVEL 
Here man does not feel directly identified with his psy-
chosomatic organism. Rather he identifies solely with 
the approximate mental representation or picture of his 
total organism, his ego or self-image. His total organ-
ism is split into a disembodied "psyche", "the ghost in 
the machine", and the "soma" (p. 109). He feels he 
exists in his body and not ~ his body. Since he is 
identified almost exclusively with this mental picture 
of his total self, his intellectual and symbolic pro-
cesses predominate . 
1.4.6 THE SHADOW LEVEL 
Sometimes man alienates various aspects of his psyche, 
dis-identifies with them and narrows his sphere of 
identity to only parts of the ego, which Wilber calls 
the persona. Man is identified with an impoverished 
and inaccurate self-image (i.e . the "persona") while 
the rest of his psychic tendencies, those too evil or 
undesirable, are alienated as the contents of the shadow. 
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1.4.7 INTERACTION BETWEEN VARIOUS LEVELS 
There is a flow and interaction between the various bands 
in the dynamic process called living. Nevertheless, 
each level represents an increasingly narrowed sphere of 
identi ty, frolI: the universal Mind through to the facet 
of the psyche called the persona. Each l evel is also 
marked by a different mode of knowing, a different set 
of dualisms, a different class of unconscious processes. 
1.4.8 THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPECTRUM, SPACE AND 
TIMB 
The doctrine of' maya supplies the answer to the question 
of why these levels seem to exist, since the level of 
Iliind is held to be the only reali ty • Maya represen ts 
any experience stenmting from dualism, especially the 
primary dualism of subjeot vs. object. In term::> of ttle 
perennial psychology, all dualism is not so much unreal 
as illusory. According to G. Spencer Brown (cited in 
Wilber, 1975), in his mathematical treatise Laws of 
Form, the world is constituted in such a way as to be 
able to see itself; but in order to do so, it trrust cut 
itself into at least one part which sees and at least 
one part which is seen. Whatever it sees, then, is only 
partially itself (see also 1.2). The division only ap-
parently divides the world. The psychologic. j)erennis 
deolares that Since all levels of mind are the ~rcduots 
of maya or dualism, they must exist only in an illusory 
fashion, wi t11 the reali ty of each level remaining always 
}[ind . For the purposes of the psychologia perennis the 
most convenient labels for the two halves of the orig-
inal dualism are subject and object, self and other or 
organism and environm(;'Jnt. With its occurrence is crea t-
ed the next major level after Mind, the Existential 
Level. Sinoe this involves seer and seen, it ,simultan-
eously creates space. Once man identifies exch;5i vely 
with his organism, the problem of life and dea th is 
created and the fear of dea th. The creation of the dual-
ism of life vs . death is simultaneously the crea tion of 
time - for Mind is timeless and always present. (Henoe 
it can perhaps be argued that all time is always present.) 
The consequence of the disruption of the life and death 
which exists at the organic level is to make man the 
his tori cal animal. (ThiS accounts for the uniQueness of 
the individual in a certain culture at a certain time -
an action of the total universe.) He necessarily separ.., 
ates past from future and is thrown out of the tirr.eless 
now into historical time, identified exclusively with 
his organism as it exists in time and space. 
The creation of time sends man fleeing from death and 
results in the idealised image of himself, his ego, for 
being composed of fixed and stable symbols, it offers 
man the security his body does not. The everlasting 
escape from death is embooied in static symbols. He 
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identifies with the undying idea of himself, moving 
from his total psycho-physiological organism to his 
self-image, with the result that the Ego Level is creat-
ed. 
Finally he identifies with only a fraction of his psychic 
processes. He disowns unwanted aspects, distorting and 
impoverishing them by identifying with the persona and 
projecting the rest of himself into the shadow. The 
levels of the spectrum infinitely shade into one another. 
They appear real only to those unable to see through the 
illusion to the ever-present and unchanging reality, 
Mind. 
1. 5 EVALUATION OF WILBER'S ffiODEL 
The main objection which can be raised to this model is 
its basis in the religious and philosophical insights 
which underlie both Eastern and Christian mysticism. 
The use of words like maya and manas, for instance, must 
be accepted as names describing certain processes, as a 
justification for their us e obviously lies beyond the 
scope of this study. 
The fact that it is based on philosophy and religion at 
all needs little apology. McClelland (1964), for in-
stance, has argued rather convincingly that Freud's 
theory had its origins in Jewish belief and mysticism 
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and that psyohoanalysis oan be seen as the religion of 
the intelligentsia. Even a slight aoquaintanoe with 
the objeotives of Eastern mysticism and of Christianity 
suggests that they have similarities to those of human-
istio psyohologists like Maslow. As Walker (1962) 
pOints out, scienoe and religion have not always been, 
and are not necessarily, in confliot. The failure of 
Christianity as a myth (in the wider sense of the word) 
has been, in the opinion of Jung (1977), that it has 
neglected to ~row in order to accommodate the needs of 
a ohanging sooial and soientific milieu. The oonfliot 
with soience has arisen from the restriotions of insti-
tutionalised religion, whioh does not reoognise that 
the revelations of God to his people did not neoessarily 
grind to a halt with the last chapter of the Bible. 
Chri·stianity has at last begun to respond to the ohallen-
ges raised by this ohange in man's intelleotual perspeo-
tive in beooming more ethically oriented and in renewing 
its interest in mysticism or direct experience as oppos-
ed to theology or dogma. 
There is another reason why this dimension of mind is 
appropriate. Persons like Joan of Arc are not deemed 
mad by virtue of "symptoms II alone but also by virtue of 
the beliefs concerning man's true nature within which 
these unusual events are interpreted. It is the inalien-
able right of every individual to interpret his ultimate 
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destiny in those terms which, by virtue of intelligence 
and nature, he finds emotionally satisfying. It is the 
business of psychologists, at least in s ome of t he ap-
plications of their disoipline, to respect and concern 
themselves with these beliefs even while taking into 
account their relativity to time, culture and person. 
If religion is seen as an expression of man's potential 
for dignity and meaning, there is every reason for him 
to reject the notion that his value can be assessed in 
terms of whether he, like a famous golfer's family, uses 
an equally famous brand of toothpaste. Consumer con-
formity is a poor substitute as the opiate of t:-Je masses. 
A model of consciousness which attempts to do justice to 
the mys tic vlhile failing to include a dimension that 
will accommodate his interpretation of himself would be 
ridiculous. 
Wilber's Spectrum of Consciousness is extremely flexible 
and vli11 be the taci t framework throughout this study 
for the following reasons. 
Since he locates various therapies and schools of psych-
ological thought at different levels of human experience, 
the apparent contradictions in theory and application 
can be neutra lised. The model provides a useful and com-
prehensive framework within which to study the mechanics 
of schizophrenia and mysticism as relationships rather 
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than as sets of behaviour and content of belief. Be-
cause the model transcends the merely temporal and 
scientific without negating their importance, it is pos-
sible to evaluate a person without r~ducing him/her. 
Moreover, the model should prove acceptable to both dual-
ists and monists and a dangerous area of controversy can 
be avoided. 
CHAPTER 2 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
AND 
ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS (ASCs) 
Our normal wal<ing consciousness • •. is but 
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one special type of consciousness, whilst all about 
it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there 
lie potential forms of conscious ;1hc 7 entirely dif-
ferent. We may go through life without suspecting 
their exi ,,, tence; but apply the r equisite stimulus, 
and at a touch they are all there in all their com-
pleteness, definite types of ment ;-l.li ty wh ich pro-
bably somewhere have their field of application and 
adaptation. No accoun" of the universe in it s tot-
ality can be final which leaves these other for:ns 
of consciousness quite disregarded. How to r egard 
them is the question - for they are so discontin-
uous with ordinary Gonsciousness. Yet they may de-
termine attitudes though they cannot furnisfl foI"Il-
ulas, and open a reg ion though they fail to give a 
map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing 
of our accounts with reality. 
William James 
2. INTRODUCTION 
In its extreme reaction against the futilities of intro-
spection as a means of stu(iying the mind and its deter-
mination to become a quantitative science, the Behaviour-
ist Sohool refused to reoognise oonsoiousness as a subjeot 
for study; just as parapsychologists had to abandon the 
richness of spontaneous ''fisi'' so that ESP was reduced to 
what A.J. Ayer called "no more than a oolourful way of 
summari '1.ing a mildly interesting oolleotion of statistics" 
(cited in Parker, 1975,p. 11). 
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Renewed interest in ASCs and consoiousness oan be traoed 
to at least two souroes. The first was the emergence of 
the humanistic, existential and phenomenological approaoh-
es to psychology, which gave priority to experiencing and 
awareness. The second was the psychedelic experience of 
members of the counter-culture . which would appear to have 
been born of the existential vacuum produced by the over-
whelming advances in technology, the hypocrisy of power 
politics and the values used to rationalise them. One 
can only begin to guess at the lack of meaning and des-
pair of the followers of a Manson or a Jones. 
The intensive attention given to ASCs, as a result of 
drug experimentation, has not met with uniform approval. 
Rose (1976), for example, ha s pOinted out the similar-
ities between drug-induced states and psychosis. He 
argues that our present brain structure is a product uf 
a hundred thousand years of human social evolution and 
has proved its usefulness as an instrument lor inter-
preting and manipulating the surrounding world; and 
that it is precisely these rational modes of enquiry 
which mysticism relegates to a position of secondary im-
. portance . Important as spontaneous ASCs may be for en-
riching our eXistence, he feels that mystic experience 
for the few should not be allowed to jeopardise the op-
portunities for mind expansion in the widest sense for 
all. He supports his views with those ideals that 
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scientists generally use to rationalise their own myth 
(again in the widest sense and not necessarily deroga-
tory). He underlines the need to act upon the world so 
that conditions of poverty and ignorance can be changed. 
Rose is justified in painting out the dangers of psych-
edelic drugs used indiscriminately, for this leads to 
psychological and behavioural degeneration as surely as 
the use of alcohol may lead to degeneration unless its 
use is ritualised as for i~stance, in the Jewish culture. 
It is also true that the rational consciousness he speaks 
of has hiSh survival value. But to dismiss Ornstein's 
argument (1973) for a reintegration of the hypothetically 
more mystical functioning of the right cerebral he!1i-
sphere as a corrective to vvestern man's largely linear 
existence as merely fashionable and irrelevant at the 
present time is to misunderstand the nature of the true 
mystical experience. The present time is in fact the only 
time humanity, acd even more pertinently, the individual 
has. For most people, constrained as are scientists by 
the vested interests of power politics, their sale ef-
feotive gesture to alleviating the plight of the starv-
ing millions would seem to be eating every morsel on 
their plate in gratitude that they are able to eat at all; 
and the best antidote to the sort of despair and abandon-
ment of values evidenced in activities like drug-taking 
is the renewal of a meaningful structure within whioh the 
individual can exercise his rational consciousness to its 
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fullest extent for those very ideals Rose puts forward -
not distanced to Biafra or intellectualised to so~e 
hypothetical future time but in those opportunities pre-
senting themselves here and now. It seems to be in the 
nature of the true, as opposed to the pseudo, mystical 
and religious experience to bring about a change of 
character and lifestyle, so that t11e individual may work 
with inexhaustible energy to actualise himself by alle-
Viating those adverse conditions he finds about him 
(Masters & Houston ,1967; Underhill, 1967). Paradoxical-
ly the results of some types of myst)_cism are extremely 
practical. 
The crux of the controversy surrounding ASCs and mystical 
experience is not whether all and sundry, encouraged by 
the trendiness of it, are gOing to abandon respons ibili-
ties and values for the intangible rewa rds and individual 
indulgence of meditation and contemplation. It is an at-
tempt to redress t .he "nothing bu t'l at ti tude of Qu·mti ta-
tive sOience to a large proportion of human experience. 
As Tart (1969) paints out, it is in the nature of the 
experiencing person to form beliefs and theories around 
what he experiences. A scientific exploration of ASCs 
will diminish the likelihood that he will systema tise 
his delusions. It is an exploration of the potential of 
the human psyche to experience realities which may exist 
under, over ruld above what men can only assume is the 
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reality they experience in common with their fellows; 
perhaps whether the structuring of reality is merely ar-
bitrary relative to culture or whether there does indeed 
exist an CLr:tthropological unity of Mind in Wilber's sense. 
Belcff's at~itude (1975) though cautious, is a good deal , 
more optimistic about the renewed interest in the riohness 
and diversity of consciousnes». He acknowledges the oon-
tribution of behaviourism in developing the methodology, 
sophisticated research design and instrumentation which 
make the scientific exploration of oonsciousness possible. 
He states that this area of study will aid the emergence 
of a more holistic and positive view of man. Man is no 
longer just a machine or a battleground of conflicting 
urges and desires but a creature with curiosity and 
creativity over and above biological determinism. Man 
can more confidently and optimistically direot his efforts 
....... 
towards the soals of self-fulfil ment and self- tr~~scen-
'-' 
dence as opposed to those of mere self-preservation and 
self-assertion. Beloff agrees with Ornstein (1973) in 
that he acknowledges the challenge to psychology to at-
tempt to integrate the alien metal)hysic~ of Eastern t!'ad-
itions into a soientific and linear mode of knowing W11ioh 
has proved so singularly successful. Parker (1975) pOints 
out that the conceptual framework which eme rges from t his 
area of study will be an effeotive vehicle for the explor-
ation of parapsycholoe-S (and by inference other phenomena 
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like peroeption) whioh thus far has had to subjugate it-
self to the laws of logio when its subjeot-matter appears 
to defy and oontradiot those laws. 
The purpose of the present ohapter is not, however, an 
exhaustive disoussion of oonsoiousness, ASCs and mysti-
oism. In f aot, it will be neoessary to return to these 
topios again if this study is to aohieve ooherenoe. The 
present reQuirement is that oonoepts whioh have been de-
rived from the study of ASCs should be introduoed and ex-
plioated so that they may be referred to later without 
further explanation, thus greatly faoilitating the disous-
sion to follow. These ooncepts oan, within the framework 
of Wilber's Spectrum of Consoiousness, be seen as attempts 
to explain aspeots of how ~lTind (oonsoiousness in the wid-
est sense) uses the extraordinarily flexible brain to 
foous attention on the environment and to transmit and 
deteot oonsoiousness in the more limited sense relative 
to oulture in historioal time and spaoe (1.3), the levels 
of the speotrum being mainly those extending from the 
Existential to the Ego level (1.4.3 -1.4.5 ) . 
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF THE GElfSRALISED REALITY-ORIENTATION 
Shor (1969) postulates that the usual state of oonsoious-
ness is oharaoterised by the mobilisation of a struotured 
frame of referenoe, whioh supports, interprets and gives 
meaning to all experienoes. He oalls this the usual gen-
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eralised reality-orientation. It develops slowly through-
out the life-cycle and is the only tool a person h~s to 
deal effectively with the enormous quantities of complex 
stimuli he encounters during his waking life. It is main-
tained effortlessly and is not usually consciously dir-
ected. When the person is fatigued or hyper-preocoupied 
with a task, the supportive energy of the generalised 
reality-orientation diminishes and it fades into the more 
distont background of attention, becoming relatively non-
functional. 
From this "struotured complex of recollections", this 
"abstractive super-struoture of ideas", this "superord-
inate gestalt of interrelationships", are derived con-
cepts and functions like reality-testing, body image, 
oritical self-awareness, oognition of self, world, other 
people, time, space, logi.o, purpose, various inhibitions, 
conscious fears and defences; yet it is not equivalent 
to the many processes that derive from it, nor is it the 
mere sum total of them. It does not exist just to test 
reality but is an inner surrogate for reality; and it 
is only in te:~ms of the reality-orientation trJat the 
self and the world and the distinotion between then: can 
become meaningful. This generalised reality-orientation (GRO) 
is not inflexible. It has many faoets; and what appears 
in the central background of attention depends on the de-
mands of the immediate situation. Nevertheless, the re-
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mainder of the reality-orientation is still within the 
bounds of consciousness, is in cowmunication at all 
times. When close communication has f aded into relat-
ively non-funotional awareness, the resultant state of 
mind may be designated as trance. Hence, when the sub-
ject's attention is focussed on a small range of preoc-
cupations, certain behaviours can function in isolation. 
The concretisation, stimulus-boundedness and rieidity 
which occur when a brain-damaged person, for instance, 
no longer has functionally available the usual back-
ground to his behaviour, are parallelled in hypnosis by 
suggestibility and hypersuggestibility. The latter are 
not tlle primary processes of hypnosis but are derivative 
conse~uences of isolation. Hypnosis is an admixture of 
two fundamental processes, the construction of a special, 
temporary orientation to a small range of preoccup~tions 
and the relative fading of the GRO. 
The GRO never fades away completely either in trance or 
sleep. Any situation which calls forth vigilance rapidly 
reinstates it. One is not usually aware that it has 
faded; indeed, awareness re~uires its partial re"1obili-
sation. When it does fade, experiences cannot lJave their 
usual meaning and may acquire special meanings as a re-
sult of their isolation from the totality of experienoe. 
Likewise, special orientations or special tasks function 
as the only possible reality in his phenomenal awareness 
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if the subjeot is hypnotd.sed. 
As a oonsequenoe of the fading of the GRO, a person may 
oome or be brought oloser to the souroes of his non-
oonsoious funotioning. Various mental oontents exoluded 
before oan now flow more freely into phenomenal aware-
ness and primary-prooess material and modes of thought 
may flow into the baokground of awareness to orient' ex-
perienoes. These oapaoities and memories have been 
denied expression either by aotive repression or beoause 
they do not fit into the oonventional sohemata whioh are 
the "symbolio fabrio" of the waking mind. The orienta-
tion resulting from the free flow of primary prooess mat-
erial and modes of thought shares some of the qualities 
of the dream; and at this level, there is not only a 
greater possibility of experienoes whioh do not fit the 
usual reality-orientation but of new, speoial orienta-
tions being oonstruoted at profound levels, without re-
ferenoe to knowledge, logio or oritioal faoulties. 
2. 1. 1 CO~'Tf.ENT 
In t erms of the Speotrum of Consoiousness, the GRO is the 
end produot of the prooess whereby the organism at birth 
beoo~es aware of itself as distinot from its environment 
and other organisms and aoquires lithe internalised matrix 
of oultural premises, familial relationships, and sooial 
glosses •••• and the all-pervading sooial institutions 
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of language, logio, ethios and law", whioh oomprise its 
internalised sooiety at the level of the Biosooial 
Bands (1.4.4). Added to this are those experienoes and 
aotivities that are peouliar to the person himself, mak-
ing him uni~ue within his shared sooial or oultural oon-
text. To the extent that it (the generalised rea11ty-
orientation) is based on memory it is determining and 
li~iting, yet making up for these disadvantages by being 
stable. To the extent that personality oan be seen as 
a time gest9.lt (Angyal. 1965 ) so that events V111ioh h:we 
happened in ti,.ne oan aohieve new relationships in the 
whole in response to new experienoe or to st riving and 
oreating a harmonious, fulfilling and meaningful life, 
the GRO may be seen as dynar:lio and flexible. .\s Shor 
states, it develops slowly tl1roughout the li fe-oyole. 
In existel1tial terms, Frankl (1971) desoribes the sa[1e 
prooess of beooming and being human as follows: 
The essentially self-tr:msoendent quali ty of human 
existenoe renders man a being r eaohing out beyond 
himself. Therefore, if ~.~artin Buber •.• interprets 
hunan existenoe basioally in terms of a dialogue 
between I and ThOU, we must reoognise that this 
dialogue defeats itself unless I and Thou trans cend 
the:nselves to refer to a meaning outside tl1ernsel-
ves ... what enoounter one another are not tv/o mon-
ads but rather human beings of whioh one confronts 
the other with logos, that is, the meaning of being. 
(pp. 8 - 9) 
Angyal (1965) describes the prooe.ss of develop'llent from 
Existential to Ego level in a way that will be equally 
important for an understanding of the arguraent in later 
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ohapters. Through physiologioal maturation, disagree-
able sensations and limitations in manipulating the 
external world, the ohild moves from a state of oomplete 
embeddedness in the environment to a sense of his separ-
ateness, the differenoe between the "I" and the "non-I" . 
Though this results in anxiety, the sense of isolation 
provides the opportunity to beoome human beoause it re-
quires that he exeroise mastery and love to aohieve 
homonomy and autonomy; that is, to re-relate himt;elf to 
the world through loving relationships, whioh require 
separateness, and manipulation of his environment. 
While it oannot be said that the GRO is totally synony-
mous with the ego, the part of man's oonsoiousness with 
whioh he identifies and makes himself known to the world, 
it is olear that it is the vehiole through whioh the ego 
operates, defines itself and reveals itself. As Shor 
pOints out, it is only in terms of tnt:l C,RO that the self 
and the world and the distinotion between them oan beoome 
meaningful. 
2.2 REALITY, MYTH AND LANGUAGE 
It is neoessary, at this pOint, to examine very briefly 
the "reality" aspeot of the GRO. Shotter (1975) has 
pOinted out the importanoe to psyohologists of observine 
the distinotion that man is not a oreature living in 
nature but living in a oulture in nature. For every 
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person then, reality is relative to the cultural milieu 
in which he finds himself in that he shares with other 
members of it a common set of assumptions as to the nat-
ure of reality and a common language. The implications 
of this are that, once the basiC cultural frame of refer-
ence or paradigm has been established, it is very diffi-
cult for him to perceive in any other way, for the 
reality-orientation is not re-erected from its foundat-
ions each time he wakes. In so far as it is maintained 
by memory automatically it is in the true sense of the 
word a surrogate for reality. He no longer perceives 
directly in that input from the sense organs is tested 
against ttJe already established brain state and, unless 
it is in some way startlingly cJ.isllarate, is discarded -
and events which do not fit into his categories of what 
does exist may be ignored. The sense organs are essen-
tially organs of limitation. If this were not so man 
would be inundated by the stimuli available. Far from 
perceiving directly an "objective reality" man selects 
from the mass of information available and constructs a 
stable personal consciousness, this limitation having 
survival value in that he is able to act, manii.,ul<J.te, 
avoid danger and separate himself from others in a pre-
dictable world. 
As Blair (1975) asserts, man tends to perceive what he 
expects to perceive and it is what he believes to be 
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possi ble that influences what he sees and does. 1~yths 
then are a real part of perception, estab~ishing the 
limits within which man is able to know. Any myth too 
firmly held prevents him from perceiving in new ways. 
Unhappily the material world,in which technologically 
oriented man puts so much faith that he denies any pos-
sible reality in a mode of perception different from the 
linear, analytical and scientific one, depends on his 
brain for shape, colour and meaning; for what as~ails 
the sense organs is not colours, smells, sounds and 
shapes but pulses of energy all of the same kind of elec-
trical potential. 
On the role of' language as the means by which man com-
municates with his fellows and communes with his past, 
AldOUS Huxley's assessment is particularly eloquent: 
To formulate and express the contents of this re-
duced awareness, man has invented and endlessly 
elaborated those symbol systems and implicit phil-
osophies which we call languages. Every individual 
is at once the beneficiary and the victim of the 
linguistiC tradition into which he or she has been 
born - the beneficiary inasmuch as language gives 
access to the accumulated records of other people's 
experience, the victim in so far as it confirms him 
in the belief that reduced awareness is the only 
awareness and as it bedevils his sense of reality, 
so that he is all too apt to take his concepts for 
data, his words for actual things. That which, in 
the language of religion, is called 'this world' 
is the universe of reduced awareness, expressed and 
as it were, l!etrified by language. (Huxley, 196], 
pp. 21 -22) 
With this very much simplified information as to how man 
perceives himself within his world, it is possible to 
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have some inkling of how, according to Wilber : (1975), 
man in his headlong flight from death may corne to ident-
ify solely with the static symbols which comprise his 
existence at the Ego Level or even dissociate those parts 
of himself which he finds too painful to the Shadow, 
while he identifies with a very much impoverished Persona 
(1.4.5 - 1.4.6). 
2.3 CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE BICAMERAL MIND 
The emotional life of man and the other mammals is simi-
lar. Intellectual life, culture, history, religion and 
science are different from anything else known by scien-
tists in the universe. All life appears to have evolved 
to a certain pOint and then veered sharply in a differ-
ent direction. From the metaphysical pOint of view it 
is as if something were added to the closed system of 
evolution from an outside source, if a phenomenon as dif-
ferent as consciousness is to be explained. Julian 
Jaynes (1976) has, rather controversially, attempted to 
solve the problem in terms of natural science alone. 
Since he progresses from the postulation of what conscious-
ness is to theories on schizophrenia and types of mysti-
Cism and the role of the latter in SOCiety, his argument 
must be summarised here. Moreover, since it explores the 
role of language in the life of man, it takes Huxley's 
argument (2.2) a little further in a way that is partic-
ularly useful in explaining how man may corne to identify 
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solely with what Wilber calls the static symbols of the 
ego - how he may structure and explore his world through 
language, not merely in nature, but in a culture in nat-
ure. 
Language grows by metaphor, a metaphor or implied com-
parison being composed of a metaphrand, the thing des-
cribed, and a metaphier, the thing or relationship used 
to elucidate it. With use metaphors become labels and 
the function of metaphor is the generation of new lang-
uage as it is needed to deal with the increa sing complex-
i ty of human culture. Man'.3 powers of perception of [,i.:; 
~orld and his understanding of it are enormously increas-
ed by metaphors and, moreover, metaphor.3 literally create 
new objects. Language then, is an organ of perception 
as well as of communication, and man's command of it al-
lows an ever more subtle structuring of life and his 
interpretation of it. Abstract words are "ancient coins" 
whose "concrete images" (p. 51) have worn away with 
usage and the lexicon of language is a "finite set of 
terms that by metaphor is able to stretch out over an 
infinite series of circumstances, even to crea ting new 
circumstances thereby" (p. 52). The process gains cum-
ulative power by the existence of a transaction which 
can be described in terms of paraphriers (various assoc-
iations or attributes of the metaphier) and paraphrands 
(created by the paraphriers projecting back into the 
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metaphrand). Thus a metaphor by means of the associa-
tions interacting back and forth between metaphier and 
metaphrand becomes enriched and dynamic. One of the new 
circumstances created by the infinite capacity of the 
metaphor to extend itself in any context is, in Jaynes's 
opinion, consciousness itself. 
Understanding a thing is to arrive at a metaphor for that 
thing, that is, man explains it in terms of something he 
already knows, constructing theoretical models to under-
stand nature. A theory is a metaphor between a model 
and data. In their efforts to set up models for cons-
ciousness, scientists have made errors in their attempt-
ed metaphors, consciousness being thought of as a thing 
with a location (which it does not have in the physical 
sense), rather than as a process or an interaction. 
At this pOint, Jaynes introduces the concept of the ana-
log, a model the scientific purpose of which is to act 
as a hypothesis of explanation or understanding. An 
analog is at every point generated by the thing it is 
an analog of. Subjective conscious mind is an analog 
of what is called the real world. Its reality is of the 
same order as mathematics. It allows man to shortcut 
behavioural processes and arrive at more a~propriate de-
cisions. Like mathematics it is an operator rather than 
a thing or repository and it is purposive because it is 
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clearly linked with volition and decision. If mind space 
then is a metaphor of real space, it is the real "exter-
nal" world that is the metaphier. If metaphor generates 
consciousness, by the paraphrands of our verbal expres-
Sion, rather than merely describing it, then conscious-
ness is the metaphrand. Now a basic property of an 
analog is that the way it is generated is not the way it 
is used. Thus the functioning of consciousness is the 
return journey (in which presumably the external worle', 
may be seen as an analog of consciousness). Conscious-
ness becomes the metaphier full of our past experiences, 
constantly and selectively operating on the unknowns of 
future actions, deCisions, and partly remembered pasts. 
And it is by the generated structure of consciousness 
that we then understand the world. Consciousness posses-
ses the following features: 
(a) Spa tialisation, a mind-space metaphor. Man assumes. 
spaces in things without spatial ~uality in cons-
ciousness because he could not otherwise be conscious 
of them, for example, time. 
(b) Excerpti~n by whioh man selects aspects of his exper-
ience because consciousness is a metaphor of his ac-
tual behaviour. He is never conscious of things in 
their tn~e nature (he can only assume their exist-
ence),only of the excerpts he makes of them, which 
will depend on a number of variables, for example, 
whether or not he likes another person. It is dis-
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tinct from memory because it is in consciousness the 
representative of a thing or event to which memories 
adhere (cf. the functioning of Pribram's hologram, 1971) 
and by which we retrieve memories. This is reminis-
cence, a particular conscious process of which no 
animal is capable. 
(c) The analog "I", the metaphor man has of himself, 
which can act vicariously in the imagination, dOing 
things that man is not actually doing. It is not 
the behavioural, physical self which underst~nds a 
theory but the analog ".I". 
(d) The metaphor ''Me'' by means of which man catches 
glimpses of himself strolling down memory lan~., 
(e) Narratisation, which is the capacity of a man to 
write his own life story within his cultural and his-
torical context, selectively perceiving and excerpt-
ing those aspects of experience which are compatible 
with it. The assigning of motives according tc 
values is a part of this. 
(f) Conciliation, based on simple recognition, where a 
slightly ambiguously perceived object is made to 
conform to the already established schema. It brings 
things together as conscious objects just as narra-
tization creates a potential for unique meaning by 
allowing man to select the component parts of person-
ality and experience most compatible with the story 
he is writing about himself, metaphorically speaking. 
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In developing his model of consciousness Jaynes pOints 
out what consciousness is not. It is quite distinct 
from reactivity because man is conscious of what he is 
reacting to only from time to time, and some things 
like reflexes of the eye have no phenomenal component in 
consciousness at all. That it (consciousness) is con-
tinuous may be merely an illusion as man cannot be cons-
cious of when he is not conscious. Consciousness is not 
a mere copy of experience, nor is it recognition and re-
call, because conscious retrospection is not the retriev-
al of an image but the retrieval of what man has been 
conscious of before and the reorganising of t hese elements 
into rational and consistent patterns. Consciousness is 
not necessary for concepts which are simply classes of 
behaviourally equivalent things. Root conoepts are prior 
to experience. It is not necessary for learning and , in-
deed, inhibits some kinds of learning. Its r ole here is 
to take man into the task. Similarly, it is not neces-
s a ry for some types of thinking. The judgement of 
weights is unconscious. Man does his thinking before 
he knows wha t to think about. The impor Lant part is the 
instruotion which starts off a largely automatic process . 
Althoug~ traditionall~ consciousness has been the s ea t 
of reason, it is not necessary for reason. 
Beoause so much of man's brain function is aUGomatised, 
it is, in Jaynes's opinion, possible to conceive of a 
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race of men who spoke, judged, reasoned, solved problems 
but were not conscious at all; and he postulates, largely 
on the tenuous evidence of events described in The Iliad, 
in which the heroes heard the voices of gods, that such 
a race did exist. The mind of this bicameral man was 
split, the specialisation of the left cerebral hemisphere 
being to carry out the automatic actions that ~ake life 
possible, the specialisation of the right, the custodian 
of his experience, being to tell him what to do in emer-
gencies. These voices originating in the right cerebral 
hemisphere, which were actually the voices of his own 
experience, he identified with the gods. Hence when the 
gods spok.e to Achilles, they 11 terally spoke - a case 
of mistaken identity merely. The difference in modern 
man is that he has somehow integrated his experience 
with the achievement of consciousness so that it is read-
ilyavailable. (This fits in with Perry's comment, 1974, that 
at one time, the voice of authority as represented by 
religion was located outside of the person, while with 
the deCline of religion and the popularity of" situa-
tion ethics fl , decisions now have to be made within the 
realm of experience.) On the basis of his postulated 
bicameral mind, Jaynes explains schizophrenia and mysti-
cism as a partial return to a more atavistic mode of 
brain function, the one pathological and the other serv-
ing a social imperative and learned. 
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2.3.1 EVALUATION OF JAYNES'S THEORY 
The first and most obvious criticism that can be level-
led at Jaynes's formulation of the bicameral mind is his 
use of The Iliad as the basis for his theory. 
Kinsbourne (1977), in a highly entertaining review, has 
shown that The Iliad furnishes examples of self-
consciousness, as for instance when Achilles sulks in 
his tent when crossed in love and Ulysses, having de-
feated the Trojans by inventing the Trojan Horse, orders 
himself to be lashed to the mast so that he cannot re-
spond to the seductive songs of the sirens. Even with-
out an intimate knowledge of The Iliad and despite its 
oral transmission, it is clear that speech, even in the 
mouths of the gods (and Jaynes is quite explicit that 
they spoke out loud and clear), must presuppose a common 
language and gods a cosmology. Jaynes has failed to 
make allowance for poetiC licence and for the nature of 
the gods and heroes of which the Greeks sang. As 
Kinsbourne remarks, there is no mention of the same phe-
nomenon in women and the lower classes. In Greek myth-
ology, the intimacy of heroes and gods was perhaps a taCit 
acknowledgement of the godlike potential of ideal man or 
man's aspirations to acqUire god-like status. 
The second debatable aspect of the theory is that the 
sense of personal identi ty was lacking in Bicameral man, 
and that self-awareness is generated by metaphor alone. 
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Kinsbourne has cited studies which show that self recog-
nition seems bound up with the transition from monkey 
to ape, as chimpanzees and orangoutangs recognise them-
selves in mirrors. Moreover, reflecting surfaces ident-
ified as mirrors were present in cultures pre-dating 
that of the Greeks. Again with a little reflection, any-
body can see that when man retrospects, excerpts, narra-
tizes and communes wi th his metaphor "Me", the result 
contains more than words. The analog is composed of as-
pects that reflect the activity of the sense organs, 
hence an analog of the world and self could be based on 
some symbolic representation other than language. Early 
attempts at recording, such as pri~~tive drawings in 
caves, suggest this, unless the gods had appropriated the 
use of the left hand as well. Under certain circumstanc-
es man may find his sense of identity attenua ted but com-
mon sense sugges ts that he possesses the brain mechanisms 
which will separate him either from the natural world, 
or the group or the culture, according to his needs in 
the fight for survival. Consciousness, as modern re-
search tends to show, can be structured in many ways 
and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that, if 
a culture allows the existence of gods, the brain will 
provide the means by which they can be apprehended. 
What Jaynes's model of consciousness does very well is 
to show the way modern man's consciousness is structured. 
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It has become specialised to incorporate language as a 
tool both to create and understand his complex culture. 
The fact that he (Jaynes) admits that words themselves 
are a form of perception, suggests that N~nd (in the 
widest sense) as it is purposive, cannot be identified 
solely with the individual ego. Teilhard de Chardin 
(1970) for instance, has advanced a powerful argument 
for spirituality as the end towards which all evolution 
appears to have striven. Jaynes's account of the way 
man interacts with his world and culture and hews a per-
sonal identity for himself within the determinants of 
his knowledge and milieu, supports what has already been 
said in this chapter and in no way oonflicts with theor-
ies of personality which postulate that man seleots from 
the input available to build up a oonsistent sense of 
self, and dissooiates the rest. It is only by some suoh 
theory that the phenomenon of dissooiated personality 
oan be explained. While data reaohing the brain may be 
discarded or ignored for the purposes of everyday cons-
oiousness, it can be postulated that the input is never-
theless stored. 
Jaynes makes the interesting point that, since conscious-
ness has no locality in the brain, the plaoe where it is 
experienced is arbitrary. He dismisses cut-of-the-body 
experienoes as a funotion of this quality. His assumpt-
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ion is to some extent supported by findings which show 
this type of experience to be more common in vivid vis-
ualisers, especially in children, non-bookish adults and 
women (Heywood, 1968~). If however, as Koestler (1973) 
has suggested, consciousness is somehow independent of 
time and space while linked to the material brain, so 
that it can be located or projected anywhere, it is pos-
sible that there is a different consciousness, as Jung 
-(Fordham, 1966) and ,Wilber (1.4) postulate, shared by 
the group and perhaps by all mankind, with a purposive-
ness other than that of individual purposiveness, yet 
intimately bound up with the latter. Jaynes sta tes, in 
describing how metaphor operates as an instrument cf 
perception, tha~ it moves out synchronically (1. e. inde-
pendent of time) to eXlllore the external world. The 
following example from Moss (1976) suggests that the 
vehicle of metaphor and mind may even move backwards (or 
forwards) in time and this rather colourful evidence may 
serve as a correotive to Jaynes's tendency to reduction-
ism: 
Mrs. Pearl Curran, a St. Louis housewife with an 
eight-grade education, was invited •• , in 1912 to 
play the "ouija board game" with a group of friends. 
As soon as she joined them, the boa rd became very 
active indeed. The friends continued the game for 
about two years, sometimes getting nons ense, but 
occasionally "receiving a message" that could be 
verified. Then suddenly, one day, came the state-
ment: _ "Many moons ago I lived. Again I come. 
Patience Worth my name." Patience Worth stayed for 
five years, fir~t with Mrs. Curran and friends at 
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the oU~Ja board, and then with Mrs. Curran alone, 
through automatic writing. Patience Worth "dictat-
ed" more than a million and a half words, in six-
teenth century English, prose and poetry, novels and 
stories, which critics hailed as having high liter-
ary merit. Most of these are extant and are avail-
able at libraries. One poem, "Telka", (of about 
70 000 words) is written in a dialect used t~ree 
centuries ago, containing a high percentage of 
Anglo-Saxon words. An analysis of the language made 
by Professor C.H.S. Schiller of London Universit~' 
demonstrates that the vocabulary contained no word 
used later than the year 1600. SChiller comments: 
"When we Q,qnsider that the Authorised Version [of 
the Bibl&Jhas only 70% Anglo-Saxon, and it is nec-
essary to go back to Layomon1l20j! to equal Patience 
Worth's percentage, we realise we are faoe-to-face 
with a philological miracle." 
Parapsychologist Dr. Walter F. Prince made a lengthy 
study of Mrs. Curran and published his observations 
as The Case of Patience Worth with this conclusion: 
"Either our concept of what we call the subconscious 
mind must be radically altered so as to include pot-
encies of which we hitherto had no knowledge, or 
else some cause operating through but not originat-
ing in, the subconscious of Mrs. Curran must be 
acknowledged." (pp. 240 - 241) 
CHAPTER 3 
SCHIZOPHRENIA 
I am but mad north-north-west; when the wind 
is southerly I know a hawk from a handsaw. 
Shakesppare: Hamlet 
3. A MODEL FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA? 
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Research in schizophrenia can be a very confusing exper-
ience to the uninitiated. By the time a patient presents 
himself for treatment, there is a vast range of inter-
action - the sum of the person's life strategy to date 
- to examine; and it is not surprising that such factors 
as genetics, parent-child relationships, parental person-
ality, family environment and interaction, social envir-
onment, social isolation, social mobility, intra-psychic 
trauma, learning, vitamin deficiency, and an over-
exposure to food additives resulting in masked food al-
lergy have been studied with reference to their possible 
role in the etiology of schizophrenia. It may well -De 
that many factors can be seen to have contributed to the 
end product of personality disorganisation that the per-
son has become. Some of these theories are very per-
suasive, yet fall down when they claim to have the only 
answer. 
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A second confusing factor has already been mentioned -
the casual equating of an influential psychiatrist dnd 
theorist, sullivan's,apparently precognitive remark 
with his being a schizophrenic. Another example of what 
appears to be loose thinking about schizophrenia is the 
assumption that what psychologists would call psychotic 
behaviour is reverenced in other cultures or sub-cultures. 
Among the amaXhosa, persons who experience phenomena of 
this apparently pathological type are told by the witch-
doctor that they are being called by t heir ancestors to 
become diviners (Kruger, 1977). Some persons, on the 
strength of this information, assume too readily tha t, 
were schizophrenics to live in another culture, they 
might find a role through which to channel and give r.1ean-
ing to their, presumably extrasensory, gifts, discrimi-
nated against in their own oppressive cultural milieu. 
The inconvenient fact that members of this same tribe, 
hospitalised for schizophrenia, say that they began to 
experience this process, called ~asa, but became schizo-
phreniCS rather than diviners is ignored (Kruger, 1977). 
The implications of this are that all that looks like 
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~wasa is not 1wasa, that the witchdoctor has no category 
into which to place the "failed" diviners and that the 
schizophrenic will tend to explain the phenomena he 
experiences in terms of his cwn knowledge. There is a 
difference between a social phenomenon and a schizo~. 
phrenic phenomenon. 
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This sort of confusion is understandable in terms of 
the influence of the ideas of the anti-psychiatry theor-
ists like Szaz and Laing on the eager but uninformed mind 
of tile student; but it does leave him with a very vague 
idea about what schizophrenia is. In fact, he may even 
come to see schizophrenia as a status symbol. 1fultigene 
theories are postulated to explain what looks like a 
link between schizophrenia and creativity. In an attempt 
to accommodate what can only be seen as an increasingly 
inclusive and wide range of ideas about this condition 
or way of being in the world, Forrest (1975) proposes the 
following model: 
But Claridge (1972) has made it easier by suggesting 
that what is inherited is only the schizoid trait, 
a trait which when allied with superior intelligence, 
can lead to unusual creativity in the intellectual 
sphere because of the unexpected associations between 
words and thoughts. 
The schizoid subject, using another frame of refer-
ence, does not need to sLrive for early closure: 
a problem can be lefL in an ambiguous state, neither 
solved nor yet unsolved. 
The model then proposed now Lsis! is that an inher-
ited trait, the schizoid trait, directs the indiv-
idual towards intellectual pursuits, an interest in 
ideas and objects rather than an interest in people. 
Associated with this trait, especially in the pre-
sence of superior intelligence, is the tendency to 
an unusual or personalised use of language, t he 
capacity to make unusual connections between diffe-
rent ideas and, LSis! concepts, the potential for 
literary, artistic and scientific creativity. 
On the other hand this trait associated with more 
modest intelligence or an advers e f amily lea rning 
experience would predispose the indi vidual to cer-
tain forms of psychiatric illness, ranging from 
schizoid personality di sorders through obsessional 
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and hysterical illness to manifest schizophrenia. 
(pp. 11 - 12) 
This model is clearly exactly the kind tha t could l ay 
itself open to abuse by the ethically and politically 
unprincipled. There is evidence to suggest, for examp-
le, tha t purely political deviance could be seen as men-
tal illness in a sta te like Russia (Wing , 1978). There 
is also the temptation to assume on rea~ing t he model 
in conjunction with Laing's works that the schizophrenic 
is in hospital because he is creative. Becoming schizo-
phrenic can hardly be seen as a valid creative sta nce 
except by the highly motivated. Schizophrenia in great 
artists like Nijinsky, for example, led to impairment of 
creativity and Foucault s aw madness as the ultima te 
break with the work of art (cited in Wing , 1978) . While 
the argument that the role of chronic schizophrenic 
thrust upon the inmate of a mental hospital confirms him 
in his maladaptive approach to life is sound, the argu-
ment that the roles that society imposes on its members 
prevent the latter from adopting their own creative 
stance in life (Foudraine, 1974), is dubious. It can 
be argued tha t without an internalised social frame of 
reference, there can be no life. Indeed, Laing (1967), 
who does not deny that schizophrenia exists, claims that 
the schizophrenic chooses existential death in what is 
f or him an un1iveab1e situa tion . . Szaz argues tha t men-
tal illness is a myth; Kety counters this assertion by 
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saying that if it is a myth, it is a myth with a strong 
genetic component (cited in Wing, 1978). That it is a 
myth seems denied by the daily experience of clinicians; 
and it cannot be subject to this age alone, as is evi-
denced by the device of the ship of fools described by 
Foucault (1967). 
What stance should be taken on schizophrenia then? The 
only starting point in this writer's view is to accept 
that it is an abstraction which becomes relevant as a 
category only when a person who exhibits symptoms that 
have come to be associated with the syndrome presents 
himself or is presented for treatment because he has 
ceased to function effectively. Applied to persons in 
. other contexts it has no m~aning. It should be appre-
ciated that the concept of mental health is itself an 
abstraction, which not oniy suggests the flexibility 
and range of behaviour possible within the framework of 
Western society but also that attempts to enforce rules 
of optimal personality development and to apply labels 
to the population in general are at the very least mis-
guided and probably a sign of what Wing (1978) would 
call medical (and psychological) expansionism. Moreover, 
madness is a lay term which can be applied to behaviours 
ranging from inspirational to eccentric of which the 
speaker disapproves. Schizophrenia within the medical 
model is a much more precise term. In fact a schizo-
phrenic may be completely sane in any lay sense of the 
term (Wing, 1978). 
60 
Wing argues most cogently for a model with a disease 
theory at its centre and, while not denying that it can 
be abused, says that it is the best way to ensure that 
no purely socia l phenomena are included. Moreover, he 
demonstrates that such a model, far from bein8 antagon-
istic to the most useful insights of other theories ca n 
very easily absorb them to best advantage. 
A favourite criticism of the medical model is that it 
is entirely dependent on a description of symptoms and 
cannot demonstrate a definite brain lesion in t he schizo-
phrenic. According to the anti-psychiatry school the 
psychiatrist is not justified in assuming that, because 
brain tumours, temporal lobe epilepsy, general paresis 
and organiC brain disease give rise to simila r symptoms, 
schizophrenia must be caused by some specific defect in 
brain functioning. It could equally well be argued that 
this is not an entirely illogical assumption, and is a 
sensible reason for putting forward a theory that ca n be 
subjected to proof. That the searoh has thus far been 
inconclusi ve is not a reason for abandoning it. r,lore-
over, t he description of symptoms has in the past pre-
ceded the discovery of the underlying causes in many 
diseases. The most promising field in this search, is 
in biochemistry. Accounts of ho~ a schizophrenic child 
was restored to normal functioning through megavitamin 
therapy (Foy, 1971) or of how a leucotomy was prevented 
61 
by the disoovery of food allergies in the patient 
(MaoKarness, 1976) somehow oarry more oonviotion tha n 
an aooount of an hysterio, misdiagnosed as SOllizophrenio, 
(Wing, 1978) being oured naturally through the Laingian 
method of tile inner journey into the self to allow the 
warped personality to grow up again (Barnes & Berke, 1973). 
Another oritioism of this model is that psyohiatrists 
oannot agree among themselves as to what symptoms just-
ify a diagnosis of sohizophrenia. For example, sohizo-
phrenia may be diagnosed twioe as often in the U.S.A. 
as in Britain, given the same group of patients, and 
this oauses oonfusion among readers of researoh paper3, 
as they oannot be sure that sohizophrenia as they know 
it is aotually being treated (Baker, 1975). Another 
result of this is that a large amount of British and 
Amerioan researoh is not oomparable (Kennedy, 1975). 
Wing (1978) pOints out that oonsiderable advanoes have 
been made in this respeot in the last ten years. He 
oites a study based on a st~ndardised form of the psy-
ohiatrio diagnosl;io interview, the Present State :2xam-
ination CP.S.E.). Researoh psychiatrists speaking lang-
uages as diverse as Chinese, Hindi, Russian and Yorubi, 
oarried out intel'views wi th aoutely ill patients in nine 
different parts of the world and their diagnoses were 
oompa red with results using the oomputer refer enoe olas-
sifioation of P.S.E. known as CATEGO. The discrepanoy 
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was only 10 perc:;ent~. The three broad groupings of 
schizophrenia, mania and depression can ' therefore be 
reliably differentiated from one another and it is pos-
sible to state quite precisely what the descriptive cri-
teria defining each type of syndrome are. \Vhile this 
does not necessarily prove the validity of the criteria, 
it does demonstrate the recognisability and reproduci-
bility of the descriptive symptoms of schizophrenia and 
that it is possible to recognise the central groups re-
gardless of the language of interview, the culture of 
patients, and the school of psychiatrists. While the 
discrepancy between seven of the centres and the CATEGO 
classification was 4,5 perbent; it was 29,5 percent in 
Moscow and Washington. In America the prevailing con-
cept of schizophrenia is much broader, including large 
parts of what British psychiatrists call depressive ill-
ness, neurotic illness and personality disorder and al-
most the whole of mania. In Moscow, psychiatrists are 
also regarded as having a broader concept, owing to the 
use of special categories such as "sluggish", "periodic" 
and "shift-like" schizophrenia. 
The most highly discriminating symptoms which, when pre-
sent, make the probability 90 p~rcent: that a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia will 'De given are: thought insertion, 
thought broadcast, and thought withdrawal, auditory hal-
lucinations of a particular kind and delusions of con-
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trol. Other symptoms may be present and are not ignored 
when the diagnosis is made but these can often be seen 
as a reaction to the primary ones, an attempt by the 
patient to make sense of what is happening to him (ibid). 
Thought insertion is the schizophrenic's experience that 
thoughts that are not his own are intruding into his 
mind. This is not the same as believing that an extern-
al agency is causing him to have thoughts of a partic-
ular l;:ind; the thoughts themselves do not belong to him. 
Wing (1978) states that this is as close as one can get 
to a non-social phenomenon since a large-scale survey of 
the general population does not turn up anybody who has 
ever experienced it. In discussing another first rank 
symptom, delusions of control, when the patient notices 
that his will has been replaced by that of another, Wing 
pOints out that, while for the schizophrenic this is 
thoroughly unpleasant, it can be experienced as an enhan-
cement of will, when a similar phenomenon, which is a 
social phenomenon, occurs. He gives the example of a 
Chinese priestess in Formosa who described how, when 
she went into a trance, she was possessed by a god which 
direoted her speeoh and aotions. She was not, of oourse, 
diagnosed as sohizophrenio. 
It seems logical that the way to combat abuse of the 
medical model is not to widen the definition to include 
all sorts of phenomena whioh may have a superficial sim-
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ilarity but to narrow the range of symptoms and refine 
the use of the diagnostic tool thus constructed. While 
Foucault (1967) has demonstrated persuasively the puni-
tive elements in the organisation of the early mental 
hospitals and the latter's tendency to the indiscriminate 
punishment of the deviant has been colourfully portrayed 
in the novel by Kesey (1973), too little attention has 
been paid to the initial humane intentions behind the 
establishment of asylums as a protection for ' those who 
might otherwise have been locked in cupboards or chained 
to bedsteads 'by embarrassed and exasperated rela ti ves or 
burnt at the stake for witchcraft or totally ostracised. 
The use of the fool as a literary device in Shakespeare's 
King Lear is effective as a comment on the "sane" world; 
but the romantic and impractical desire to return to the 
good old days would probably not be shared by many schiz-
ophrenics. At one level the medical model is undoubted-
ly helpful because in labelling people it can more ef-
fectively prescribe treatment and forecast the prognosis 
in conditions which may look very similar - process 
schizophrenia, reactive schizophrenia, a bad trip. The 
mentally retarded, the manic, the depressed, the senile, 
the schizophrenic are no longer forced indiscriminately 
to sail in t he- same ship, as of old. 
3.1. THE PROPER APPLICATION OF ANTI-PSYCHIATRY 
If the medical model is the one preferred, does this 
" 
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mean that the insights of the anti-psyohiatry theorists 
have no relevanoe? Foudraine (1974) has shown that be-
sides their obvious value in shaking psyohiatrists out 
of oomplaoenoy, they are a healthy correc~ive to the 
nihilistic attitude to sohizophrenics who may in some 
hospitals be ignored, dehumanised and isolated because 
personnel believe they are suffering from an incurable 
brain disease and so have moved beyond the pale of' human 
communication and understanding. Foudraine indulged in 
an experiment in what Popper (oited in Foudraine, 1974) 
has called "pieoemeal social engineering", a concept he 
contrasts with "utopian" or "holistic social engineering", 
a measure very popular among the anti-psychiatry support-
ers. Popper believes that the latter is in conflict with 
a truly scientific attitude. 
One of the differences between the Utopian or holis-
tic approach and the piecemeal approach may there-
fore be stated in this way: while the piecemeal 
engineer can attack his problem with an open mind 
as to the scope of the reform, the holist cannot do 
this; for he had LSig7 decided beforehand that a 
complete reconstruction is possible and necessary. 
(Foudraine, 1974, p. 310) 
Foudraine set out to demythologise a ward in his charge. 
A schizophreniC, having been hospitalised, has not only 
his primary handioap (his condition) to deal with. He 
brings with him also the seoondary handicap of the path-
ological attitudes developed by himself and those around 
him in response to his illness, leading to fUrther social 
incapacity resulting from lack of self-respect, apathy 
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about the future 'and resentment and depression, whioh 
may be the refleotion of his reaotion to how others see 
him (Wing, oited in Kennedy, 1975). The symptoms of 
the ohronio oondition may be present before any aoute 
attaok takes plaoe. These may inolude traits suoh as 
emotional apathy, slowness of thought and movement, un-
deraotivity, laok of drive, poverty of speeoh, sooial 
withdrawal, wooden faoial expression, monotonous voioe, 
stiff bodily posture and gait, inooherenoe of s.peeoh, 
unprediotability of assooiation and long-standing hal-
luoinations and delusions. Sooial performanoe at vir-
tually any task, oreative, routine and personal, may be 
impaired depending on the degree of intrinsio handioap 
(Wing, 1978). Clearly, in a rejeoting sooial environ-
ment, development along the dimensions of homonomy and 
autonomy will be severely warped. Foudraine (1974) 
notioed that "ego weakness" is a oharaoteristio of ohron-
io sohizophrenics and adopted White's model of oompeten-
oy to explain it. White (oited in Foudraine, 1974) post-
ulates that therapists need a psyohosexual, an inter-
personal and a oompetenoy model to explain human behaviour 
adequately. He interprets the restless, exploratory, 
manipulative aotivity of the ohild as an expression of 
energy that he oalls effeotance. He defines competenoy 
in the following way. 
The oumulative product of one's histo~J of effioa-
oies and ineffioaoies. It oomes to operate in new 
behaviour as a kind of set: [Siy We judge whether 
or not we can jump over the brook or oarry out a 
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proposed task. It also comes to be much cherished, 
so that we feel truly elated at new proofs of our 
ability, or deeply humiliated when we cannot do 
something we supposed was within our power. 
(Foudraine, 1974. p. 270) 
In White's view too much attention has been paid to in-
fan tile fantasies in the theory of self esteem and too 
little to a frame of referenoe with an action theory at 
its centre. In adverse oiroumstanoes (interpreted dif-
ferently according to t he school the therapist belongs 
to) t he child does not get a chanoe to deve16p a sense 
of socio-cultural competence. He is left with an in-
abili ty to Ii ve a life of his own. According to Foud-
raine, while the prevailing treatment milieu alleges 
that its aim is to strengthen the patient's ego, the 
forces in psychiatric institutions where the emphasis 
is on smooth running and good behaviour do just the op-
posite, placing him in the "sick role " and confirming 
his sense of inadequacy. 
Foudraine places the relationship between patient and 
analyst firmly at the centre of treatment. This is 
understandable as the analyst or therapist in a sense 
teaches the patient his oVin life story, which, nO matter 
what the model used, is likely to be far more congruent 
with his culture than his own account of hims elf, his 
experience often differing r adically from tha t of his 
associates outside the hospital. Foudraine found that 
the work done by the ana lyst for one hour a day wa s sys-
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tematically undone by the staff during the other twenty-
three because of the symbiotic relationships between 
some aides and patients and because patients and staff 
were so locked in their roles of staff (well) and pat-
ients (sick). Using Vbry directive methods, whic!l forced 
patients to take resllonsibili ty for the results of their 
"crazy'.' actions, bUilding up their sense of competence 
by making them take an active part in cleaning, cooking 
and gardening, increasing their self-esteem by making 
the nurses discard their uniforms as a means to more open 
communication, and including them in what had previously 
been private talk about them and even changing the lang-
uage used frcm words with medical connotations to words 
with educational connotations, he was able to produce 
considerable improvement in their condition and the 
morale of the staff. 
It seems that this is the proper area of appli0ation of 
existentidl and phenomenological inSights and for the 
valid stance that schizophrenics are people and should 
be treated with respect and also firmness. Lest the 
more energetic measures employed by Foudraine i n the re-
habilitation of his schizophrenics, (ruined by the bad 
effects of institutionalism), call forth militant cries 
for a better deal for schizophrenics, it should be re-
membered that ffian is only free and human through an ac-
ceptance of his cultural framework,and education into 
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that framework must often be quite rigorous. Both Martin 
Buber (cited in Gray, 1977) and Heidegger (cited in 
Frankl, 1971) have pOinted out the errors of subjectiv-
ism. Storr (1963) has commented that there is no group 
of persons so laoking in individuality as a ward of 
ohronio sohizophrenic patients, for it is in interaotion 
with the world and others that man finds himself. 
3.2 THE RELEVANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF THE GENERAL-
ISED REALITY-ORIENTATION (GRO) 
In terms of Wilber's Speotrum of Consciousness (1.4), 
mOdels of sohizophrenia oan be seen as operating between 
those levels designated Existential (1.4.3), Biosooial 
Bands (1.4.4) and Ego (1.4.5). These approximate at any 
given moment the person's development from birth, when 
self and environment are not clearly differentiated; 
through socialisation to the end product of Ego, wi1ioh 
is, of course, not a oompletely static oonstruot. The 
level - of the Biosooial Bands is oruoial in effeoting 
the transformation by whioh man beoomes, not a creature 
in nature but a oreature living in a oulture in nature. 
They are the "internalised matrix of cultural premises, 
familial relationships, and social glosses, as well as 
the all-pervading sooial institutions of language, logie, 
ethiCS, and law .•. those aspeots of the organism's sooial 
environment that it has introjected aoross the organism-
environment boundary of the Existential Level" (Wilber, 
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1975, p. 109) - the internalised society which profound-
ly colours and moulds the organism's basic sense of 
existence. They comprise as an end result the phenomen-
ally flexible GRO (2.1) which, while not totally synon-
ymous with the ego, is the vehicle by which man identi-
fies and reveals himself to his world and by which his 
world identifies and reveals itself to him at any speci-
fic time in a specifi,c culture. It is the inner surro-
ga te for reali ty, maintained effortlessly and, uncons-
ciously, comprising the usual contents of waking con-
sciousness and presumably based on memory. In states 
of fatigue or hyper-preoccupation, its supportive energy 
diminishes and it fades into the background of attention; 
but it is always available should it be needed. All 
important psychological concepts and functions are de-
rived from it. Based on automatisation, it, to some 
degree, sacrifices immediacy of perception for the advan-
tage of a stable inner world. Otherwise man would be 
inundated by stimuli. 
One of the implications (for this study), of the GRO as 
a concept is that its existence as a tool for attention 
to the outside world is dependent not only on the com-
plex social and cognitive skills that give it its shape 
but also on normal physiological brain functioni ng . If 
the latter i s present, the forrr.er should be available 
also. (A great deal of learning is acquired unccnscious-
71 
ly and automatioally and is also applied automatically.) 
The presence of the former, however, does not guarantee 
the latter and in the presence of organic brain dysfunc-
tion it may become warped in a number of ways, no matter 
how optimally the person was able to develop bis compe-
tence and interpersonal skills. 
There are several reasons for this writer's suspicion 
that in scbizophrenia, the mecbanisms that control the 
maintenance of a stable GRO are defective. These reasons 
are not formally linked but take on the appearance of a 
fragmentary jigsaw puzzle. This type of solution is 
capable of absorbing insights from other levels of per-
sonality development and explaining them . Other mOdels 
are not nearly as comprehensive. 
Smythies' (1975) view on the biochemical model is as fol-
lows: 
It seems generally agreed that what is inherited 
is a predisposition to develop schizophrenia and 
that other factors (e.g. intrauterine, minimal 
birth injury, stress) are involved in many cases. 
In which case it is most likely that some defect-
ive enzyme system or systems are involved, as gen-
etic faults nearly always express themselves in 
this manner. It is also unlikely that a condition 
so amorphous, ill-defined and whose nosology is 
based entirely on symptom complexes, should turn 
out to represent the phenotypic expression of only 
one genotypic abnormality. The biochelD.Luo.l mech-
anisms controlling the l{inds of brain function and 
behaviour that go wrong in schizophrenia are like-
ly to be very complex, and faulty enzyme(s) at any 
one of a number of different key loci might -oe ex-
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pected to derange the machinery in such a way that 
a 'final common path' t~pe of disordered behaviour 
results. (pp. 51 - 52) 
McGhie (cited in McGuire, 1975) asserts that schizophren-
ics have suffered a breakdown in the filter mechanism 
which limits sensory input to a level at which the decis-
ion channel in the brain can deal with it. An alternat-
ive theory developed by Broen and Storm (cited in 
McGuire, 1975.) is that the ceiling of response strength 
is low in schizophrenics. Under pressure they very eas-
ily reach the response ceiling and the most suitable 
response of a number of possible responses is no longer 
dominant. This leads to bewilderment and inappropriate 
reactions. 
Schizophrenics ar~ noted for an idiosyncratic use of 
language. This is sometimes seen as similar to creat-
ivity. However, combined with evidence that they appear 
to have most difficulty with abstract concepts and least 
with concrete words, it is legitimate to suggest that, 
since the use of language itself is dependent on automa-
tisation, the mechanisms controlling the latter may be 
faulty. Imagination is also dependent on automatisation. 
That the inner map of the schizophrenic is not sustained 
is suggested by the fact that some schizophrenics cannot 
do tasks like pretending to drink from a glass in which 
there is no water. This suggests depletion of fantasy 
life rather than an increase in it. There is evidence 
. , 
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to show that schizophrenic thought is not only different 
from normal thinking but also different from his own 
thinking at another time. Bannister's theory of thought 
disorder is that it is a form of loose construing and, 
because it is loose, it is inconsistent (cited in r,:cGuire, 
1975) • 
Venables (cited in Wing, 1978) discovered that chronic 
schizophrenic impairment, particularly social withdraw34 
was accompanied unexpectedly by what appeared to be over-
arousal. (Schizophrenics appear to be less anxious than 
most other people on account of unvarying facial express-
ion and tone of voice and because they tend not to use 
nonverbal me:'ins of indicating emotion.) The more with-
drawn they were, the more physiologically anxious the 
sufferers appeared to be, having a wetter handshalce and 
faster heart rate. This accords with the view of Jaynes 
(1976) that the schizophrenic is genetically deficient 
in an enzyme that allows the metabolic by-products of 
stress to be evacuated. Moreover, schizophrenic patients 
appear unduly upset by any unexpected event and even 
stimulation like occupational therapy, deSigned to over-
come the negative effects of institutionalism, can pre-
Cipitate an acute attack if they are too demanding. 
Wing (1978) suggests that the unusual interaction and 
behaviour within the family, such as walking around at 
night and sleeping during the day can be seen as a pro-
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tective device because the schizophrenic is unable to 
deal with the stress of a too emotional or intrusive re-
lative. The more usual view is that the mother refuses 
to allow the child independence owing to her own emot-
ional conflicts and that the child may connive at thi s 
if the relationship is symbiotic. 
The schizophr enic does not show the usual RE]~ rebound 
following deprivation of REM sleep, the period of sleep 
in which dreams occur (Smythies, 1975). Rosen (1951) 
saw the schizophrenic as a dreamer. K. Jung (cited in 
Wing, 1978) suggested that an impairment of attention 
with a consequent release of unconscious associations 
seemed to fit many of the phenomena of schizophrenia. 
This accords well with Shor's account (2.1) of how, when 
the energy supporting the GRO is at a lolY ebb as in hyp-
nogogic and deep hypnotic sta tes, primary process think-
ing and odd ass ociations come to the fore. 
Many persons appear to have healthy relationships and 
self-concepts until they suffer an acute schizophrenic 
a ttaclc in early adulthood. Many others may be withdrawn 
and isolated but never become schizophrenics, even under 
severe stress. Again, the logical place t o look for 
malfunctioning is in t he biochemical and physiological 
maintenance of the GRO. 
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If it were decided to reject the common sense stance 
that normal brain functioning will automatically provide 
persons with interpersonal and cogni ti ve slcills in the 
normal development of the GRO (and it is astonishing to 
see how persons who are eager to accept physiological 
explanations to deny the validit:l' of mystical experience, 
will show a perverse refusal to entert~in the notion of 
such a factor in sChizophrenia), the concept is still 
capable of accommodating all the theories put forward 
by other schools. For example, a symbiotic relationship 
with a dominant mother may prevent the construction of 
of a healthy GRO along the dimensions of homonomy and 
autonomy (2.1.~). 
The following will suffice as an example of the useful-
ness of the GRO, once its implications are understood. 
The psychodynamic and interpersonal approach might read: 
the schizophrenic, through isolation and other trauma 
has turned his attention inward and the GRO has become 
so distorted as regards meaning st.ructure by comparison 
with that of his fellows that only intensive re-education 
will rehabilitate him. A psycho-physiological model 
might read as fo llows. The energy support of the GRO i5 
intermittent or inadequate to maintain the schizophrenic 
in a state of optimal waking consciousness as normally 
functioning persons experience it. Anyone who has per-
ceived a stimulus in the waking process, given it an in-
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terpretation or identified it in the hypnopompic frame 
of reference and then been conscious of its gradual but 
perceptible fading into its rightful place in relation 
to a now fully reconstituted GRO, will realise t he im-
plications in preventing the growth to maturity and self-
confidence of the schi zophrenic. If the energy t hat 
supports the GRO is inadequate, it means a world of per-
ceptiorJO> wnich ca nnot be interpreted with any degree of 
confidence since the pa th they t a ke through th'e hologram 
(to adopt Pribram's, ,1971" model of brain functioning) 
will be idiosyncratic and dreamlike in quality, with 
chance stimuli such as knoclcs at the door precipitating 
the person into fantasy-mimicking explanations or alter-
natively, hallucinations. This is not withdrawal into 
fantasy but involuntary dreaming. 
Jaynes's model of sohizophrenia as a partial return to 
the bicameral mind (2.3), has the same advantages a s tre 
use of the GRO and rivals it in simplicity. As has a l-
ready been mentioned, he sees the schizophrenic as being 
preCipita ted into psychosis by a genetic inability to 
metabolise the biochemical products of continued stress. 
He explains the distress caused by the deterioration of 
consciousness in the enforced return to bicamerality in 
terms of the loss of the analog "I", and subsequent loss 
of ego boundaries, sense of time, mind space and the 
ability to narratise. To one who has never experienced 
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a true bicameral existence a loss of these aspects of 
consciousness is very confusing since enough of the old 
structures remain for him to be aware of the difference. 
Auditory hallucinations of an authoritative and relig-
ious kind are a sign of underlying bicamerality. 
The reasons for choosing the GRO in preference to Jaynes's 
model as the central concept in the analysis of ~he rela-
tionship between mysticism and schizophrenia are based on 
the reservations expressed in the evaluation of his theory 
(2.3.1). Jaynes relies too heavily on the role language 
plays in the generation of consciousness and his evidence 
for the existence of the bicameral mind is not convincing. 
In fact, his picture of tireless automatons building the 
Pyramids of Egypt or the Ziggurats of Suma in the service 
of some unconscious social imperative would make sense 
only if he acknowledged the actual existence of ~·i1ind at 
Large and the vOices as those of actual gods rather than 
as those of man's own experience. It was suggested that 
symbolic representations other than language and based 
on the data of the sense organs could have allowed man 
to differentiate himself from the world and others and 
given him self-consciousness. The GRO is able to absorb 
Jaynes's theory and make up the deficit. Although our 
perception of our environment is inside ourselves and i s 
a surrogate for reality built up ·through action in time, 
we experience ourselves quite consciously, not only ver-
bally as he suggests, but also as moving in a three di-
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mensional world, mapped presumably by means of space, 
time, kinaesthetio and other co-ordinates and remembered 
in terms of those co-ordinates. 
The relevance of the GRO for this study is that it is a 
convenient shorthand term, the implications of which in-
oorporate everything we know and are. Hence schizophre-
nia oan be seen usefully as a mode of being out of touch 
with reality and being subject to extraordinary events. 
The GRO is not automatically reconstituted once lost or 
has never functioned optimally, the result being mental 
and sooial crippling. In non-schizophrenics the opposite 
is the case. 
3.J PSYCHOANALYTICAL MODELS OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 
It has been stated that the relationship between patient 
and therapist is indispensable to his rehabilitation. 
Beoause doctors ana other staff in mental hospitals as-
sume that the patient's statements are meaningless and 
find their inflation and other "crazy" behaviours embar-
rassing, they tend sometimes to rely on chemotherapy 
alone, which leads to an artificial rather than an auth-
entic adjustment. They forget that patients, withdrawn 
into the ASC which is acute schizophrenia, need empathy 
and support. Perry (1974) mentions the case of Perceval, 
son of an aristocratic English family, who experienced 
madness for several years. He reported that, when his 
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experience became tco strange, others shrank from it and 
their withdrawal and rejection drove him further into 
his madness. Sechehaye (1951) wrote that when she at-
tempted to reach Renee, her chronic schizophrenic patient, 
by way of rational explication of her condition, which 
Renee was intellectually capable of understanding, the 
latter was driven further into autism. Sechehaye con-
cluded that since the patient did not understand her 
language, she must use the patient's. The process by 
which Renee made her needs known and Sechehaye satisfied 
them, the latter called "symbolic realisation". Foudraine 
(1974) also insists that, once over the initial difficul-
ty, the doctor can learn to understand the patient's 
private use of language. If then there is a need to en-
ter the patient's phenomenology, it would seem that the 
therapist might use the phenomenological approach alone 
- in practice he probably does so to some degree. Wnat 
then is the pOint of complicated psychoanalytical models 
at all? Presumably, they act as guidelines for the ther-
apist himself, as a means to aid his understanding of the 
phenomena with which he deals. To enter the patient's 
world is not enough. The therapist has to tell the 
patient who he is in terms of a shared reality. In a 
sense he has to narratise for the patient. Success in 
therapy appears to be independent of the theoretical 
affiliations of the therapist, the crucial factor being 
the warmth he brings to the therapeutic relationship. 
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It is not proposed to discuss all the psychoanalytical 
models. It is sufficient to say that all would see t he 
pathology of t he schizophrenic condition a s a failure at 
the Ego Level, the person having failed for one reason 
or other to function as a fully-fledged autonomous human 
being. For this study tha t is enough. The discussions 
of the models to follow are motivated by t he f a ct tha t 
both are Linked to mysticism. 
3.3.1 PERRY AND THE CENTRAL ARCHETYPE 
Since Perry's frame of reference in his study (1974) of 
acute schizophrenic episodes in young adults is the 
Jungian model, which takes into account all the levels 
of Wilber's model, except that of Mind (1 . 4-1) a few intro-
ductory comments may facilitate an understanding of wha t 
Perry is saying. 
Jung postulated that the unconscious is the matrix of 
consciousness in which are to be found the seedlings for 
new life potential. From the unconscious rises like an 
island the conscious aspect of the psyche, the ego, the 
centre of consciousness, synonymous with the knowing , 
willing "I". Vina t belongs to consciousness or is known 
by the person about himself and his world or can be dir-
ected and c.ontrolled by him is not fully available to 
consciousness a ll the time. More important still for 
an understanding of Perry is Fordham's (1966) version 
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of Jung's formulation of the self: 
But if the ego can relinQuish some of the belief in 
its own omnillotence, a position can be found some-
where between that of consciousness with its hardly-
won values and unconsciousness with its vit~lity 
and power, and a new centre of versona11ty can 
emerge, differing in its nature from the ego-centre. 
Jung called this new centre of Derson",lity 'the 
self' • LJie uses this in tile Eastern manner :-:-:. 
"In Hindu thoul'h t t he self is the supreme principle, 
the supreme, oneness of being," Fonlham, 1966, p.63 
- footnote..:7 
The ego • •• can only be regarded as the centre of 
the conscious, and if it tries to add unconsciGus 
contents to 'itself (i.e. collective contents, not 
the personal unconsciGus or shadow which does be-
long to the ego) it is in danger of destnlction, 
like an overloaded vessel which sinks under the 
strain. The self, however, can include both the 
conscious and the unconscious. It ar,pears to i:1C t 
as something like a magnet to the disparate ele-
ments of the personality and the processes of the 
unconscious, and is the centre of this totality as 
the ego is the centre of consciousness, for it is 
the function which unites all the opposing elements 
in man and woman, consciousness and unconsciousness, 
good and bad, male and female, &c., and in so do-
ine transmutes them . To reach it necessitates ac-
ceptance of what is inferior in one's nature, as 
well as what is irrational and chaotic , .••• 
Jung makes it clear that his concept of the self is 
not that of a kind of universal consciousness, 
which is really only another name for the uncons-
cious. It consists rather in an awareness on the 
one hand of our unique na tures, and on the other 
of our intimate relationship with all life, not 
only huma n, but animal and plant, and even that of 
inorganiC matter and the cosmos itself. It brings 
a feeling of 'oneness', and of reconcilia ticn with 
life, which can now be accepted as it is, not as 
it ought to be. (Fordham, 1966, pp. 61 - 63) 
Psychosis is a compensatory process in the Jungian model. 
Perry, like Laing, sees schizophrenia as a potentially 
healthy and creative process, the psyche seeking reinte-
gration in an orderly way. The sickness in schizophren-
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ia lies in the pre-psychotic personality (at the Ego 
;Level in Wilber's model). As a resul t of early damage 
to the self-image in the maternal relationship, a con-
stricted and impoverished ego is formed, an ego out of 
contact Vii th the natural elements, emotion and image, of 
psychic life, The person is educated into an identity 
that does not belong to him, in which the power prinCiple 
(Logos) takes precedence over the Eros principle. When 
the personal self-image is debased, the archetypal self-
image is exalted to the same degree, leading to an un-
stable psychic situation full of a sense of unreality 
and anxiety. At times of great crisiS, the libido is 
attracted to the archetypal level to redress the balance 
by reorganising the central archetype (the self) and re-
constituting the self-image. To , do this the libido act-
ivates those components, the elements of the self, whose 
nature it is to effect a transformation, or redistribut-
ion of psychic energy. Perry calls these "dynamisms" 
affect images since they express themselves in terms of 
symbols and their appropriate emotional charge. An 
example of an affect image is the statement: "I'm call-
ed by special election to save the world", which means, 
"There's an image appearing in my inner ps~rchic world 
representing a redeemer, a messianic hero" (p. 66). 
Intrapsychically the reformi,ng hero ' represents 
one's motivation to participate meaningfully and 
effectively in the great societal issues of the 
times.... The part one actually takes in the soc-
ial setting depends entirely upon the real gifts 
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one happens to possess. The redeeming hero as an 
image describes not the specific part one is to 
play in life, but the potential and the motivation 
to fulfill it. (Perry, 1974, p. 66) 
The ego, having abrogated its control, readily identifies 
with any of t he forms of the central archetype, espec-
ially with royal and divine figures, leading to a"bnormal 
irlflation and delusions of grandeur. The ideation ex-
pressed by the acute psychotic is not bizarre thinking 
but metaphori (lal expressions of emotional sta tes , a 
return to an archaic mode of thought or primary process 
thought. In terms of affect imagery, the self repres ents 
itself as a centre (cf. the religious symbolism of the 
mandala, a symbol of the wholeness of the psyche); hence 
Perry calls it the central archetype. Through the symbol-
ic mechanisms of death and rebirth and through cla sh a nd 
reversal and through the union of opposites it becomes 
reconstituted. Only when the affect images have rea ched 
their objectives is the person able to reconnect the con-
cerns they represent with the issues of his normally ad-
justed life. This leads to a new way of experiencing 
people and things, new interests and new investments in 
relationships. The inner solutions are only potentials 
until t hey find reoonneotion with the aotual emotional 
problems of everyday life. 
In a study of twelve young aoute catatonic schizophrenic 
patients, Perry found remarkable parallels between the 
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symbolism of their affect imagery and that of a New Year-
ritual drama, the rites of renewal of the King and his 
Kingdom. These symbols are : Centre, Death, Return to 
Beginnings, Cosmic Conflict, Threat of OppOSite, Apoth-
eosis, Sacred Marriage, New Birth, New Society, Quadra-
ted World. 
Perry says that the sacral kingship had its roots in the 
urban revolution, when primitive democracy was no longer 
adequate to cope with the need for aggression and defence 
and a potent chief had to be elected. With the rise of 
these first royal chiefs appeared for the f irst time in 
man's history a remarkable array of gods, each portray-
ing actual dynamic historical forces: 
They came upon the scene as a function of the diff-
erentiation of culture itself, which in turn was an 
expression of the differentiation of the psyche. 
Vie can only suppose that culture-making is at the 
same time psyche-making, that the creative work of 
structuring the one is equivalent to the same work 
upon the other. (p. 43) 
Perry's explanation of how the symbolism of the ritual 
, 
drama of the renewal of the King and his Kingdorr. has 
become the symbolism of the psyche during an acute psy-
chotic episode, shows some similarity to Jaynes's bicameral 
mind theory (2.3). 'II'hile the latter sees modern con-
sciousness as a kind of synthesis between right and left 
cerebral hemisphere activity, the former sees it as an 
internalisation of archetypal forms which were at first 
concretized and externalised, built into man's material 
and social world, by his own activity and perception. 
85 
This internalisation led to a more spiritual conscious~ 
ness, allowing each man to accomplish his own "indivi-
duality, uniqueness and immortality" by the realisation 
of the kingly powers within himself. J aynes concept-
ualises schizophrenia as a partial return to a more pri-
mitive way of functioning, the bicameral mind, a physio-
logical theory of brain functioning. Perry sees kingship 
as the natural historical framework and vehicle of tran-
sition from t he concretisation of the archaic mentality 
to the spirit quality of the more fully awakened mind of 
our era. Hence elements of the ritual of sacral kingship 
in the affect images of the acute schizophrenic turmoil 
are a partial return of a psychodynamic kind. 
The embeddedness of th~ person in his cultural milieu, 
itself embedded in a matrix that Jung called the Collec-
tive Unconscious, is the premise upon which Perry bases 
his theory of the role of the mystic and the nature of 
the nwstical experience. When a culture has become stag-
nant and institutionalisation has drained the spirit of 
the great innovative creations of the past, persons sen-
sitive to their SOCiety's need for change react by going 
through what appears to be exactly the same process as 
he describes for acute catatonic schizophrenia. To sup-
port his argument he pOints to persons like George Fox, 
founder of the Quaker movement, whose "symptoms", Perry 
claims, might well have p~aced them in a mental hospital 
if they had lived in our modern world. 
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3.3.2 LAING AND THE BIRD OF PARADISE 
I 
R.D. Laing's first book The Divided Self (1960) was an 
attempt to apply the insights of existentialism to the 
subject of schizophrenia. Within the existential frame 
of reference Laing sought to explicate the situation of 
the schizophrenic as that of a person estranged both from 
himself and society. To deal with ontological insecurity, 
that is"the failure to experience oneself as real in 
terms of identity and autonomy in the face of the psych-
otic's main fears, engulfment, implosion, petrification 
and depersonalisation, the schizophrenic develops a split 
self, the false self existing to complement the disembod-
ied or inner self. In the words of Sedg'wiok (1972): 
'-" 
A major form of psychosis was' elucidated as a mental 
system possessing lawful shape and sequence, compre-
hensible in existential terms as the outcome of ra-
tional strategies adopted by the patient in the 
face of an ambiguous and threatening personal envir-
onment. (p. 13) , 
Since the traditional model of man as a machine failed 
to see man as autonomous and intentional, Laing (1960.) 
proposed that psychology substitute a sCience of persons 
for its usual fragmented orientation. 
The sCience of per'sons is the study of human beings 
that begins from a relationship with the other as 
a person and proceeds to an account of the other 
still as a person. (p. 20) 
For terms like "ego", which can lead , to reification, 
Laing had substituted words with inter~ersonal connota-
tions, the schizophrenic being seen in terms of inter-
action and process. Of this book, which is indeed of 
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great interest, Sedg~ick (1972) wrote: 
-' 
One of the most difficult of philosophies was 
brought to bear on one of the most baffling mental 
conditions, which, somewhat surprisingly, helped 
to clarify both. (p. 13) 
For this study, it is enou~h to say that Laing presented 
yet another model operating between the levels "Existen-
tial" and "Ego" in Wilber's model (1.4). 
It is Laing's The Politics of 1'xperience (1967) that is 
of particular interest in a study of mysticism and schiz-
ophrenia. In it Laing for the first time hints that he 
and the schizophrenic knoVi something about reali t~' that 
the "sane" do not, the latter having adjusted to an im-
poverished reality, validated by an insane society. 
Laing's style is polemical and his tone dogmatic. The 
content of the book is not entirely original, enlarging 
as it does on some intima tj,ons of Bateson. Laing ci tes 
the latter's introduction to the story of Perceval al-
ready mentioned (3.3.1): 
It would appear that once precipitnted into psych-
osis the patient has a course to run. He is, as 
it were, embarked upon a voyage of discovery which 
is only completed by his return to the normal 
world, to which he comes back with inSights diffe-
rent from those of the inhabitants who never em-
barked on such a voyage. Once begun, a schizo-
phrenic episode would appear to have as definite 
a course as an initiation ceremony - a death and 
rebirth - into which the novice may have been pre-
Cipitated by his family life or by adventitious 
circumstanoes, but which in its course is largely 
steered by endogenous proces's. 
- In terms of this picture, spontaneous remission is 
nO problem. This is only the final and natural out-
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come of the tota l process. What needs to be ex-
plained is the failure of many who embark upon 
this voyage to return from it. Do these enoounter' 
ciroumstanoes either in family life or in instit-
utional care so ".rossl malada tive that even the 
riohest and best or o.nised ha lucinato. ex-r'er-
ience cannot save them. Laing, 1 7?, pp . 97 98) 
The similarity between Bateson's ideas and Perry's is 
obvious, though the latter does not imply that all per-
sons need to undergo a psychotic breakdown or that the 
whole of "'estern culture is maladaptive. Bateson is 
simply stqting in a provocative way the main issues 
dealt with in this chapter. 
The Politics of Experience is, however, a confusing book. 
All Laing appears to be saying is that schizophrenia is 
not all "breakdown" but also "breakthrough", that the 
patient cannot be blamed for refusing to adjust to a 
reality which is merely another form of alienation from 
man's true nature - "it is the insane man's cOmmitment 
t o the truth that drives him crazy" (Gray, 1977) - and 
that he is discrimina ted against when his f amily in 
conspiracy with a tame psychiatrist, has him incarcer-
ated in a mental hospital. The reason for the confusing 
effects of this book is probably that Laing is concerned 
not so much with psychology as with tyranny and victim-
isation (ibid). The experienoes of Rosenhan and his co-
experimenters suggest . that in some systems this may be 
a ·valid political stance. It is the stigma and the 
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stereotyping attaohed to the label "sohizophrenio" that 
makes Laing suggest that the sohizophrenio be sent on 
his" Mmys tio" journey with sooiet:\r' s approval, and also to 
suggest the substitution of a oeremony that will define 
his position as one of the ohosen,for the eXisting, de-
grading oeremony whioh launohes him into a oareer as a 
lunatio. The faot that all psyohoses are not benign 
(Wing, 1978) and that he might never return from the 
journey might deter the sohizophrenio, if he " had a ohoioe, 
but does not appear to bother Laing. 
Laing a ppears to give undue emphasis to the opinion of 
Bateson that the sohizophrenio may return with inSights 
that are different from those of the persons who have never gone 
through the ordeal or embarked on the journey. It would 
seem wiser to ohange this to "inSights that are differ-
ent from the ones that failed him and made his psychotio 
experienoe neoessary before he oould adjust in a way 
satisfying to his own needs". Laing is presumptuOus in 
assuming that the experienoe of those who share in this 
consensually validated "delusion" is neoessarily stripped 
of all emotional and spiritual satisfaction. As Gray 
(1977) pOints out, the most unattraotive feature of Laing's 
~ork is his contempt for ordinary people. This springs 
peL'haps from hi s need to be the mouthpieoe of the anti-
establishment oounter-oulture and, perhaps, as Sedgewiok 
(197~) suggests, from his interest in the use of drugs 
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in therapy, a prooedure whioh has been restrained to 
some degree by growing suspioion that drugs are danger-
ous. Laing would see this perfeotly logioal oonolusion 
as a conspiracy on the part of the establishment to re-
striot psyohedelioi experience's alleged potential for 
overthrowing the "insane" system in supremaoy at this 
time. 
There seems to be a fundamental flaw in Laing·' s conoep-
tion of reality as we know it in the Western world. The 
basic tools of oommunioation that are a birthrigi1t of 
sharers in our reality should not be oonfused with the 
apparently insane and suicidal behaviour of partioipants 
in the various power games permeating politics and 
business. An aoknowledgement of their existenoe is not 
necessarily to oonnive at their perpetuation but to see 
the world as it is rather than as it ought to be. The 
acquisition of the basic tools neoessary to change life 
must be seen as a prime requisite of anybody eleoted to 
hyper-sanity and the schizophrenic's failure to aoquire 
them must then be considered blameworthy in the moral 
frame of reference to which he has been transported by 
Laing. 
That schizophrenic experience is experienoe in a mode 
discriminated against by the majority of the mundane 
minded is a concept that does not bear close sorutiny. 
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First, the schizophrenic mode alone is quite cleariy 
limited in survival value. Second, it is a complete 
fallacy to believe that our culture makes use of the 
linear mode of experiencing to the total exclusion of 
any other. Split~brain experiments suggest very strong-
ly that there are two modes of experience and Ornstein 
(1973) uses data from these experiments in his compar-
ison of the Western and Eastern ways of life. Split 
brains are,. however, a very rare phenomenon, 'dependent 
for their existence on medical intervention in some 
disease process. The pOint is that Westerners exper -
ience both modes quite unconsciously. According to 
Perry (1974), psychic development is not linear, one 
type of knowing being that of the mundane handling of 
' the mundane world of the ego, the other being knowing in 
depth, reverberations of meaning and emotion not quite 
conscious. It is probable that normal psychic activity 
follows the same rules. The great works of art, and the 
appreciation of the~ is one example. Another might be 
religious experience at its best, Other examples might 
include falling in love or creative activity. Though 
man in the West is technologically orientated, there is 
a great deal of evidence to suggest that his brain is 
not constricted to the rational mode of thinking alone. 
The two ways are complementary and the mistake the West 
has made is to imagine that the non-linear mode is less 
important and to deny the relevanoeand meaningfulness 
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to his own life of any experience a person has, inexpli-
cable in terms of the prevailing scientific paradigm. 
The "underground" social life of the psyche has never 
been wholly eradicated and today's environment probably 
provides more potential for its satisfaotion than any 
other period in history. The failure to satisfy lies 
in the emphasis being on t he experienoe rather than the 
meaning. Experience in any mode is likely to be unsat-
isfying unless some fundamental purpose oan be found for 
individual existenoe. This is the advantage of mystioism. 
And it is to the disadvantage of the sohizophrenio that 
any mystical experience he may have must remain value-
less until he has acquired some cultural conceptual 
framework within whioh to experience himself as an auto-
nomous being and in terms of which to evaluate the exper-
ience. 
The concept of the relativity of reality needs some clar-
ification as well if Laing is not seriously to mislead 
the researcher. It is clear that the reality which per-
sons build up consensually has its origin in the organ 
of integration of perception, the brain, aDd that some 
stimuli must be ignored for the advantage of a stable 
inner world (the surroga te of the aotual environment). 
What may not be clear is that the range of the reality 
built up this way is apparently fairly standard and in-
nate. For example, it is beyond the realm of belief 
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that, if one placed a table in the path of a primitive 
denizen of the Amazon jungle who had no previous know-
ledge of such a thing, he would fail to see it and walk 
right through it. Physiological theories of brain func-
tion would suggest that he would ,display dishabituation; 
that is, he would be alerted until he had built the 
table into his inner surrogate for reality or made allem-
ance for it in his brain state of the moment as inert and 
harmless. If he were not fully awake he might invest 
the table with all sorts of properties it does not possess 
and it is possible to imagine other circumstances in which 
the table might take on connotations over and above its 
normal properties of tableness. Man in nature alone ap-
pears to have a range of gross perception that is uni-
versal. What may be phased out by the "reducing valve" 
(Huxley, 1959) of the brain are subtler stimuli which 
may be culturally biased. The testimony of persons of 
unquestionable integrity like Eileen Garrett indicates 
that there might be finer areas of perception which the 
majority cannot experience most of the time. A common 
sense approach suggests that, given the same sense organs, 
men will perceive more or less the same thing and have 
been dOing so for at least the last three thousand years. 
The relativity of cultural reality . is not at all the same 
thing as the relativity of sensory perception, even in 
relation to cultural values. The real difference lies 
in the relationships of the things persons perceive 
within different oultures, functions of its ethos, 
i t~ organisation of daily life and its meaning structURes. 
, 
To a sCientist a dead r a t migh t suggest the danger of a 
plague. To someone in a more "primitive" frame of ref-
erence it might mean an omen of misfortune. For each 
its meaning i s "real" and may be proved by subsequent 
events. But each s ees a dead rat. 
In view of t hese reservations about the validity of 
Laing's ideas and in view of his failure to demonstrate 
them to the satisfac tion of the scientifio c:o!"l::!un i t,~', his 
more controversial hypotheses have been largely i gnored 
in this study, despite his influential status among lib-
erals and refor mers t l1e 1.Vor:'::l over. 
3 • 4 SUMlIiARY 
The following picture of. the schizophrenic S110:.:1d now 
havb clarified. He has a Jifferent way of bein3 in the 
world from normal persons, caused by factors that have 
not yet been fully a scertained - phYSiological, biocnem-
ica~, developmental,genetic, interpersonal and intra-
psychic. It is probable that combina tions of intrinsic 
and seoondary handioap will vary fr(lm patient to patient. 
If assessed within the medioal model he will share some 
symptoms with other patients but hi:.> thinlcine is charao-
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terised by a frame of referenoe whioh is peouliarly his 
own as distinot from the frame of referenoe shared by 
other persons ~n his oulture or from other schizophrenics, 
each of which inhabits a "mental universe" conditioned 
to a laree extent by the loneliness and isolation which 
results from his predioament. This is not merely a de-
lusional belief as mieht be found in paranoid disorders 
where the oore of the personality is muoh less affeoted. 
The schizophrenic does not possess the tools·for effeot-
ive living inoorporated in the GRO, for struoturing and 
manipulating a oonsensually validated reality. 
In terms of Wilber's model, the levels of the Biosooial 
Bands (1.4 .4) and Ego (1.4.5) are defeotive or inter-
mittently maintained. Sometimes the Existential Level 
(1.4.3) may be involved also,as wIlen the patient loses 
his body boundaries. In other words, he has failed to 
differ'entia te himself as a unique member of his oul ture 
at a certain time and plaoe in history. He may enter 
the level of the Transpersonal Bands (1.4.2) but there 
is at present little evidenoe of this, sinoe the diffi-
oulty of oommunioqting in his isolation makes it imposs-
ible to assess him for increased performanoe effioiE:noy 
in standard ESP tests,for example. Religious ideation 
may be misleading from a semantio point of view. 
Seen in terms of his relationship to sooiety, the sohiz-
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ophrenio is a-human (in a non-pejorative sense) in that 
he has failed to differentiate himself as a person along 
Angyal's : (1965) parameters of mastery and love. 
CHAPTER 4 
MYSTICISM AND THE MYSTIC 
Weave a circle round him thrice 
And close your eyes with holy dread; 
For he on honey-dew hath fed 
And drunk the milk of Paradise. 
Coleridge: Kubla Khan 
4. INTRODUCTION 
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Knowles (1967) attributes the renewed interest in mysti-
cism, which began in the nineteenth century, to two 
sources. Within the Church, thinkers reacted to the over-
whelming oppression of materialistic philosophies, which 
in this century has culminated in the extremes of logical 
positivism and behaviourism. Outside the Church, the 
s 
scientific study of psychology focu~ed on religious phen-
omena as providing examples of unusual, and probably un-
desirable, psychological conditions. In contrast to this 
academic concern, interest in mysticism as a source of 
alternative lifestyles was given impetus by the drug-
taking counter-cultural movement. Toffler (1971) sees 
it as a defence against the spiralling technological com-
plexity of today's world, the impact of which is too 
great for the human organism to 'assimilate. The impli-
cation in this latter view is that mysticism is largely 
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delusional and esoapist. 
Just as madness as a term oan be used in a rather oare-
less and colloquial way, so can mystioism be misunder-
stood, so that the old joke about mysticism's beginning 
in '!mis t" and ending in "schism" becomes applicable. 
According to Cuthbert Butler (1960) "it has come to be 
applied to many things of many kinds: to theosophy and 
Christian Scienoe; to spiritualism and olairvoyance; 
to demonology and witchcraft; to occultism and magic; 
to weird psychical experiences, if only they have some 
religious colour; to revelations and visions; to other-
worldliness; or . even mere dreaminess and impractic-
ali ty II . (p. 65). 
There are many defini tions of mys ticism (Dean Inge; 1969,. 
lists twenty-six). Some definitions emphasise love, 
others understanding, all to a greater or lesser degree 
determined by the intelleotual or emotional allegiance 
of the formulators. The examples listed below are cited 
by Happold (1970): 
LMysticism i§7 the filling of the consoiousness by 
a content (feeling, thought, desire) by an involun-
tary emergence of the same from the unconscious. 
Von 'Hartmann 
The mystical phenomena of the soul-life are antioi-
pations of the biological process. Soul is our 
spirit within the self-consoiousness, spirit is the 
99 
soul beyond the self-oonsciousness. 
D.l Prel 
The essence of mysticism is the assertion of an 
intuition which transcends the temporal categories 
of the understanding, relying on speculative rea-
son. Rationalism cannot conduct us to the essence 
of things; we therefore need intellectual vision. 
Lasson 
Mysticism is the art of union with Reality. The 
mystiC is a person who has attained that union in 
a greater or lesser degree; or who aims at and 
believes in such attainment. 
Evelyn Underhill 
It Liiiysticis!E7 appears in connexion with the endea-
vour of the human mind to grasp the Divine essence 
of the ultimate reality of things and to enjoy the 
blessedness of actual communion with the highest. 
Professor A. Seth 
(pp. 37 - 38) 
Great mystics and visionaries are rare. Some of the 
greatest like Jacob Boehme are more easily categorised 
as nature mystics. The mystical experience on the other 
hand is catholic in its occurrence, though perhaps hap-
pening onoe in an individual lifetime, and, moreover, 
may bear elements of creative insight rather than relig-
. ious ideation. It would be possible to choose one of a 
number of alternative definitions as a starting "point. 
For the reason that Joan of Arc lived within the frame-
work of a mediaeval Christian cosmology it seems appro-
priate to use the definition of McNamara (1975) as the 
basis for this introductory discussion of mysticism. 
He states that mystiCism is the science of mystical 
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experience, that is, the realisation of union with God, 
and the latter is simply the most profound and most 
sought-after kind of religious experience. The data of 
this science are the experiences of the great mystics, 
all of whom, when differences in philosophical and relig-
ious frames of reference have been taken into account, 
have reported phenomena of remarkably similar nature. 
McNamara finds in St Augustine's words, "My mind in the 
flash of a trembling glance came to Absolute Being -
That which is" (cited on p. 399),the most ooncise and 
impressive statement of the mystic's claim. Bla ise 
Pascal's words: 
God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, 
Not the God of philosophers and scholars. 
Absolute Certainty: Beyond reason. Joy. Peace. 
Forgetfulness of the world and everything but God. 
The world has not known thee, but I have known thee. 
(Happold,1970, p. 39) 
emphasise the independenoe of the mystic ·'s encounter wi th 
God from the God of theology and dogma" its essentially 
, 
empirical quality. The fundamental assumption arising 
from the accumulated testimony of those who have been 
gifted with consistent mystical ability, is th~t, at the 
root of the mystic's being, the centre of his true self 
as opposed to the phenomenal ego, there is a direct ex- · 
perience of Transcendental Reality. The mystic does not 
come to God by intellectual activity or metaphysical 
speculation but by experience - a union of love with God. 
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The soeptic may question the validity of a SCience based 
on the reports of persons whose experiences are private 
events. To the extent that all man knows is based on 
his experience of life, the reality of the mystical ex-
perience is no more questionable than that of the every-
day consensory experience shared with other members of 
the same culture. A science must adjust its method to 
suit its subject matter, not distort the data to fit in-
to its own possible miscoDueptions . Happold (1970) 
pOints out that the status of intuition, creative insight 
or imagination is acknowledged by the scientist as well 
as the mystic, poet or :philosopher. He Cites the testi-
mony of Dr H.H. Huntley in The Faith of the Physicist: 
The .h-,hysicist. is driven by his own, experience to 
conclude that his personality has depths and re-
sources beyond the analysing conscious mind, 
wherein lie ~owers of synthesis, allpreciation, 
and understanding, a latent skill and wisdom super-
ior to that to which his consciousness is routinely 
accustomed. This suggests that the framework of 
pbysi0S, filled in with a host of facts, has been 
fabricated in mental regions where analysis is sec-
ondary to synthesis. Thus, both the inner exper-
ience of the individual scientist and the confess-
ions of genius concerning the mental mechanism of 
discovery indicate that, no less than poetry and' 
music, this framework of generalizations, principles, 
and laws which constitute science has been built up 
in mental levels below the levels of oonsciousness. 
(pp. 28 - 29) 
The existence of at least two main mystical traaitions, 
oriental and Western, make a discussion of this subject 
difficult, for the interpretation of mystical experience, 
ineffable by nature, seeks its expression in t .he relig-
ious and philosophical framework in which the mystic 
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finds himself. Clearly, any attempt to assert the val-
idity of one approach over another, or one explanation 
of the event over another explanation of a similar event, 
must depend on the belief of the person involved. Argu-
ments that the apparent similarities between the mystic 
experiences of Christians, like St Theresa of Avila .or 
St John of the Cross,land those of Eastern mystics can 
be attributed to the paganistically influenced Neo-
Platonist ideas adopted by St Augustine and Denis the 
Areopagite are hardly convincing except through person-
al commitment justified by studies in theology and phil-
osophy. For the purposes of the present study, the 
insights of Huxley in The Perennial Philosophy (1958) 
incorporated by Wilber in his model (1.4) are the most 
useful, although to do full justice to any individual 
mystic, considerations based on the findings of experi-
mental psychology must be supplemented by ontological 
and theological considerations (McNamara, 1975). Accord-
ing to Zilboorg, "while psychology can throw a great 
deal of psychological light on religious experience, and 
religious faith may enrich one's psychological function-
ing, psychology as a SCientific discipline can shed no 
light whatsoever on the relations between man and God" 
(cited in McNamara, 1975,pp. 393 - 394). 
A first step to the full acoeptance of the validity cf 
the mystical experience is clearly, as Happold (1970) 
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says, the acknowledgement that God exists and this 
affects the concept of the nature of man. In such a 
framework the religious act becomes consent to the tran-
scendence of man's being. His subjection to God in this 
framework does not enslave him but instead liberates him 
to become his best and most noble self (McNamara, 1975). 
His goals in life are then no longer those conditioned 
by his unique occupation of cultural space in time but 
are first and foremost transcendent and universal. This 
does not, however, alienate him from the dimensions of 
his cultural being. According to Underhill (1967), the 
mystiC, having established his relationship with the 
Absolute, returns to his reality-oriented tasks with re-
newed and apparently inexhaustible vigour. The denial 
of the desires of the phenomenal ego, so frustrating in, 
for example, a Freudian frame of reference, becomes self-
actualising in a cosmology which includes the Transcen-
dent. Adrian van Kaam calls this the "self-actualising 
surrender" which "arises from the authentic gift of one-
self ••• Lani7 implies growth in maturity by constant 
participation in the Transcendent" (cited in McNamara, 
1975, p. 396). It is a function of the whole person and 
thus truly integrative. The religious act is the supreme 
manifestation of the essence of man and faith in God is 
super-rational and intelligent, not sub-rational. 
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Although psychology alone cannot do justice to the in-
dividual mystic, there are now within the discipline 
theoretical formulations and empirical evidence that 
tend to support the contention that mystical experience 
has in truth the intentional and integrative qualities 
that are claimed for it (as opposed to the disintegra-
tive schizophrenic experience). For example, while from 
a purely psychological point of view, it is not possible 
to state that God exists, it is possible to agree unequi-
vocally with the conclusion of Masters and Houston (1967) 
that the God myth is the most powerful myth in man's 
armoury of self-actualising metaphors. Since the crucial 
issues involved in a comparison between the schizophrenic 
and the mystic are their apparently or allegedly similar 
perceptual idiosyncracies and their role in SOCiety, the 
focus in the remainder of this chapter will be on the 
nature and occurrence of the mystical experience and the 
role of the mystiC in the culture of which he is a member. 
Though aspects of these studies can be criticised, the 
contribution of transpersonal psychology and psychedelic 
experimentation and the theoretical formulations they 
have produced is that they place the experience and life 
of the mystiC firmly within the normal range of inter-
action between man and his environment; or alternative-
ly, extend the range of normality to include those phen-
omena which, though unquestionably present in the sane, 
were excluded by the rigidity of the paradigm accepted 
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by psychologists. 
4.1 THE MYdTICAL EXPERIENCE 
In all human beings, waking consciousness is a discrete 
state of consciousness (d-SoC) defined by Tart (1975) 
as a "specific pattern of functioning of the mind, recog-
nising that this pattern may show a range of variation 
in its specifics while still remaining the same overall 
pattern" (p. 14) •••• "o.!l is an active way of coping 
with reality, with incoming information both about the 
external world and about one's body and own experiences" 
(p. 16). Modern psychological research has shown that, 
contrary to what it might seem, "any d-SoC is an arbi t-
rary way of working with information" in that it is 
selective, a "construction built up in accordance with 
biological and cultural imperatives for the purpose of 
dealing with our physical, intrapersonal, and interper-
sonal environments" (p'. 16). What Tart is describing 
here is the GRO (2.1) essential to any person if he is 
to function in his society and never very far away from 
consciousness even when attention is firmly fixed in 
some specific frame of reference embedded within it, for 
example, in the reading of an extremely technical book. 
A discrete altered ~tate of consciousness (d-ABC) "is a 
radical alteration of the overall patterning of conscious-
ness (compared to some reference d-SoC ••• )suCh that the 
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experiencer of the d-ASC (or perhaps an observer) can 
tell that different laws are functioning, that a new, 
overall pattern is superimposed on his experiencel~,,<p; 14). 
Hypnogogic and hypnopompic states, alcohol intoxication, 
drug intoxication, meditative states, spirit possession 
states, hypnotic and auto-hypnotic states are examples 
of d-A0Cs. Though some d-ASCs may appear to be the same, 
they can differ widely both in cause and physiology. 
Doxey (1974), , for example, demonstrated th&t the brain 
states and physiological reactions accompanying biofeed-
back, hypnotic and ~~t states were significantly different 
from one another. 
The mystical experience is a particular d-ASC recognis-
able by the following qualities! 
(a) It has the quality of ineffability - it defies de-
scription in terms which can be understood by one 
who has not had a similar experience. It resembles 
a state in which feeling rather than intellect pre-
dominates. 
(b) It is, nevertheless, a state of knowledge, having 
a noetic quality resulting in insight not access-
ible in terms of discursive intellect but bearing 
an undeniable and completely convincing sense of 
authority. 
(c) It has the quality of tranSiency, rarely lasting 
for any length of time before the experiencing 
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person returns to normality. Certain practices anu 
ways of life can increase its frequency and it may 
even become controllable in the adept. 
(d) While it is possible to prepare oneself for mystic-
al experience, it occurs invariably as something 
given. The mystic experiences passivity, his own 
will being in abeyance while he is in the grip of 
some external force. 
(e) In the mystical state there is the consciousness 
of the "Oneness" of everything. All existence is 
experienced as a unity. 
(f) There is a sense of timelessness. Since the nature 
of time is controversial, (subjective experience of 
time is relative and clock-time probably only one 
aspect of time), t his is by no means incomprehen-
sible. The fact of pre-cognition in oertain (as 
yet not fully understood) circumstances is also 
suggestive of the curious role of time in relation 
to man's life. (LUnne, 1934i Gooch, 1979; Moss, 
1976; .A. Smith , 1976). 
(g) Closely related to (e) and (f) is the characteris-
tic that the phenomenal "ego" is not the real "I" . 
On the b~s1s of this quality, the Hindu postulates 
that in man there is another self, the true self, 
not affected by daily , humdrum happenings, uncha ng-
ing and eternal. In Christian mysticism it is ex-
pressed a s the "spark", the "centre" or "apex of 
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the soul". (Happold, 1970) 
Deikmann (1969) divides persons who experienoe the mys-
tioal d-ASC into three groups: untrained-sensate, train-
ed-sensate and trained-transoendent. The term "sensate" 
refers to wha t adepts would regard as the lesser pheno-
men a of the mystio way, involving as they do, emotion 
and ideation. The experienoes of the first two groups 
are phenomenologioally indistinguishable exoept that in 
the trained-sensate group, experienoes oonform olosely 
to the speoifio religious cosmology of the individual 
mystio and also, for this reason, have a more signifi-
oant and persisting psychologioal effect. The untrained-
sensate group has no oategories with which to interpret 
his experienoe and may eventually forget it. For examp-
le, take the experienoe of a fifteen-year-old boy: 
What had been merely an outside beoame an inside. 
The objective was somehow transformed into a com-
pletely subjeotive f a ot, whioh was experienoed as 
'mine', but on a level where the word had no mean-
ing; for 'I' was no longer the familiar ego. 
Nothing more can be said about the experienoe, it 
brought no aooession of knowledge about anything 
exoept, very obsourely, the knower and his way of 
knowing. After a few minutes there was a 'return 
to normaloy'. The event made a deep impression on 
me at the time; but, beoause it did not fit into 
any of the thought patterns - religious, philosoph-
, 1oal, soientifio - with whioh, as a boy of fifteen, 
I was familiar, it oame to ~~em more and more anom-
alous, more and more irreleva nt to 'real life', and 
was finally forgotten. (Happold, 1970,p. 130) 
Persons olassified as belonging to the trained-transoend-
ent group experienoe a higher, ultimate union that goes 
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beyond affect, occurring almost always in associa tion 
with long training. 
Of the aforementioned groups the trained-sensate a nd 
trained-transcendent are in a sense of less interest to 
this discussion than those who experience a mysti cal 
d-ASC s pontaneously or undergo a conversion experience 
which changes the course of their lives. While persons 
in the former two groups may have pursued t heir :;ubse-
quent aesthetic disciplines a s a result of such an ex-
perience, there is nothing really surprising in the 
fact that certain practiu8s and lifestyles are mere con-
duei ve to mys tillal experience. Research into sensory 
deprivation a nd the physiological effects of flagella-
tion and f as ting suggest very strongly that the induce-
ment and more frequent occurrence of the experience is 
partially explicable in physiological terms (Masters & 
Houston, 1967). This does not mean that it is r educible 
to these causes, since tl1e motive force is the belief 
system of tlle mystio or rather the way he use s t he eXIJer-
ience intentionally to aotua lise himself aooordi ng to 
his conoept of the nature of man in relationship with 
the Absolute. (The physiologioal effects of his pract-
ices may also contribute to the high incidence of psych-
osomatic symptoms in the gr ea t mystios, who nevertheless 
appear in general to have been at least as long-lived 
as their oontemporaries.) 
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The untrained-sensate group would appear to be more rel-
evant to the SOhizophrenic/mystic relationship beinS 
studied in tha t the mysti cal d-ASC is not solicited. 
And the relevant question is whether'. or not such exper-
ience must be labelled as pathological or may be seen as 
creative and meaningful, and potentially within the 
range of all humans. 
4.1.1 DEAUTOMATIZATION 
Deikman (1969) states that the mystical experience can 
be conceptualised as a process of the deautomatization 
of psychological processes, automatization referring to 
processes which become habi tua'l or automatic, in the 
sense that the person is no longer awa re of their stages. 
These can be motor, affective or intellectual responses. 
An example is 'formulated by Werner (cited in Deikman, 
1969) in a statement based on studies of eidetic imagery 
in children as well as on broader studies of perceptual 
development: 
The image ••• gradually changed in functiona l char-
acter. It becomes isiS! essentially sub ject to the 
exigencies of abstn"ct thought. Once t he image 
changes in function and becomes an instrument in 
reflectiv~ thought, its struoture will also change. 
It is only through such structura l chans e that the 
image can serve as an instnAment of expression in 
abstr8.ot mental activity. This is why, of neces-
sity, the sensuousness, fullness of detail, the 
color and the vivacity of the image must fade. 
(Deikman,1969. p . 32) 
Deautomatization is a reversal of this process in the 
direction of a more primitive mode of functionins. This 
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permits a gain in sensory intensity and richness in the 
presence of a loss of abstraot oategorisation and differ-
entiation. It is through its oontrast with adult memor-
ies and functioning, controlled by a different mode of 
consciousness, that the experience of deautomatization 
aCQuires its peculiar flavour of vividness and intensity. 
In other words the GRO is still somewhere in the back-
ground as a standard for testing. 
When Benson (cited in A. ;. Sm;Lth, 1976) postulated that the 
relaxation response was at the root of all mystical and 
religious experience, it was found that this was a part-
ial truth but that relaxation alone could not account for 
the increased alertness that is a charaoteristic of Tran-
scendental Meditation, nor for the efficacy of prayer in 
the life of the devotee. In the same way, deautomatiz-
ation is a useful concept in that it makes the mystical 
experience intelligible in terms of psychological theory 
and physiology and shows it to be well within the range 
of normal brain functioning, especially in the presence 
of a supportive setting in which renunciation of the 
world, poverty, chastity, isolation and silence playa 
large part. In the hierarchy of mystical interaction, 
with transcendence as its pinnacle, changes in sensory 
perception and subseQuent cognitive and affective funct-
ioning are not regarded as being very high on the scale. 
Nor can deautomatization alone account for the profound 
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changes such an experience produoes i.n the person. ' For 
example, Vera Brittain (oited in Happold, 1970) desoribes 
a mystioal experienoe of Winifred Holtby, who at the age 
of thirty-three, with a promising oareer as a novelist 
before her, learned that she had only two years to live. 
Rebellious and exhausted, she took a walk and oame u pon 
some lambs whioh oould not drink from the trough beoause 
it had frozen over; 
She broke the ioe for them with her stiok, and as 
she did so heard a voioe within her saying 'Having 
nothing, yet possessing all things'. It was so 
distinot that she looked round startled, but she 
was alone with the lambs on the top of t he hill. 
Suddenly, in a flash, the grief, the bitterness, 
the sense of frust:C'c1uon disappeared; all desire 
to possess power and glory for herself vanished 
away, and never oame baci<.... She always assoc-
i a ted it afterwards with the words of Bernard 
Bosanquet on Salvation: 'And now we are saved ab-
solutely, we need not say from what, we are at home 
in the universe, and in prinoiple and in the main, 
feeble and timid oreatures as we are, there is 
nothing with:i.n the world or without it that oan make 
us afraid.' (p: 131) 
Deikman (1969) also puts forward possible explanations 
for the unique qualities of the mystioal d-ASC. While 
making these intelligible within the psyohologist's 
frame of referenoe he does not reduoe the experienoe and 
deprive it of its riohness. 
Conoerning the sense of reality, of authority, that ao-
oompanies this d-ASC, he argues that the feeling of real-
ness is a funotion distinot from that of reality judge-
ment (although they usually operate in oonoert), and is 
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not inherent in sensations as such. Hence, realness 
as a quantity function can be displaced and is subject 
to intensification, reduction or transfer. The quality 
of reality during deautomatization, formerly invested 
in the material world, becomes attached to sensations 
and ideas. 
Unusual sensory perceptions, such as increased light or 
other visionary experience not normally associated with 
the real world, are, according to Deikman, not due to 
unusual sensory input from another dimension but are 
representative of an unusual mode of perception. Deikman 
defines this as "sensory translation", the perception of 
psychic action in terms of unstructured sensations dur-
ing the deautomatized state. In contrast to symboiic 
translation of psychic aotivity in hypnogogio phenomena, 
sensory translation is "non-verbal, simple, ooncrete 
peroeptual equivalents of psyohic aotion" (p. 37). With-
in this model, "Illumination" may not simply be a meta-
phor for mystioal experienoe but an actual sensory exper-
ience of the liberation of energy or the resolution of 
an unconsoious oonflict. The mystio, becoming aware of 
intra-psychic prooesses ordinarily outside the range of 
everyday consciousness and displacing the feeling of 
realness, misinterprets the perception as being oaused 
by an external stimulus. 
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Conoerning the sense of unity with nature or God, Deikman 
suggests two possibilities. It oould be attributable to 
the fact that the aotual stuff of peroeption is the 
eleotro-ohemioal aotivity that constitutes peroeption 
and thought in the funotioning of the brain and. that, at 
this level, the oontents of awareness would be homogen-
eous. An alternative possibility is that unity is a 
oorrect evaluation of the external world in that deauto-
matization with its oonoomitant of requiring ·more atten-
tion to the increased detail and sensation available to 
the mystio, may allow him an awareness of new dimensions 
of the total stimulus array, a process Deikman terms 
"perceptual expansion". The normal psychic organization 
of an adult requires that some stimuli be seleoted at 
the expense of others. If this prooess is temporarily 
suspended, more aspects of " reali ty beoome available". 
The quality of ineffability as oonoeptualised by Deikman 
is of particular interest dealing as it does with the 
elements of love and knowledge, whioh most experts agree 
are the most important aspeots of the mystical d-ASC. 
One type of experienoe is ineffable, in his opinion, 
because it is based on primitive memories and preverbal 
fantasies or non-verbal sensory experienoe. In the re-
gression in thought processes that results from renun-
ciation, infantile longings may be activated by the 
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~rom1se inherent in the relisious frame of referenoe. 
It is necessary to plaoe this fornlllation of Deikman in 
perspective dS its implioations are derogatory. All 
that appears regressive is not necessarily so. It could 
e~ually well be argued that in general the love between 
mother and ohild is the most perfeot state of love the 
human experienoes, so that it beoomes a paradigm for 
all the needs expressed in non-verbal fashion in adult 
love relationships. It is immature only when it is 
exeroised without the leaven of adult responsibility 
and unselfishness. 
The second type of experience is ineffable beoause it is 
comprised of a revelation too oomplex to be verb~lised, 
of the significance and inter-relationships of many di-
mensions of life, simultaneously revealed. Deikman 
hy~othesises that an attempt to express the experienoe 
verbally is analogous to trying to oommunioate the im-
paot of a great novel without having reoourse to the 
actual linear argument and detail that the novelist used 
to create that impact. It would be like trying to oon-
vey verbally the vertioal inter-relationships of layers 
of oonoeptual struotures. 
The great adepts describe a stage of the latter exper-
ience that goes beyond sensory and intelleotual elements 
familiar to everyday experienoe. This variant of the 
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mystical d-ASC transcends and is yet not a blank but 
filled with intense, prcfound and vivid perception. It 
is considered to be the peak experience of the mystical 
route to union with the Absolute. Deikman sees this as 
the operation of a new perceptual capacity responsive 
to ar8as of the stimulus array previously blocked from 
ccnscicusness - perhaps a combination of those processes 
put fcrward as explanations of the quality of union and 
intellectually holistic insight. The mental event is 
unidentifiable and sO •. indes cribable. The loss of self 
reported also suggests a new perceptual mode outside of 
reflective a wareness, the phenomenal ego thus falling 
into abeyance. Since the mystic is motiva ted to perceive 
something, it is likely that a lternative and undeveloped 
perceptual capacities, if t il ey do indeed exist, will 
s 
come into operation when the awareness i .3 focusfd away 
fro m the ordinary contents of consciousness. 
4.1.2 EVALUATION 
The logical and creative explanations presented by Deik-
man are in marked contrast to such exotica as Alexander's 
definition of mystical experience as a withdrawal of 
libido from the world to be reinvested in the ego until 
intra-uterine narCissism ("the narcissism of the s perm") 
is achieved (cited in Deikman, 1969, p. 30). This i s an 
absurdity to anyone who does not subscribe to Alexander's 
belief system. Deikman's ideas go a long way towa rds 
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reinstating the mystical experience as a potentially 
fulfilling state of consciousness. There is a t endency 
to believe that if something can be explained it is 
automatically discredited or reducible to an epiphenom-
enon . A knowledge of the physiological mechanisms of 
orgasm does not explain love or the noble or ignoble acts 
committed in the na,me of love; nor does similar know-
ledge about human aggression account for its positive 
and negative applications in man'a life. If Mind is in-
deed the organising principle of life (Randall, 1975), 
if the end or purpose of biological evolution is indeed 
the spiritual development of the individual (De Chardin, 
1970), the so-called epiphenomena of man'a cultural be-
ing are clearly essential and have a significance that 
the psychologist cannot afford to despise. 
Radnakrishnan (cited in Rappold, 1970) emphasised the 
intellectual and noetic ~ualities of the mystical 
d-ASC when he defined mysticism as integrated thought 
bringing things together in a new pattern rather than 
breaking them down into parts as in analytical thought . 
A creative inSight welling up from the depths of the 
unconscious relates parts into a meaningful whole. 
Deikman concludes his article as fol l ows: 
The available scientific evidence tends to support 
the view that the mystic exper ience is one of in-
ternal perception, an experience that can be ecsta-
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tic, profound, or therapeutic for purely internal 
reasons. Yet for psychological science, the pro-
blem of understanding such internal processes is 
hardly less complex than the theological problem 
of understanding God. Indeed, regardless of one's 
direction in the search to know what reality is, 
a feeling of awe, beauty, reverence, a nd humility 
seems to be the product of one's efforts. Since 
these emotions are characteristic of tile mystic 
experience, itself, the question of the epistemo-
logical validity of that experience may have less 
importance than was initially supposed. (p. 43) 
4.1.3 SPONTANEOUS MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE IN PERSONS 
CLASSIFIED AS UNTRAHfED-SENSATE 
The special conditions which create the spontaneous 
mystical d-ASC in the untrained-sensate group are as 
yet unknown and may be combinations of causes specific 
to the individual. However, many persons such as St 
Paul and St Francis and more recently, Bucke and Allen, 
had experienced a period of restlessness or defiance or 
sense of purposelessness which culminated in what could 
be described as a revelation. In this context the spon-
taneous conversion or mystical d-ASC may be seen as a 
response of the psyche to the need of the person. 
s 
Increased alertness or mental involvement, the focus~ng 
of attention intensely on a specific area of thought, 
leading to peripheral hypoalertness, may be conducive 
to a mystical ASC. Conversely, decreased alertness and 
a relaxation of critical facult~es may precipitate its 
occurrence (Ludwig, 1969). 
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Sensory translation may occur when heightened attention 
is directed at the sensory pathways, in the absence of 
controlled analytical thought (Deikman, 1969). John 
Buchan, the novelist, has described an episode which 
suggests some of these features: 
I had been ploughing all day in the black dust of 
the Lich tenburg roads, and had come very late to a 
place called the eye of Malmani - Malmani Oog -
the s pring of a river which presently loses itself 
in the Kalahari. We watered our horses and went 
supperless to bed. Next morning I bathed in one 
of the Malmani pools - and icy cold it was - and 
then baslced in the early sunshine while breakfast 
was cooking. The wa ter made a pleasant music, and 
near by was a covert of willows filled with singing 
birds. Then and there came on me the hour of reve-
lation, when, though savagely hungry, I forgot about 
breakfast. Scents, sights, and sounds blended into 
a harmony so perfect that it transcended human ex-
pression, even human thought. It was like a glimpse 
of the peaoe of eternity. (cited in Happold, 1970, 
p. 131) 
These perfeotly intelligible processes suggested by 
Ludwig and Deikman, together with a more or less rapid 
return to the oonfines of the GRO, establish the unsoli-
oited experience of the untrained-sensate group well 
within the range of normal and quite probably desirable, 
peroeptual modes and ASCs available to man for his en-
riohment and perhaps for a radioal change in a direotion 
meaningful to the person and his oulture. 
4.2 PSYCHEDELIC DRUG RESEARCH 
Masters and Houston (1967) studied the effeots of LSD 
and peyote. Their findings, based upon first-hand ob-
servation of two hundred and six drug sessions and upon 
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interviews with another two hundred and fourteen persons 
who had been volunteer subjects, or psychotherapy 
patient~ or who had obtained and taken drugs on their 
own, tend to confirm the picture of the mystic as it 
emerges in this chapter. 
It is extremely likely that drugs have been used for cen-
turies to produce religious experience in a supportive 
setting and probably preceded askesis-provoked mysticism. 
De Felice (cited in Masters & Houston, 1967) theorised 
that the failure of the drug in the ~ to survive 
Aryan migration to India led to the intricate Hatha Yoga 
exercises designed to simulate or recapture such exper-
ience by natural means. The Solanaceae drugs were pro-
bably responsible for the hallucinations and nightmares 
which led to witches confessing that they had done deeds 
which they had only dreamed about. A modern example is 
the Peyote religion of the American Indian. The inter-
esting aspect here is that belief systems firmly based 
in the GRO tend to control the sort of experience that 
the mind constructs under the stimulus of drugs. This 
is supported by the fact that well-adjusted subjects in 
the Masters and Houston experimental drug sessions tend-
ed to have experiences which confirmed and enriched an 
already worthwhile life. Maladjusted persons were as 
far as possible screened out as subjects in this re-
search but unforseen reactions could be controlled and 
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re-directed by the guide, the guide and the subject hav-
ing in common a congruent, shared GRO as a means towards 
;' 
trust and understanding. Though in abeyance, ~he GRO 
was still avuilable to the subject, a vehicle by virtue 
of which he could interpret and share his experience. 
In religious diSCiplines, the spiritual mentors would 
serve a Similar function, having already travelled the 
road upon which the novice is embarking. 
The existence of four levels of, experience ,under 'drug 
intoxication emerged in the Masters and Houston study: 
(a) the Sensory Level - phenomena were limited to per-
ceptual distortions and changes 
and fantasies bused on these. 
(b) the Recollective-analytical - adjustment problems 
involving relationships and other 
difficulties were lived through, 
(most likely in persons who had 
been in therapy). 
(c) the Symbolic Level - where psychodynamic conflicts 
were dealt with in archetypal, 
universal terms. 
(d) the Integral Level - where new insights contributed 
to a restructuring of personal-
ity and lifestyle. 
These levels cannot be discussed in detail but it is in-
teresting to note their approximation to the levels of 
122 
Wilber's model. The sensory level at which subjects 
experienced phenomena like that of the merging of the 
self with object is of interest in that much mystioal 
and religious metaphor was used and that subjeots might 
on the basis of this, report religious experienoe, yet 
have their lives totally unaffeoted by the experienoe, 
vivid though it seemed at the time. 
Masters and Houston oontend that it is almost exclusive-
ly at the Integral Level (very rarely at the Symbolic 
Level) that true religious experienoe can be said to 
take place. Other studies have olaimed a high peroentage 
of religious experienoe but they set the level at six 
percent of their sample, pOinting out that this is a pro-
blem of language (in that religious metaphor may be used 
to desoribe unusual experienoe), and a matter of defini-
tion: 
Our major oriteria for establishing the validity of 
these most profound religious and mystical experi-
enoes are three: Enoounter with the Other on the 
integral level; transformation of the self; and, 
in most oases, a prooess of phenomenologioal pro-
gression through the sensory, reoolleotive-analytio 
and symbolio levels before passing into the inte-
gral. In the oase of these authentio experienoes 
this progression has been at the same time a rich 
and varied exploration of the oontents of these 
levels providing a oumulative expansion of inSight 
and association until, at the threshold of the in-
tegral, the subject has experienced a comprebensive 
familiarity with the complex network of his being 
suoh as he had never known before. This process is 
greatly intensified and approaohes culmination dur-
ing the subjeot's passage through the symbolic 
level. (Masters & Houston, 1967, p. 267) 
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True mystical and religious experience produced a radi-
cal change in the lifestyle and interpersonal relation-
ships of the subject, a positive trend to better adjust-
ment; and seemed to be either a resolution of a long-
standing conflict with regard to the subject's orienta-
tion to the transcendent or, alternatively, a culwination 
of the actual practising of a discipline as a means to 
enlightenment. Of interest is that persons in the latter 
category, having a rather distracted air before ingestion 
of the drug, also showed a tendency to embrace real life 
in terms of the insights gained, a positive reaction 
confirming the assessment of Underhill (1967) that the 
mystic is filled with inexhaustible energy for work in 
the world after the relationship with the Absolute is 
established - a harmony of love and knowledge (not nec-
essarily discursive) applied to everyday, cultural pro-
blems, activities and relationships. 
When Aldous Huxley (1959) wrote an account of his exper-
iences after his experimental ingestion of mescaline, he 
suggested controversially that drugs would be a f ast and 
easy method for bringing mystical and religious exper-
ience to the masses, who in a world of stimuli bombard-
ment could no longer obtain the same satisfaction from 
such simple devices as the gentle translucence from a 
stained glass window, for example. This would, in effect 
be instant religion. In an analysis of Huxley's exper-
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ienoe, Zaehner (oited in D'Arcy, 1958) has pOinted out 
the danger in confusing pantheism, monism, monotheism, 
natural mysticism and theistic mysticism. In identifying 
oneself with nature, one initiates a dissociation between 
the conscious self and the will and the unconscious, a 
process Jung maintained led to inCipient madness. In 
calling "creatures", the natural world, by the name of 
God, Huxley experienced a fear near to paniC and madness 
(D'Arcy, 1958). Though they and psychopathology may 
mimic it, drug-induced phenomena are not synonymous with 
the mystical d-ASCs. Von HUgel (cited in D'Arcy, 1958) 
maintained that the expansion or contraotion of the per-
sonality, and love were the test. The madman loses in-
terest in duties and friends while the genuine mystic 
beoomes increaSingly generous and integrated (ibid). 
McNamara (1975) supports the claim that genuine mystical 
and religious experience under drugs is Only possible 
to those already predisposed by their interests and pre-
oocupations and perhaps also some degree of preparation. 
He sees it as a gift from God, just as Knowles (1967) 
claims that the spontaneous mystical d-ASC in non-
Christians comes by the grace of God: 
Drugs might heighten the possibility LOf mystioal 
experienc~ in the case of an individual already 
morally disposed by changing his temperament from 
dOminantly opaque LDot given to mystical d-ASC§7 
to dominantly transparent .. This transparency due 
to drugs ..• can expose the divine content of the 
soul otherwise imperceptible to the subject. The 
use of narcotiCS, however, generally leads to 
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pseudomystic1sm. (McNamara, 1975, p. 400) 
The danger is present that in using drugs the person may 
come to accept the pseudo for the genuine. Also he may 
feel he is growing in love and empathy and yet his life-
style will indicate the very opposite in that he shirks 
responsibility and decreases his circle of associa tes to 
a few anti-social and possibly criminal persons. Others 
may profess a love for all humanity, for the entire uni-
verse, as a f~9ade for narcissism (Masters & Houston, 
1967) • 
The value of the Masters and Houston study is that it 
demonstrates empirically the existence of an integral 
level of the psyche at which new insights can be accom-
modated into the subject's psychical functioning and lead 
to positive, vital adjustment at all cultural leveis. 
It supports what scholars in other disciplines have main-
tained, that mystical experience is not mere self indul-
gence and posturing, that easy access to it may in fact 
lead to a worsening of functioning and adjustment, that 
not all that appears mystical is indeed mystical (the 
problem of metaphor and semantics leading to the confus-
ion) and that genuine mystical activity manifests itself 
in the life a nd actions of the person who experiences it. 
4.3 THE ROLE OF THE MYSTIC IN SOCHTY 
Wilber's model of the Spectrum of Consciousness (1.4) 
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postulates on the basis of ;Eastern and Western insights, 
that Mind, the Absolute or God, some cognizant and high-
ly purposeful force, is the organising princi:ple through 
which all people and all the universe have their being. 
It is interesting to note the similarity between 
Schrodinger, the founder of quantum mechanics ',. words 
and those of Bernard Bosanquet on salvation (4.1,1): 
Inoonoeivable as it seems to ordinary reason, you 
- and all other oonsoious beings as suoh. - are all 
in all. Henoe this life of yours you are living is 
not merely a pieoe of the entire eXistenoe, but is 
in a oertain sense the whole .•.• Thus you oan 
throw yourself flat on the ground, stretohed out 
upon Mother Earth, with the oertain oonviotion that 
you are one with her and she with you. You are as 
firmly establishe~ as invulnerable as she, indeed 
a thousand times firmer and more invulnerable. 
(oited in Wilber, 1977, p. 108) 
Perry , (1914), using as a theoretioal base Jung's oonoep-
tualisation of the oolleotive unoonsoious and arohetypes 
integrated by the oentral arohetype, the self (the reoon-
oiler of opposites), puts forward a theory of the value 
of mystioal experienoe and the role of the mystio in 
sooiety, whioh is appealing in that it appears to explain 
why the mystioal experienoe is of most value when it is 
an adjunot to normal psyohologioal adjustment and may 
have a detrimental effect if it is merely an indulgence 
and esoape. The latter effects are possible only in 
oommeroial-commodity types of experience like those pro-
duced by drugs. Active seeking il} other oontexts demands 
a disoipline and aesthetioism daunting to one who is not 
in earnest. Even a relatively simple teohnique like 
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Transcendental Meditation does not produce instant eu-
phoria or cosmic consciousness. Without perseverance 
and high seriousness it becomes at best a remarkably 
effective relaxation technique. 
The work of the mystic can be seen as relative in the 
sense that cultures change, institutions change, ideas 
ch3.nge, so that what these persons produce at cuI tural 
level sometimes becoQes outmoded or, in the case of the 
political reformer, temporal, with relevance to only 
one period in history when judged from the perspective 
of distance in time. The great legacy of the mystics 
is their account of the mystical d-ASC and its inspir-
ation; their works in time are usually relative. If 
she is viewed as a mystic, Joan's accomplishing the 
crowning of the Dauphin in a divided France does not 
seem worth the while of such illustrious entities as 
St Michael, St Catherine and St Margaret. 
Perry pOints out that new ideas generally inject new 
vitality into institutions, which, designed as t hey are 
to give structure and expression to the human ,syche by 
some collective action of the totality of those psyches, 
may have become repressive in their rigidity, leading 110 
stasnation. Logos predominates over Eros, if Perry's 
somewha t limi ted defini tion of Logos is accepted. ,Jus t 
as the individual psyche strives to redress the balance 
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, . 
if the person's orientation has become too one-sided; 
so in such circumstances, the collective psyche becomes 
restless. The mystic, the prophet, the contemplative, 
.. 
the reformer, the artist, are persons who are tempera-
mentally sensitive to this collective unrest, this need 
for change. They experience what, in some cases, may be 
a cataclysmic, psychic reorganisation similar to that which 
Perry postulated for schizophrenics (3.3.1), an event 
which, while not always pleasant, may be profound in its 
effect. As a result of this event's striking nature and 
its anomaly in comparison to routine ev:ents, they spend · 
the rest of their lives integrating the experience intra-
psychically and findL1g expression for it in wri ting, 
teaching, religious and f olitical reorganisation and 
other measures for change and reform. As a result, 
changes are effected which, at first full of life and 
spirit, become institutionalised in their turo and event-
ually rigid and repressive, so that once again a new 
formulation becomes necessary. 
The tendency for institutions to become rigid, for society 
to resist change, has some positive value in that it is 
only in a stable society that creative activity can find 
its basic shape or cootext. Nevertheless, at tl1e core 
of the spiritual life of the people are the mystics, 
positioned along some mysterious creative continuum, who 
are committed by temperament to constant efforts to ef-
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feet a balance in the expression of collective psychic 
needs. 
In this sense, the mystical d-ASC and the mystic are 
essential to their time and creative in their impact. 
That they have the conservatism of their fellow men to 
contend with may be the essential ingredient in the 
creating of the tension needed for change. Out of con-
flict comes a new dispensation~ If existenc~ in the 
cave had been euphoric, presumably man would never have 
embarked on the sea rch for knowledge and for control of 
the environment and would no longer exist as a species. 
4 • 4 sm'IMARY 
Emerging from the arguments above is the picture of the 
mystic as one who, while not necessarily conforming to 
the norms of the man in the street, is super-adjusted, 
in that he is adjusted to the ethos of his temporal cul-
ture and is one of the cata lysts which bring about change, 
though it is impossible to state categorically that this 
is always change for the better. In terms of Wilber's 
model, he has at his disposal not only the GRO, or 
psychical tool for effective functioning at the Ego Level, 
but also has contact with a transcendent principle. This 
• 
contact beyond the confines of his existence at the phe-
nomenal level, may lead him to a variety of experiences 
at the level of the Transpersonal Bands (1.4.2) a nd per-
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haps even at the level of Mind (1.4.1). Perhaps it 
would be useful to postulate a concept like the Genera-
lised Transcendental Orientation - GTO - to supplement 
that of the GRO. 
CHAPTER 5 
SCHIZOPHRENIC OR MYSTIC? 
Whom the gods destroy they first make mad. 
Euripides 
Let not the oonoeit of intelleot hinder thee 
from worshipping mystery. 
M.F. Tupper 
5. WINDMILLS AND GIANTS 
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From a reading of the preoeding ohapters the following 
piotures of t 11 e sohizophrenio and the mystio should have 
orys tallised. 
The sohizophrenio has failed to adjust to his sooial en-
vironment along the dimensions of homonomy and autonomy, 
or, alternatively, has a tenuous hold uyon reality in 
that the maintenanoe of the GRO is unprediotable/unre-
liable for an as yet undetermined reason. As a result, 
he hCls been unable to differentiate himself to his full 
potential as a person oapable of funotioning withou~ 
some supportive therapy or milieu. He may, as a result 
of the seoondary effeots of his primary handioap, t ake 
on a role which our sooiety oalls · "ohronic sohizophrenio" 
and have developed "symptoms" not unrelated to institu-
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tionalism and the attitudes of those who see him as sick. 
He may, as an alternative, have carved out for himself 
a fringe adjustment in the care of a relative in a world 
structured enough to allow him relief from the anxiety 
which new situations can create in such persons. 
On the other hand, stalking through the pages of history, 
are persons who have contributed to mankind's conception 
of himself and the universe and who have frequently 
claimed that their power lay not in themselves but that 
it came from another scuroe: Gautama Buddha, Jesus Christ, 
St Paul, St FranCiS, St Teresa of Avila, St John of the 
Cross, Blaise Pascal, Swedenborg, William Blake and 
C.G. Jung, to mention but a few. There are also relat-
ively unknown persons who have claimed to have experien-
ced the mystical d-ASC or what appear to be related 
phenomena at some time in their lives. The mystiC, as 
a result of his belief, may voluntarily have excluded 
himself from the mainstream of society by entering a 
monastic institution; at the same time, he is capable 
of sharing a consensually validated GRO with other per-
sons. He may experience unusual phenomena over and be-
yond the mystic experience as defined in Chapter 4, for 
example, visions and VOices. These may at first glance 
appear to be the same as those experienced in some types 
of schizophrenia. In the case of the mystiC, however, 
they are desirdble in that they tend to confirm his be-
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lief. Also, they may have an integrative and beneficial 
effect on his life, leading to greater adjustment in the 
areas of love and mastery. This is in contrast to th8ir 
incapacitating effect on the schizophrenic. It should 
also be clear that being a mystic does not, as a matter 
of course, exempt the person from sharing the lot of 
humanity at large. He may at times display traits that 
could be seen as hysterical or neurotic. Sainthood is 
not bestowed on all who a re mystical by nature. 3erna-
dette was not canonised because she saw visions of what 
was believed to be the Virgin Mary at Lourdes. Her 
exemplary life as a nun later was the decisive factor. 
It has also been suggested that a great many curious 
patterns of behaviour have come to be accepted in Western 
society, its not being dissent that is the crucial issue 
but whether or not the dissenter uses the same vehicle 
of expression as others (the GRO), even if it is to neg-
ate its own values. Hence, the view that the schizophren-
ic is a deviant against whom society discriminates has 
been treated with scepticism. It may well be that chronic 
schizophrenia could be made to look different at a super-
ficial level if society changed its attitudes to those 
who are "differen t" • Nev&rtheless, it is vulnera bi Ii ty 
and the danger to himself and sometimes to others that 
are decisive factors in his finding himSelf in a mental 
hospi tal. 
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Voioes I visions (halluoina tions) and -oeliefs (delusions) 
would seem to be the areas where there is the greatest 
overlap in sohizophrenio and mystioal experienoe. They 
are either the same phenomena in different oontexts or 
they are entirely unrelated. There is some evidenoe, 
and muoh opinion, that the latter is true. Auden (1964), 
for instanoe, makes the observation that in nature mys-
tioism (whioh he oalls the vision of Dame Kind), the 
person does not peroeive an alternative reality to that 
of his everyday experienoe. Instead it is a re~lity 
suddenly oharged with additional meaning and beauty -
existenoe is extended: 
The experienoe seems to the subjeot not only 
more important than anything he experienoes when 
in a "normal" state, but also a revelation of real-
ity. When he returns to a normal state, he does 
not say: "That was a pleasant dream but, of oourse, 
an illusion. Now I am awake and see things as they 
really are"; he says: "For a moment a veil was 
lifted and I saw what really is. Now the veil has 
fallen again and reality is again hidden from me." 
His oonolusion is similar to that of Don Quixote 
who in his bouts of madness sees windmills as giants, 
but when in his luoid intervals he sees them as 
windmills, says: "Those oursed magioians delude me, 
first drawing me into dangerous adventures by the 
appearanoe of things as they really are, and then 
presently ohanging the faoe of things as they please." 
•..• The experienoe is totally different from that 
of "seeing things" whether in dreams or waking 
visions. In the oase of the first three kinds 
LAuden's oategories of mystioal experienoi! which 
are concerned with visible oreatures, these are 
seen with extraordinary vividness and oharged with 
extraordinary Significance, but they are not physi-
oally distorted; sQuare objeots do not beoome round 
or blue ones red, nor does the subject see objects 
whioh are not there w11en the vision fades. Again, 
one tninks of Don Quixote. He may see a windmill 
as a giant, out he doesn't see a giant unless there 
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is a windmill there. (pp. 10 - 11) 
There is also clearly a difference between a schizophre-
nic at the mercy of a voice that commands him to commit 
suicide; and a man who, on the point of committing sui-
cide because he has cancer, sees "the Lord" who tells 
him not to take his own life as he will be healed; he 
is subsequently healed and dedicates his life to that 
cause with which he associates the authority he encoun-
tered. In the face of this \{ind of evidence, the stu-
dent may still elect to believe that the phenomena are 
the same. Should he do so, it is still possible to 
pOint out to him the area in which the pathology lies 
and so bring him to a closer understanding of the diff-
erence between schizophrenia and mysticism. To illus-
trate this, it would be useful to look once more at 
some of the theorists who have theories of schizophrenia 
and mysticism within the same model and also, at the 
same time, to look at voices and visions and other phen-
omena to see whether they must be labelled pathological 
or whether they can be considered neutral in terms of 
societal approbation. Hopefully it will be demonstrated 
that voices and visions are not the main issue. 
5.1 PERRY 
In his discussion of mysticism Perry (1974) remarks that 
persons like George Fox were fortunate that there were 
no psychiatrists to lock them up when their experiences 
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of conversion or guidance assumed more dramatic aspects. 
Fox's account of his encounter with the spirit is as 
follows: 
Then I was commanded by the Lord to pull off my 
shoes. I stood still, for it was winter: but the 
word of the Lord was like a fire in me. So I put 
off my shoes and left them with the shepherds; 
and the poor shepherds trembled, and were aston-
ished. Then I walked about a mile, and as soon as 
I was got within the City, the word of tne Lord 
came to me again, saying: "Cry,' Woe to the bloody 
ci ty of Lichfield:' " So I went up and down the 
streets, crying with a loud voice •••• And no one 
laid hands on me. As I went thus cryine through , 
the streets, there seemed to me to be a channel of 
-olood running down the streets, and the market-
place appeared like a pool of blood. (o1ted in 
Perry, 1974,P. 96) 
Perry also states that, instead of searching for what is 
pathological in mysticism, it mi ght be more productive 
to search for what is mystical in intent in psychosis. 
In developing this train of thought he compares the 
elements of the saoral !cingship he disoerned in acute 
oatatonic schizophrenia, that is, the oentre, the Divine 
kingship, the royal marriage and so forth (J. 3.1) with 
similar themes emerging in the records of the mystics. 
His model of sohizophrenia is linked with mysticism 
(4.) in that he suggests that some persons sensitive to 
the unrest of the collective psyche react as do the mys-
tics but that their psyohio orga nisation is not strong 
enough to withstand this onslaught of material from the 
unconsoious and so fails to reintegrate. 
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5.1.1 EVALUATION 
The implication of Perry's explanation for this study is 
that he definitely locates the difficulty of the schizo-
phrenic at the Ego Level of Wilber's model. It is path-
ological in that adjustment to consensually validated 
reality is in some way faulty or not firmly established. 
The GRO,. having once been displaced, is not agdin read-
ily available. 
It must be pOinted out that Perry's re.'isoning, persuasive 
though it is, can be questioned in the light of the myths 
and language and the range of emotional experience avail-
able to per~ons of the same culture, and, at universal 
level, of the archetypes shared by t he human race. The 
language looks the s ame bec:iuse language is finite and 
limited. The themes appearing in mystical experienoe 
and in schizophrenia may well appea r in other human en-
deavours and s ta tes simply 'oecause they a re common themes. 
Frankl tells the anecdote of how an audience, confronted 
with a passage by Heidegger, the philosopher, and a pas-
sage originating in the utterances or writings of a 
schizophrenic, agreed that the former was the ravings of 
a madman. Frankl (1971) comments that it is a crisis of 
expression that links the two. Blake's prophetic writ-
ings do not necessarily indicate Blal:e' s il1sani t y . Their 
obscurity may measure the failure of the visionary poet 
to give intelligible form to his vision. Blake was per-
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fectly aware that his way of perceiving was different 
from that of others. On being asked where he had seen 
a landscape that had made a particular impression on 
him, he replied by pointing to his head, since the actual 
physical surroundings would not have produced the same 
effect on his questioner (Lister, 1968). 
It is also ~ossible to question Perry's assertion that 
the existence of psychiatrists would have put paid to 
the expres.sion of persons lilw Fox. Should such d danger 
have existed it is ver"J' probJule that Fox and others like 
him would not have given such uninhibited performances 
where there was a likelihood that they would be consid-
ered insane. Thornton (1967) comments on his awareness 
at the time of his initiation into rr,ystical exyerience 
that he should not reveal to anyone what he was exper-
iencing, since he knew they would not be capable of un-
derstanding it. He continued to worl, effectively during 
this time. 
5.2 JAYNES 
In the ea rlier discussion of Jaynes's rr.odel of the bi-
cameral mind (2.3), the concept of the role of language 
as the sole generator of consciousness was rejected. 
Its role in generating particular .aspects of conscious-
ness was, however, seen to be feasible and even enlight-
ening. The actual existence of the bicameral mind at 
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any paint in man's history is still in question. Using 
this construct of a more primitive mode of functi uning , 
ousted by consciousness as man now experiences it, Jaynes 
sees t11e phenomenon of voices whioh intrude upon the 
schizophrenio, commanding, heolcling, consoling or what-
ever, a s a partial return to bicameral functioning , re-
sulting from the effects of stress on a s pecific type 
of metabolism (). 2). Trance states· or possession s t a tes 
can be learned social phenomena whioh follow a similar 
pattern, the voioe of the con trol in t~e case of medium-
ship emerging through the mechanism of the undeveloped 
Werniche's area in the right cerebral lobe, using Broca's 
area of the left to produce articulated speech. 
Jaynes makes the paint tha t the general bicamera l par a -
digm he is using to explain the phenomena of possession 
and prophecy is representative of but a vestige of the 
bicamera lrnind proper. The schizophrenic is unable, 
f or instance, to return to true bioameral functioning. 
The medium or oracle is unconscious during the posses-
sion state, and does not remember what has been said, 
while Achilles did hear Athene. This distinction is of 
interest in the brief considera tion of St Theresa to 
follow. 
5.2.1 EVALUATION 
Jaynes sees religion and interest in psychical phenomena 
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as a nostalgic harking back to the blissful days of the 
bicameral1nind, when man did not consider himself as 
finite and where he lived an unreflective and experien-
cing life as opposed to the hyper-reflective and vicar-
ious mental experience of modern man, from whose life 
divine authorisation has departed. The actual existence 
of the gods he considers to be "ontological nonsense". 
If his theoI'1J is di vcrced from this reductionist tend-
ency, it is interesting as a model of the physiological 
mechanisms of both types of phenomena. If voices heard 
in schizophrenia do occur for the reasons he suggests, 
the theory supports the idea of impairment of function-
ing at Wilber's Ego Level since the GRO is partially or 
completely immobilised. The linking of schizophrenia 
and trance and possession states in the social context 
by means of a similar mechanism, that is, the reassert-
ion of aspects of bicameral functioning, is also sup-
portive of the argument as, once again, the normal GRO 
through which personality manifests itself falls into 
abeyance temporarily while an alternative entity tokes 
control. Theories of dissociation of values and infor-
mation which do not fit in with the person's sense of 
self can be considered in conjunction with Jaynes's 
model. It is a commonplace in psychical resea rc11 that 
tile alleged spiri t guides of a medium may be simply dis-
sociated aspects of his or her personality. I e is clear 
that mediumship Of a kind can be learned by some types 
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of person (GoOCh, 1979). And, once again, the research-
er in this field is confronted by pseudo-phenomena as 
opposed to phenomena that carry with them a high degree 
of credibility, at least for the existence of extra -
sensory perception,in that they give information about 
past, present and future wtlich can be checked. Heywood 
(1968b) co~nents that there appears to be a f hcet of the 
human uhconscious ever willing to dramatise in accord-
ance with the cues given it. Hence the danger in an 
over-gullible acoeptance of all that practitioners in 
ESP can offer, and also the existence of pseudo-phenomena 
known to all who follow the mystic way and rega rded with 
suspicion by adepts when present in themselves or in the 
novices under their guidance. 
Jaynes then is making a clear distinction between a path-
ological set of phenomena (in this case attributed to a 
biochemical malfunction) and a social set of phenomena. 
It is a distinction that Wing (1978) clai~s that any 
competent psychiatrist would make. The social role de-
mands the possession state and the person possessed wel-
comes it. The pathological state is one in which the 
voices come unbidden and cause severe distress to the 
sufferer. 
That the mystic's sense of unreality is unimpaired, al-
though extended to include another dimension of funotion-
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ing, is suggested by the sturdy common sense aod discern-
ment, the self-critical faculty in terms of which the 
great mystics evaluated the phenomena occurring as a by-
product of their vocation. St John of the Cross wrote: 
I am really terrified ••• by what passes ar.:ong us 
in these days. Anyone who has barely begun to med-
itate, if he becomes conscious of words of this 
kind during his self-recollection, pronounces them 
forthwith to be the work of God; and, convinced 
that they are so, goes about proclaiming 'God has 
told me this,' or 'I have had that answer from God!' 
But all is illusion and fancy; such an one has 
only been speaking to himself. Besides, the desire 
for these words, and the attention they give to them, 
end by persuading men that all the observations which 
they address to themselves are the responses of God. 
(cited in Underhill,1967,p. 275) 
Underhill comments that "these are the words of one who 
was at once the sanest of saints and the most penetrating 
of psychologists: words which our modern unruly amateurs 
of the 'subconscious' might well take to heart". 
St Theresa of Avila, renowned for her practicality and 
her genius for organisation, was governed and guided by 
voices, which sometimes interfered with her plans, gave 
judgements different from her own and criticised or for-
bade certain actions. She learned to discriminate between 
the true and the false. She seldom resisted their com-
mands, although what they advised appeared foolish to her 
and frequently caused .her difficulties. She never had 
cause to regret obedience to and reliance upon those 
voices she judged as coming from God. Of the words spok-
en by these voices she reported that: 
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... /They ar§7 very distinotly formed; but by the 
bOdily ear they are not heard. They are, however, 
muoh more olearly understood than if they were 
heard by the ear. It is impossible nOL to under-
stand them, whatever resistanoe we may offer ••.•. 
The words formed by the understanding effeot noth-
ing, but when our Lord speaks, it is at once word 
and work.... The human looution il.e., the work 
of the imaginati0n7 is as something we cannot well 
make out, as if we were half asleep: but the div-
ine looution is a voioe so olear, that not a syl-
lable of its utterance is lost. It may ocour, too, 
when the understanding and the soul are so troubled 
and distracted that they cannot form one sentence 
correotly: and yet grand sentences, perfectly ar-
ranged, such as the soul in its most recollected 
state never oould have formed, are uttered: and 
at the first word, as I have said, change it utter-
ly. (cited in Underhill, 1967, pp. 275 - 276) 
Jaynes states that the true bioameral mind no longer 
exists (5.2) because in social phenomena involving his 
General Bicameral Paradigm, the person possessed does 
not remember what was said by the alternative conscious-
ness, while Achilles did hear Athene. Kinsbourne (2.) . 1) 
pOinted ou t that in The Iliad Achilles showed defini te 
signs of self-consoiousness as when he sulked in his tent. 
Taken in oonjunction with the testimony of St Theresa, 
these observations have the inesoapable implication that 
the bioameraltnind as oonoeptualised by Jaynes has never 
existed. As St Theresa was oonsoious when she heard her 
voioes, so was Aohilles. This mode of peroeption is one 
whioh depends on temperament, oosmology and meditation 
for its appearanoe. The person has available to him his 
own experienoe as stored in the personal unoonsoious and 
also other information presumably originating in what 
oould be oalled the oolleotive unoonsoious, and manifest-
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ing itself symbolically in the identity of the local 
deity or deities. A further inference frcm St Theresa's 
account is that, in the lives of mystics who exhibit ESP, 
voices and visions are probably dramatic and symbolic 
forms of communication between the unconscious and the 
phenomenal ego and, though unusual, are natural modes of 
functioning encouraged in certain milieus. Underhill's 
exposition seems as sound as any other in this context: 
If we would cease, once for all, to regard V1Slons 
and VOices as objective, and be content to see in 
them forms of symbolic expression, ways in which 
the subconscious activity of the spiritual self 
reaches the surface-mind, many of the disharmonies 
noticeable in visionary experience, which have 
teased the devout, and delighted the agnostic, 
would fade away. Visionary experience is - or at 
least may be - the outward Sign of a real experience. 
It is t he picture which the rr~nd constructs, it is 
true, from raw materials already at its disposal: 
as the artist constructs his picture with canvas 
and paint. But, as the artist's paint and canvas 
picture is the fruit, not merely of contact between 
brush and canvas, but also of a more vital contact 
between his creative genius and visible beauty or 
truth; so too we may see in vision, where the sub-ject is a mystic, the fruit of a more mysterious 
contact between the visionary and a transcendental 
beauty or truth .•.. The transcendental powers take 
for this purpose such material as they can find 
amongst tile hoarded beliefs and memories of the self. 
Hence Plotinus sees the Celestial Venus, Suso the 
Eternal Wisdom, St Theresa the Humanity of Christ, 
Blake the strange personages of his prophetiC books 
.... 
Visions and VOices, then, may stand in the same re-
lation to the mystiC as pictures, poems, and music-
al compositions stand to the great painter, poet, 
musician. They .are the artistio eX:(lressions and 
creative results (a) of thought, (b) of intUition, 
(c) of direct perception. (Underhill, 1967, pp. 
271 - 272) . 
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5.3 LAING'S PSYCHEDELIC MODEL OF SCRI ZOPHRENIA 
It has already been suggested that Laing has come to be 
regarded by some as a prophet of the counter-culture. 
Siegler, Osmond and Mann (1972), using dimensions like 
"definition", "etiology", "prognosis" and "the rights 
and duties of patients", have detected in Laing's 
Politics of Experience (1967) the existence of three 
models of schizophrenia, "the conspiratorial model", "the 
psyohedelio model" and "the psyohoanalytioal model", the 
first being an aocount of how Laing thinks sohizophrenics 
are treated, the seoond being an a ocount of t he way he 
feels they ought to be treated and the third being an 
aooount of what he aotua.lly does himself in ti1era py wi th 
the sohizophrenio patient. The aotual psyohedelic model 
states that sohizophrenia is a natural hea ling process 
to rectify our present st~ te of alienation. It may a p-
pear like a breakdown but it is potentially a brei:11~­
through, the a lternatives being either. liberation and 
renewal or enslavement and existential death. It is not 
an illness but a "voyage" and is one of the forms in 
whioh light may dawn through cracks in olosed minds. 
Siegler et al (1972) assert that Laing has failed to d~­
tinguish between two very different kinds of experience 
- psyohedelio and psychotio. While not denying that 
sChi~ophrenics may have psychedelio experience, espeo-
ially at the beginning of their illnesses and that they 
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have on occasion made creative use of their experiences, 
they pOint out that viotims of other illnesses have also 
been able to incorporate illness into their lives in a 
positive way, to gain new insights during prolonged in-
activity. In discussing the implications of Laing's pro-
posed "voyage of self discovery", they mention first of 
all the arbitrariness with which schizophrenics find them-
selves precipita ted into their turmoil a nd the resultant 
helplessness in the face of sometimes severely un pleasant 
experiences. The latter sort of experience can be aVOid-
ed in solicited psychedelic experiences by pleasant sur-
roundings and the presence of loved ones. The latter 
condition may make the experience worse for schizophren-
ics as they often feel hatred for those they love; and 
guilt because they really do love them. The psychedelic 
experience is short while the psychosis is indefinite. 
Siegler et al (1972) draw up the following comprehensive 
table to illustrate the differences between the psyche-
delic and psychotic experience. Since psychedelic ex-
perience has some of the qualities of the mystical 
experience - albeit a pseudo-mysticism - the contents of 
the comparison a re relevant to this analysis. 
PSYCHEDELIC EXPERIENCE 
Time dimension 
Liberation from time. 
Expansion of time di-
mensions. 
Internal or external 
time may speed up, in-
creasing possibility 
of quick and decisive 
action. 
Ability to modify past, 
present, future. 
The future is the 
realm of ambition and 
motivation. 
Space dimension 
Expanded depth. 
Enhanced distance. 
Distance perception 
stable. 
Distances so vast that 
one feels liberated. 
Affect 
Feeling that every-
thing is meaningful 
and exhilarating. 
Feelings of love, 
empathy, considera-
tion, affection. 
Euphoria. 
Feeling of delight 
with oneself. 
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PSYCHOTIC EXPERIENCE 
Frozen in time; nothing 
will ever change. 
Shrinkage and collapse 
of time dimensions. 
Internal and external 
time may slow down, in-
hibiting action and 
creating despair. 
Inability to influence 
any of the temporal 
ca tegories. 
The future is the realm 
of anxiety and danger. 
Reduced depth. 
Reduced distance. 
Distance perception high-
ly variable. 
Distances so Vds t that 
one feels isolated and 
alienated. 
Feeling that everything 
contains hidden, threat-
ening meanings. 
Feelings of isolation, 
fear, hatred, suspicion. 
Depression. 
Feeling of disgust with 
oneself. 
PSYCHEDELIC EXPERIENCE 
(continued) 
Thought processes 
Thought changes are 
sought for, expected, 
valued. 
Seeing more possibili-
ties that can be acted 
upon, wl1ich makes life 
exci ting. 
Seeing beyond the usual 
categories. 
Seeing new ccnnections 
which have always been 
possible. 
Ability to see things 
objectively. 
Ability to see things 
subjectively. 
Ability to explain 
thought changes. 
Perceptions 
Clear and distinct 
vision. 
Augmentation of per-
ception. 
Unusual perceptions 
seem to emanate from 
greater-than-human 
spirit or force. 
Perceptual changes may 
be experienced as ex-
hilarating, exciting, 
novel. 
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PSYCHOTIC EXPERIENCE 
(continued) 
Thought changes come 
unawares, are not wel-
come, are seen as 
accidental. 
Seeing so many possibili-
ties that action is im-
possible. 
Seeing only fragments 
or parts of the usual 
categories. 
Seeing connections which 
are not possible. 
No objectivity, inabil-
ity to disengage from 
total involvement. 
No subjectivity, estrang-
ment from self. 
Desperate attempts (de-
lusions) to explain 
thought changes. 
Blurred and distorted 
vision. 
Diminution of perception. 
Unusual perceptions seem 
to emanate from mechan-
ical or sub-human forces. 
Perceptual changes may 
be experienced as frigh-
tening, threatening, 
dangerous. 
PSYCHEDELIC EXPERIENCE 
(continued) 
Identity 
Feeling of unity with 
people and material 
objects. 
Experience of the Self. 
Feeling of being at 
one with the world. 
Feelings of humility 
and awe as one sees 
oneself as part of 
the universe. 
Feelings of integrity 
and iden ti ty. 
Pleasant, creative fan-
tasies that one can 
control. 
Feeling that one can join the company of 
other enlightened 
people. 
PSYCHOTIC EXPERIENCE 
(continued) 
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Feeling of invasion by 
people and material 
objects. 
Experience of the No-
self, ego fragmenta tion. 
Feeling of being oppo sed 
to and in conflict with 
oneself and the world. 
Feelings of smallness 
and insignificance as 
one feels at the mercy 
of the universe. 
Loss of integrity and 
identity. 
Nightmarish fantasies 
that one cannot control. 
Feeling that one is less 
and less human, mor,e and 
more isolated. 
(pp. 117 - 119) 
Psychedelic experience then appears to involve an exten-
sion of the GRO, a reaching out towards and a positive 
relationship with the physical and cultural environments 
at all levels. Psychotic experience suggests the part-
ial collapse of the GRO so that the person feels he has 
become trapped within it. 
This trend is supported by an experiment in hypnosis 
carried out by Aaronson (1969). A subject was given 
first the suggestion that the dimension of depth was 
gone. He showed marked schizophreniform behaviour with 
catatonic ·features. He perceived the ceilings and walls 
as closing down on him. When he was given the sugges-
tion of expanded depth, lines seemed sharper, colours in-
tensified, everything seemed to have a place and to be 
in its place and to be aesthetically satisfying, the hand 
of God manifesting itself in his creation. Tne subject 
had not read material which could have suggested these 
reactions to him. Another subject, given a "no depth" 
suggestion experienced everything as flattened out, and 
colours, shapes and sounds as less intense. He reported 
a loss of sensitivity to touch and became bored, with-
drawn and hostile. A second suggestion of "no depth" in 
the same subject four months later produced apathy and 
withdrawal with little affect shown. He did not appear 
hostile but felt the environment had become alien and 
the people around him dehumanised. 
Since the GRO is the surrogate of the environment at all 
levels, and since depth must be one of its dimensions 
as persons experience it, this study is very suggestive 
of the partial collapse (as opposed to deautomatization) 
of the GRO in the production of schizophrenic symptoms. 
An experiment cited by Masters and Houston (1967) also 
supports the distinction made by Siegler et al (197 .4). 
" 
" 
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'Schizophrenics given psychedel1cdrugs insisted that the 
ensuing experience was not the same as the psychotic ex-
perience. Huxley (1959) gave the example of the hard, 
alien world experienced by the schizophrenic, Renee, and 
remarked on the bewilderment of the schizophrenic at not 
being able to reverse his experience in the direction of 
normal perception and functioning. Wilber (1975) states 
that, if the sohizophrenic sometimes does reach the 
level of the Transpersonal Bands, it is an experience 
which produces bewilderment, while in the mystic it is 
a positive experience. There is in fact the distinct 
possibility that the schizophrenic's experiences are 
limited to the sensory level (as described by Masters 
& Houston, 1967) or alternatively to the contents of the 
personal unconscious as opposed to the collective uncon-
scious of Wilber's model. Presentation of material in 
either of these modes would be symbolic in the same way 
as dreams are symbolic. Tl:e similarity between psychotic 
and psychedelic experience then is semantic and symbolic 
in origin, rather than a true similarity. 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
In a comprehensive article, Ludwig (1969) discusses the 
production of ASCs, the basic features they have in com-
mon, despite differences in manifestation and subject-
ive experience, and their maladaptive and adaptive 
functions. 
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Maladaptive expressions represent: attempts to resolve 
emotional oonflicts as in fugues, amnesias, traumatio 
neuroses, depersonalisation and dissociation; defensive 
functions in t hreatening situations conducive to the 
arousal of anxiety as in hypnoidal states during psycho-
therapy; a breakthrough of forbidden impulses as in 
acute psychotic and panic reaotions; esoape from respon-
sibilities and inner tensions in the use of narcotics, 
marijuana and aluohol; the symbolic acting-out of uncon-
soious conflicts as in demoniacal possession and bewi t .C11-
ment; manifestations of orga nic lesions or neurophysio-
logical disturbances as in auras and toxic conditions; 
inadvertent and potentially dangerous responses to cer-
tain stimuli a s in highway hypnOSis, and radar screen and 
sentry duty trance. 
Adaptive functions of ASCs are found in the healing arts 
and practices; in their use as avenues of new knowledge 
and experience; and in their use in groups to serve in-
dividual and group needs. 
Ludwig ooncludes that ASCs might be regarded as ·final 
oommon pathways for a great variety of human expression, 
some of which is atavistio and harmful to the individ.ual 
or society, · the res t of which enables man to transcend 
the bounds of logic and f ormality or express repressed 
needs and desires in a socially sanctioned way. 
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It would seem that any confusion between schizophrenia 
and mysticism arises from the fact that they have ASCs 
in common. It has been argued that ASCs are potentially 
within the range of experience of all humans, inferent-
ially in all cultures throughout recorded time. lIence 
it cannot be argued that pathology results from a lack 
of social channels for the expression of a talent like 
ESP . Nor can it be argued that during earlier periods 
of history, schizophrenics got away with deviant behav-
icur because persons in their culture were superstit-
ious and gullible. ASCs in isolation are neutral in 
quality regardless of the prevailing cosmology. They 
take their significance from the chara.cter and behav-
iour of the person experiencing them. Hence the main 
consideration in distinguishing between mysticism a.nd 
schizophrenia is that of relationship to culture at the 
Ego Level and the accent is not on conformity but on 
the degree to which the persoll in question is able to 
use the culturally determined GIiO for self-actualisation 
at every level. In this sense the schizophrenic has a 
negative relationship to his culture and by inference, 
to life itself, while the mystic not only has a positive 
relationship to his culture but also to some tra.nscen-
dent, creative principle which would seem to link humans 
in a purpose that goes beyond that of mere self-actual-
isation. 
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As Moss (1976) indicates, a distinction is drawn in 
primitive cultures between those who possess their spirits 
and those who are possessed by them. It is possible to 
assert that, when faced with tr.e grosser manifestations 
of the latter condition, most persons are capable of mat-
ing this distinction. 
PART II 
JOAN OF ARC AN EVALUATION 
Whether her c&reer was a miracle of Heaven or a 
device of men ••• I should find it hard to say 
.... It is a phenomenon whioh deserves to be 
recorded, although after ages are likely to 
regard it with more wonder than credulity. 
Pope Pius II (1405 - 1464) 
CHAPTER 6 
A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
' The legend is now too old, too rugged, even 
too hallowed ever to be seriously modified. ' 
Milton Waldman 
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The France into which Joan of Arc was born in 1412 had 
been harassed and devastated by war with England since 
1337, the so-called Hundred Years' War, which had been 
fought entirely on French soil. Through this war the 
English kings tried to unite France and England under 
one crown, their own. England, smaller, less wealthy 
and less populous than France, had been able to sustain 
a war of this nature only because France itself was in 
the throes of civil war, being by 1429, the year of 
Joan's emergence on the political scene, divided into 
two parts, Armagnao and Burgundian. The Armagnacs, who 
were the supporters of Louis of Orleans and who baclced 
the Dauphin Charles in his claim to the throne, held 
most of Franoe south of the Loire. The opposlng faction, 
led by the Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good, controlled 
most of the north and east of France and also the rich 
cloth towns and trading centres of the low countries. 
The Burgundians were allies of the English against 
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Charles and the Armagnacs. 
By the Treaty of Troyes (May 1420), it had been agreed 
that Henry V of England should take the title of Regent 
and Heir of France, should marry Catherine, the daughter 
of the French King, Charles VI, and should suc0eed to 
the throne of France upon Charles VI's death, so uniting 
France and England. By this treaty, the claims of the 
Dauphin Charles were disregarded, his mother tacitly 
agreeing and so implying he was a bastard. Henry V died 
on 31 August 1422 and Charles VI on 21 October 1422, 
leaving France with what amounted to two heirs to the 
throne (Saclcville-West, 1948). The infant English 
king, Henry VI's, interests in France were defended by 
his uncle and regent, the Duke of Bedford. The Dauphin 
Charles was old enough to press his claim to the throne 
but is repre~ented as being rather weak and indecisive 
at this stage of his career. 
Joan's birthplace, Domremy, lay on the borders of the 
D.ucllies of Bar and Lorraine. While it was technically 
part of the D.uchy of Bar, it belonged to that part which 
depended directly from the French crown, making Joan by 
birth a subject of the French king, ruled directly by 
royal administration. Part of the village of Domremy 
itself formed a seigneury belonging to the Bourlement 
family, malcing Lt part of the portion of the Duchy of 
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Bar which was not under the control of the French crown. 
Although this sort of arrangement was not unusual in 
feudal times, in the case of Domremy it is significant 
because the various relationships could be interpreted 
in national terms, mal<ing the village a microcosm of the 
distressed conditions of the .king(lQlll, while at the same 
time it was not subject to the social breakdown which 
was present in other parts of the realm (Lucie-Smith, 
1976) . 
Joan's father was not a peasant but a fairly influential 
tenant farmer (Vale, 1974). Evidence suggests that her 
mother was an enthusiastic pilgrim and belonged to a 
religious movement popular among the lower classes at 
that time (Fabre, 1954). It was probably in her twelfth 
year that Joan began to see visions and hear voices. 
The voices were those of the Archangel Michael, and of 
St Catherine and St Margaret, who succeeded him as her 
personal advisers. The Archangel revealed to Joan that 
she had been chosen by God, who was moved by a great 
compass1on for France, to go to the aid of the Dauphin. 
She would oause the siege of Orleans to be raised and 
the Dauphin to be orowned. It took four years for her 
scepticism to be worn down by the persistenoe of the 
voioes (ibid). She had heard of the prophecy that a 
virgin would undo the wiol<edness oaused by an evil woman 
and this probably provided further authorisation for the 
160 
purpose being formed in her with the aid of her voioes 
(Luoie-Smith, 1976). 
In 1428 Joan persuaded her oousin's husband, Durand 
Laxart, to take her to Vauoouleurs to request Robert de 
Baudrioourt, the oaptain of the garrison there, to send 
her to the Dauphin at Chinon. As her voioes had pre-
dioted her reoeption was unfavourable, De Baudrioourt 
being a down-to-earth, professional soldier, not easily 
influenoed by superstition. By February 1429, however, 
he had been persuaded to support her,and Joan and her 
party set out for Chinon on 23 February. 
At her first meeting with the Dauphin, she won his oon-
fidenoe; and after she had been subjeoted to tests like 
an enquiry before the learned men at Poi tiers and an 
examination to asoertain that her olaim to be a virgin 
was true, she was sent to Orleans where she played a 001-
ourful, if unorthodox, part in the raising of the siege, 
whioh ended on 8 May 1429. Other viotories followed and, 
on 17 July 1429, Joan was present at the orowning of 
Charles VII at Rheims. 
Joan wished Charles to follow through his advantage and 
subdue Paris, from whioh he had been driven by the Bur-
gundians in 1418. Charles delayed, perhaps owing to his 
growing uneasiness over Joan's influence; perhaps per-
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suaded by his advisers, who could not have been happy 
at the threat to their vested interests. It seems clear 
that the diplomatic strategy favoured by Charles now he 
had become king and Joan's less subtle intention of driv-
ing the English willy-nilly from France caused the inter-
ests of the Maid and the king to diverge (Lucie-Smith, 
1976) • 
, The atta ck on Paris, which eventually took place on 
18 September, was a failure. Joan's impressive success-
es had by now come to an end and Lucie-Smith suggests 
that not only did Charles VII lose some of his confidence 
in her but that she bega n -to lose confidence in herself. 
She was finally taken prisoner at Compiegne by the Bur-
gundians, who sold her to the English. The latter deliv-
ered her into the hands of the Inquisition. Pierre 
Cauchon, Bishop of Beauvais, was appOinted to judge the 
case. 
At first her inqUisitors tried to lay a charge of sorcery 
against her. They failed to prove that Joan was a sorcer-
ess; ,but from her replies during the preliminary invest-
igations, saw that t hey could profitably charge her with 
heresy. The trial at, Rouen was a fair one in t he narrwl 
sense of the word, since in terms of the definition of 
heresy of that time, Joan was an heretic (Lucie-Smith, 
1976). Nevertheless, it must also be borne in mind that 
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the English were determined to burn her, so that her 
abjuration on 24 May was an embarrassment; for by this 
means she esoaped death at the stake, if nOL imprison-
ment. There is indeed evidenoe to suggest that her sub-
sequent relapse into heresy on 27 May was engineered 
(ibid). Joan was oondemned as an heretio and handed over 
to the seoular power, in this oase tlle English, for exe-
oution. She was burnt at the stake tllree days later. 
In July 1456, after rehabilitation prooeedings begun in 
1450, the sentenoe was revoked by Pope Ca1ixtus III. On 
16 May 1920, Joan was oanonisedby Pope Benediot xv. 
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CHAPTER 7 
JOAN OF ARC - SCHIZOPHRENIC OR MYSTIC? 
But nothing that is human ever assumes final form: 
no crystallization is exempt from the flux and 
flow that is life itself. 
Charles Wayland Lightbody 
7. INTRODUCTION 
Joan of Arc is one of the most controversial ' figures in 
history. Lightbody (1961) remarks that "each generation, 
each new grouping of creative spirits, even each histor-
ian, poet or artist, if of an independent and original 
turn of mind, sees her in a different light" (p 17). It 
is perhaps a tribute to the complexi ty of Joan's person-
ality and the activeness of the role she played during a 
turbulent period in French history that they can sustain 
such interest. A study of her life does i mpress the read-
er with the curious interplay of synchronicity, human 
motive and deoision, and events that shape a person's life 
and the fairly limited application of the rules of cause 
and effect in human affairs. 
The nature of this study forbids excursions into many 
aspects of the life of Joan. There are, however, a num-
ber of problems in viewing her career that should be 
mentioned before she can be discussed in terms of the 
frame of reference established in Part 1. 
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The modern reader, perhaps any reader, approaches the 
subject of Joan of Arc at a disadvantage. It is a dis-
advantage which results from the stereotyped connotations 
of the title ". saint l' • The Church confers the honour of 
sainthood, seleoting those details of a total life that 
suggest a more than ordinary Christi~n dedication. The 
ensuing hagiographio myth is a working of that detail 
and an adaptation of other detail into a pattern that 
best fits the tenets of the Church's dogma. . Should the 
reader be a believer, he will be dismayed to read a bio-
graphy in whioh the human failings of Joan are r evealed. 
As Lightbody says, "the a priori assumption of the great 
majority of historical Lsii/ students who deal with Joan 
is that, since she was always right, anyone who opposed 
her can only have been wrong- (p.19). 
Should the reader on the other hand be an unbeliever and 
especially a psyohologist, he will feel the need to ex-
pose t he humanity denied by this paragon of piety, pas-
sivity and asexuality. Having shown to his satisfaction 
that ordinary human impulses were present, he may debunk 
saintliness as a oharacteristic and, in the presence of 
visions and VOices, may triumphantly consign his victim 
to the many imaginary mental hospitals scattered through-
out the oenturies. It is important to realise that 
saintliness, far from being an inherent quality of the 
psyche, is the result of a series of oonscious choices 
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throughout a life-time. If the saint in Question is 
found to be as full of allegedly wicked impulses as the 
ordinary person, his distinction is a tribute to the 
strength of his oommitment. It should not be surprising 
then that, as Luoie-Smith (1976) states, the myth and 
the facts in the oase of Joan are subtly at variance. 
In no oiroumst~nces should the human Qualities of arro-
gance or boastfulness or an example even of an outright 
lie (ibid) make a reader diagnose sohizophrenia in a 
panic reaction to his own misguided preconoeptions. He 
must also beware of aooepting without Question the latest 
myth ereoted on the faotual substratum. It is a myt11 
both entioingly familiar and dear to the heart of psych -
ology students, so muoh so that its very application 
makes Joan of Aro a muoh more reoognisable human figure. 
It is the psyohoanalytio myth. 
Luoie-Smith, in his outstanding biography, puts forward 
a number of interes ting speoulations about Joan's psyoh-
ology, whioh tell the reader a great deal about Luoie-
Smith's beliefs with regard to the human psyohe and very 
little that is helpful in explaining the phenomenon of 
Joan in her totality. While speculation can be stimUlat-
ing and valuable, it is important to realise that, should 
the underlying purpose be to prove abnormality, it is 
presumptuous to narratise for and so reduce, one who is 
oapable of narratising for himself. Psyohoanalytical 
. . 
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theory derived from the neurotio and psyohotic and then 
applied to fully funotioning persons oan be very mislead-
ing. Two examples of the pitfalls inherent in this ap-
proaoh will suffioe. 
Joan's father had a dream in whioh his daughter rode away 
with men-at-arms. He reaoted violently to this, saying 
that if he thought it would happen, he would drown her if 
her brothers would not. Luoie-Smith's oomment is as fol-
lows: 
To a modern psyoholoanalyst suoh a dream might have 
quite oomplex implications. To 'go away with men-
at-arms' meant, in a fifteenth-oentury oontext, that 
Joan was doomed to beoome a soldiers' trull. If her 
father's suboonsoious was ready to plaoe her in suoh 
a situation, it implies a wish to possess her himself. 
The dream, therefore, has a strongly inoestuous ele-
ment, oombined with a degree of sadism. This is a 
rape fantasy, as well as an inoest fantasy. (p. 24) 
In addition, Joan was involved in a breaoh of promise suit 
brought by a young man who maintained that she had promis-
ed to marry him. Her parents did not aooompany her to 
Toul to defend herself, implying that they wished her to 
marry and in faot had made a determined effort to arrange 
this. Luoie-Smith sees this also as an indioation of "un-
formulated family tensions" (p. 26) whioh made Joan's pre-
senoe in her father's house unoomfortable. He suggests 
that this illioit sexual longing played a part not only 
in the produotion of her voioes but also ih the shaping 
of her mission. 
167 
The problem with this sort of speoulation is that there 
can be hardly a parent who has not had at least one such 
dream about his or her child, nor indeed a child who 
could not be shown to have had covert incestuous desires 
by the motivated researcher. The presence of suoh dreams 
is not enough to produce abnormality and to use them to 
suggest it is already to presuppose abnormality. Surely, 
the most logioal and least misleading explanation is t11at 
Jacques d'Arc, anxious because of his daughter's growing 
interest in mi l itary affairs (Fabre, 195~) or perhaps 
having been told of some unguarded remark of Joan 
(Guillemin, 1972), expressed in a dream his anxiety that 
she would be a camp follower, the only role he could have 
imagined for women among soldiers. Any eagerness to marry 
Joan to her suitor would be prompted by concern lest she 
disgrace the family and herself. 
After the battle 'of Patay, Joan saw a Frenchman i:1 charge 
of a group of English prisoners knock one of them on the 
head and leave him for dead. She heard the dying man's 
confession and comforted him as much as possible. Joan 
had no love of the English and for this reason alone the 
incident is interesting. Luoie-Smith (1976) co~ments 
that Joan was shocked as she always was when she was con-
fronted with .the horrors of war. There is some validity 
in this remark if it is remembered that it is a healthy 
defence mechanism to blot from the mind those things that 
, 
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cannot be ohanged and whioh might hamper efficient funot-
ioning. A hagiographer would probably quote this as an 
example of Joan's divine oompassion. The psychoanalytic 
time traveller would wax professional on the act as a 
symptom of growing delusions of grandeur as Joan took up-
on herself an office that lies within the provinoe of a 
priest. Surely, a sensible explanation is that Joan did 
feel genuine compassion for the man as opposed to the 
easily oounterfeited compassion of almsgiving; and gave 
him what she firmly believed would both comfort and save 
him. She was her usual practical self and her lack of 
learning combined with her confidence would prevent her 
from seeing the action as unorthodox. That she could not 
have been making claims for her own holiness on the 
strength of her reputation is suggested by the probability 
that the Englishman would be more prone to see her as a 
sorceress. 
To do Lucie-Smith justice his intention is not to prove 
that Joan was mad. . He quotes only one statement to sug-
gest mental instability and on the whole his comments 
would be more app1ioable to the neurotic personality. 
His intention is simply to "exhaust the possibilities of 
the natural world before aocepting any kind of supernatural 
explanation" (pp. 22 - 23), for there are three possible 
views that can be taken of Joan's career. The first is 
that her voices were divine in origin and that she was 
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appointed by God to resoue Franoe. The seoond is that 
her voioes and her oharaoter and oareer oan be explain-
ed rationally and that no supernatural intervention 
took plaoe. The last is that, though Joan is explic-
able in terms of oommcn experienoe, the part she played 
in the history of Franoe was not a mere oOinoidenoe or 
aooident but was subjeot to divine influenoe c(ib1d). 
The approaoh in this study is to disouss as rationally 
as possible events whioh at one level are explioable 
in terms of common experienoe but whioh also oontain 
elements for whioh there is not as yet any oonvincing 
explanation in the paradigm generally aooepted as being 
a rational view of the universe. As an aid the trans-
personal model of Wilber (1.4) has been adopted, first 
because it aooommodates supernatural events and seoond 
beoause, implioit in it, is the importanoe of the per-
son in oonstructing his own world and interaoting with 
it in ways that defy explanations. 
Joan's naIvete, vanity and arroganoe; her wearing of 
male olothing; her oonviotion on a oharge of heresy; 
her burning; whether her mission oan be oonsidered 
important in the long view of history; whether her 
rehabilitation in 1456 was undertaken merely to make 
Charles VII's crowning respeotable; whether she was 
an imposter, or a protegee ~f a faotion intending to 
inorease their influenoe with the king; the fact that 
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she was human and subjeot to life's ohances like every-
body else; none of these is relevant to the question 
of whether Joan was a sohizophrenio or a mystio. The 
answer for this study lies in an attempt to establish 
the health or otherwise of the GRO. It has already 
been stated that this is ea.sier in the case of Joan 
beoause there is so muoh reliable evidence recorded: 
Though Joan did not live in an illiterate society, 
she lived in one where the written word occupied 
a position which was both more and less authori-
tative than the one it has today. It was more 
authoritative because it was rarer, and people re-
lied upon it less for the same reason. One not-
iceable thing about the accounts giv en by witness-
es at the Trial of Rehabilitation is the way in 
which Joan's personality fills the direct quota-
tions t hey give. Their rec ollections of what she 
said are quite astonishingly cons istent with the 
record of the Trial of Condemnation, whioh is 
based on notes which were made on the spot, then 
welded into a continuous narrative after each 
day's session . We may reasonably believe that the 
men and women of the fifteenth century were in 
some respeots better equipped to preserve the 
truth for us than a similarly varied band of wit-
nesses would be today. Their verbal memories were 
demonstrably better, and we do well to pay atten-
tion to the nuanoes, as well as the aotual content, 
of their testimony. The way in which a thing is 
reported can be nearly as important as the f acts. 
r(Lucie-Smith, 1976" p. xiv) 
Lucie-Smith comments that the inner consistency of a 
great part of the documentation has been underestimated, 
rather than overestimated, by historians. 
7.1 JOAN OF ARC AS A SCHIZOPHRENIC 
It has been postulated that schizophrenics are persons 
who, owing to an intrinsic handicap which is probably 
of a biochemical nature, have developed secondary hand-
'. 
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icaps as a result of the reactions of other persons to 
such symptoms as wooden facial expression and stiff gait. 
The result is a range of reaotions that have come to be 
associated with sohizophrenia because the GRO at the 
schizophrenios' disposal is not congruent with that of 
other members of their culture. Their performance at 
virtually any task, creative, routine and personal, may 
be impaired, depending ' on the degree of intrinsic hand-
icap. The inade~uacy of the GRO as a tool for autono-
mous living may be due either to a physiological failure 
to maintain it (waking consciousness) at optimal level" 
with resulting aberrations of perception; , . or o.u(O to the 
oumulative effects of isolation. 
There has been a teno.ency in the past to see Joan as 
speno.ing a great deal of her chilo.hooo. as a herder 'of 
sheep in a remote and isolated plaoe in the country; 
a possible conclusion from this is that Joan's thinking 
became distorted as a result of a lack of stimUlation. 
The picture, however, owes something to the allegorical 
thinking of mediaeval times (Lucie-Smith, 1976) and is 
not partioularly aoourate. While Joan probably did 
drive the flocks to pasture, she did so only when it was 
her turn. Though Domremy was not as devastated by the 
war as other parts of France, it is clear that it was 
not isolated, despite the lack of sophistioated mass 
communication. The war was reflected in the rivalry 
'. 
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between the children of Maxey (Burgundian in sympathy) 
and Domremy; and there were other sources of inform-
ation available, such as the talk of elders and the 
great Roman road because along it passed persons of all 
ranks and oocupations (Fabre, 1954). The issues of the 
war, then, were within the range of a child's compre-
hension of its environment (Lucie-Smith, 1976). Moreover, 
the fifteenth century was one permeated with faith and 
mysticism in a way almost impossible for the · modern per-
son to comprehend. The supernatural occurrence was 
theoretically as lilcely as any more mundane one (Fabre, 
1954). Added to this there were precedents of seers 
wielding influence in high places, and an abundance of 
astrologers, magicians, prophets and visionaries (Lucie-
Smith, 1976). It seems then that, in a general sense, 
the cultural content of the GRO in the case of Jo an was 
both oongruent and appropriate, the only really unusual 
and original aspect being her wearing of male clothes 
and partiCipation i n warfare. "The role of prophetess 
was one of tl1e few wl1ich allowed a woman to play an act-
i ve part in great affairs" (ibid, p. 69). From this 
point of view, Joan's mission can be seen as a creative 
synthesis of cultural components serving as authorisa-
tion for goal-directed behaviour totally in harmony with 
her social context. 
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7.1.1 THE ATTITUDE OF OTHER PERSONS TO JOAN 
With the exoeption of growing piety, excessive in the 
eyes of those who did not share it, Joan's childhood 
friendships appear to have been normal. Referring to 
Joan's being pious, her friend, Mengette, said that 
"her oomrades ' and I said she was too muoh so" (Lucie-
Smith, 1976,p. 14). This is revealing in that it sug-
gests that, while Joan's comrades found occasion to 
oritioise her devotion, she was, nevertheles.s, one of 
them. Another friend, Hauviette, when she heard of 
Joan's departure wept, saying that Joan h~d been her 
best friend and "I loved her much for her many kindness-
es" (Fabre, 1954, p. 72). Again, the implication is 
that Joan participated equally in the relationship and 
was not merely pitied and sheltered by Hauviette . 
That Joan, besides not exhibiting the physioal pecul-
iarities and/or eocentricities of the schizophrenic, 
possessed an unusually persuasive and arresting person-
ality and great confidence is suggested by the reactions 
of those about her to her mission. These re~ctions were 
not confined only to the beginning of her oareer. In 
fact desoriptions of her oonduot are unusually consist-
ent throughout it. Joan did not lose popularity because 
her hypothetioal "oondition" deteriorated but because, 
like all those who playa definitive role in public life, 
she was subject to life's fortunes. 
". 
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To launoh herself into the destiny she believed she was 
born for, Joan persuaded Durand Laxart, a humble field-
worker, to take her before Robert de Baudrioourt, the 
oaptain of the garrison of Vauoouleurs. While it may 
be true that fifteenth oentury persons were more willing 
to believe in those who olaimed to be divinely inspired, 
it is also likely that the oriteria used to separate the 
oompetent from the inoompetent would be more strongly 
relevant. It is unlikely that Laxart would have risked 
oensure by presenting Joan to De Baudrioourt if there 
had been any hint of the oharaoteristios that, aooording 
to this study, prevent sohizophrenics from being aooept-
ed. The oaptain himself, a professional soldier, was 
not the man to aooept this sort of olaim readily and 
his initial reaotion was soeptioism. Durin~ the inter-
val that elapsed between Joan's announoing herself to 
De Baudrioourt and his finally agreeing to support her, 
she made many oonverts to her oause, so muoh so that 
the people of Vauoouleurs, oharmed by her piety and 
Quiet manner, had a full set of male olothing made for 
her before she left for the Dauphin's oourt at Chinon 
(Luoie-Smith, 1976). This suggests that her oonformity 
in other spheres must have been impressive indeed for 
them to aooept what must have been a stunning innovation. 
It is probable that their enthusiasm influenoedDe Bau-
drioourt favourably. 
175 
De Baudrioourt seems to have tested Joan before risking 
his reputation by sending her to the Dauphin. He was, 
for example, satisfied by her demeanour when she visit-
ed the court of Duke Charles of Lorraine at Nancy, the 
visit having the appearance of a trial to test Joan's 
mettle. He also had the local cure exorcise Joan, much 
to her indignation. She had confessed herself to the 
cure already and been granted absolution. Needless to 
say, she was not possessed of devils. If, as Vale (1974) 
suggests, Joan was a protegee of the House of Anjou, 
which wished to exploit the Dauphin's interest in astro-
logy and prognostication by introducing Joan as the vir-
gin foretold by Maria d'Avignon as the saviour of ?rance, 
the chances are that they would have chosen a seer quite 
obviously sane. It has also been suggested that persons 
at Charles's court gave1>e Baudricourt permission to 
send her to Chinon (Guillemin, 1972). Again, it is 
clear that Joan must have met the cultural criteria of 
normality and conformity. 
Charles himself was impressed with Joan. Nevertheless, 
he did not send her straight to Orleans but subjected 
her to tests, one being held at Poitiers where she ap-
peared before a com~ittee of churchmen he had apPOinted; 
and " ••• they were greatly astonished, that a si~ple 
shepherdess, a young girl, should so prudently reply" 
(cited in Lucie-Smith,1976,p. 74). It is likely that 
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the examiners at Foitiers wer e prejudioed in Joan's fav-
our, Gerard Maohet and Jean trault aotually reoalling 
Marie d'Avignon's propheoy. It would, however, be pre-
sumptuous to believe that thes e men would be blind to 
the symptoms of madness. 
If it were supposed that Joan's astonishing olai~s and 
her early suooess blinded those about her to what was 
obvious, it would be as logioal to suppose that onoe she 
had lost her aura of invinoibility, that onoe she had 
lost her influenoe, that onoe her own oonfidenoe had 
been shaken, the hitherto unaoknowledged symptoms of 
madness would have been disoerned. After the defeat at 
Paris, for instanoe,the royal troops ".oursed the 
Uaid bitterly, for she had promised them that Paris would 
oertainly fall to their assault" (oi ted in " Lu"oie-, , " 
Smith, 1976,p. 179). This represents a oomplete reversal 
in Joan's popularity in this quarter . Shortly after-
wards, Joan spent a period of three weeks in the house 
of 1~argaret La Touroulde, the wife of the royal oounoil-
or in oharge of finances. In her deposition before the 
Trial of Rehabilitation she said that she had been oon-
stantly in Joan's oompany and never peroeived anything 
wrong, Joan's behaving like an honest Catholio woman 
(Luoie-Smith, 1976). Lest it be sugges ted that the form 
of the question would exolude oomments that oould pertain, 
to sanity, it must be remembered that the aim at the 
177 
Trial of Rehabilitation was to olear the Maid of heresy. 
"Mad"' symptoms could have been defined as heretic3.1 or 
due to sorcery. Margaret added that Joan, in response 
to a remark that her bravery in battle was due to the 
fact that she knew she could not be killed, replied that 
she was no safer than any other combatant . If the stu-
dent does not assume that this was a rather boastful 
defenoe of her oourage (and oourage after all would be 
sacrifioed to the muoh more impressive quality of omnis-
oienoe), this was the modest r eply of a woman who was 
not making any speoial olaim for herself. Certainly it 
does not aooord with the 3.ocepted pioture of a deluded 
woman. 
While Joan was a prisoner of Jean de Luxembourg, she Vias 
transferred to the ohateau of Beaurevoir. Here, she and 
her hostesses, Jean's Wife, aunt and step-daughter, est-
ablished a strong bond of , sympathy. Joan's liking was 
so great that she deolared that of all the women in 
Franoe, with the exoeption of the Queen, these had the 
greatest chanoe of persuading her to adopt woman's dress, 
oould she be so persuaded. Jean's aunt was so impressed 
that she attempted to persuade her nephew to deal light-
ly with Joan; and he , did in fact delay handing her over 
to her enemies until the aunt's death. 
During her trial, Joan spoke soathingly of the English 
in reply to a question. A great English lord, who had 
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managed to secure entrance intc the ccurt, co~mented in 
admiration, "Really, this is a fine woman. If only she 
was English" (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976,p. 240). A 
well-respected priest and legal expert, Jean Lohier, 
arrived in Rouen. Asked tc give his opinion of trJe 
trial, he replied after two or three days' study, that 
he thought it invalid. Moreover, he commented as fol-
lows: 
You see how they are setting about it. ' They will 
catoh her, if they can, through her own words, I 
mean thanks to those assertions where she says I 
know for oertain about ber appariticns. But if-
she said It seems to me, rather than I know for 
certain, then I am convinced that no man could 
condemn her. It looks as if they are proceeding 
more out of hatred than otherwise; and for this 
reason I will not remain here, because I do not 
want to be in this place any longer. (cited in 
Lucie-Smith,1976, p. 244) 
Lohier's criticism of Joan is of a legal and theological 
nature. It is clear that she must have made a favourable 
impression upon him. Lucie-Smith oomments that she im-
pressed her judges despite themselves and the threat she 
posed to them. 
There appears to be a consistency both of reaction to, 
and behaviour on the part of, Joan that sugges ts that 
her personality was clearly defined and that she pos-
sessed integrity. 
7.1. 2 SKILL AND COMPETENCE 
In this section it is necessary to decide whether Joan 
179 
developed a sense of socio-cultural competence and was 
able to live a life of her own. According to White, 
competency is "the cumulative product of one's history 
of efficacies and inefficacies" (3.1). Lightbody (1961) 
comments that Joan's confidence was sublime. The facts 
suggest that this confidence was not entirely misplaced. 
Joan's village contemporaries testified to her being a 
hard and willing worker, both at tasks that required 
strenuous physical effort (which built up the reserves 
of strength she was to demonstrate later) and at house-
hold tasks like sewing and spinning, at which she was 
accomplished, claiming that she could hold her own with 
any woman in Rouen. She also carried out all the house-
hold tasks common to girls of her class. Clearly, in 
competence, she conformed to the expectations of her 
community. 
Joan's ability and confidence were such that they could 
be generalised to operate in a more sophisticated milieu. 
The court at Chinon was impressed with her "graceful 
good manners'l (Lucie-Smith, 1976,p. 126). She was also 
an excellent horsewoman. 
That her competence extended to the management of people 
is suggested by her shrewd sensitivity to the laws gov-
erning morale when she inSisted that the armies approach-
ing Orleans with her should be shriven. During the rais-
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ing of the siege another example of this can be found: 
Excited by their successes of the previous day, the 
French on this occasion might easily have accepted 
the challenge, probably with disastrous consequences. 
Their leaders had some difficulty in holding them 
back. Joan, though hot-headed, did not lack common 
sense, and on this occasion she was in favour of 
restraint. Her reasons were religious as well as 
practical. She did not want to fight on a Sunday, 
unless the English themselves were the firs t to 
make an assault. Her method of ensuring that her 
commands were obeyed shows what a shrewd instinc-
tive psychologist she could be. She com1!anded some 
of the clergymen of Orleans to put on their vest-
ments and come into the fields with the troops, and 
here they 'sang with great solemnity hymns, respon-
ses and devout orisons, giving praise and thanks to 
GOd'. A portable altar was brought, and two masses 
were said. Once tbis had been done, Joan asked: 
'Now, look and see if they have their faces towards 
you, or their backs?' She was told that the enemy 
were retreatingi and said: 'Let them go . It is 
not Messire's iGOd'il pleasure that they should be 
fought today. You will have them another tiwe.' 
(ibid, p. 123) 
There are two other examples at least that suggest this 
quality of shrewdness in Joan. During the examination 
at Poitiers, Joan " ••• greatly moved the women, 'ladies, 
damoiselles and townswomen', who flocked into her pre-
sence, speaking to them 'so gently and graciously t hat 
she made them wee)).'. At other times she was to be seen 
engaged in more warlike exercises, 'gOing with the men-
at-arms to the fields and coursing with the lance as 
well as any, and riding black ohargers, so bad-tempered 
that none dared to ride them' II (ibid, p. 75). 
The second example is: 
And she rode always armed in habiliments of war, 
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and the other people of her company were also 'thus, 
and she spoke as prudently of war as any captain 
could. And when it happened that there was in the 
host any cry or affray, she came whether on horse-
back or on foot, as valiantly as a captain of the 
company would have known how to do, giving courage 
and hardiness to all the others, and admonishing 
them to keep good watch and guard in the army, as 
reasonably one ought to do. (cited in Lucie-Smith, 
1976, pp. 149 - 150) 
Lucie-Smith comments that these were some of the happiest. 
days she ever spent, implying that her fantasy found full 
and unlicensed expression at this time. It is, however, 
arguable that Joan was not living out a fantasy as a 
small boy might play at soldiers. There is a strong ele-
ment of unconscious showmanship in these ex~mples. Joan 
knew how to sell herself. It is an ability that is es-
sential to most forms of spectacular public life. 
When Joan rode to war to relieve the siege of Orleans, 
she appears to have known very little about strategy. 
Indeed, her main contribution seems to have been cataly-
tic in that, in her presence, potentials already present 
but suppressed by the tedium and despair of the war were 
realised. The captains viewed with alarm some of what 
they considered her more reckless decisions. Her ambig-
uous position among the leaders is suggested by her be-
ing relegated to the rearguard before the battle of Patay 
(Lucie-Smith, 1976). Nevertheless, there is evidence to 
suggest that' Joan learned something of the art of war. 
The Burgundian chronicler, Monstrelet, denied that Joan 
played a decisive part in the raising of the siege of 
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Orleans but reported that the garrison at Beaugenoy felt 
that they had lost the battle beoause of her presenoe in 
the opposing army (ibid). Joan's reputation probably 
played a part here. The oompliment of Dunois to Joan's 
ability during the Siege of Troyes, however, is une~ui­
vooal in its signifioanoe. 
The positions she took up were so admirable ..• 
that the most famous and experienoed oaptains 
would not have made so good a plan of battle. 
(Oited in Luoie-Smith, 1976,p. 155) 
Joan's ignorance, far from detracting from a sense of 
her oompetenoe, enhances it. By the time of her capture 
there is evidence to suggest that Joan had been given 
her own command by King Charles VII. The latter's motives 
may be ~uestionable (it is embarrassing to owe one's 
orown to a young woman who understands nothing of diplom-
atic expedienoe and is dedioated to battles with t0e Eng-
lish and the launching of orusades ). It seems olear, 
however, that he could not have bestowed suoh a position 
on an inade~uate or incompetent personality. 
Lucie-Smith, in discussing Joan's feelings on the road to 
Rheims, makes the following comment: 
Her obsession demanded of her that she establish oom-
plete control over the situation in which she found 
herself, so that events would follow the patterns it 
prescribed. (Lucie-Smith, 1976,p. 159) 
This is in faot a tremendous compliment to Joan's compe-
tence if the reader allows that he is correot. Her con-
trol after all did not extend to a household or a school. 
The life picture she was oonstructing contained factors 
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like a king, oourtiers, generals, soldiers of fortune, 
. reoruits from allover the kingdom (enlisting in the 
army at their own expense) and the aotual need to do 
battle. She did this for several months. Even if al-
lowanoe is made for mass fervour and luok, it is still 
a remarkable feat. Aooording to T. Douglas Murray (oit-
ed in Lightbody, 1961) Joan aohieved ~in short months •• 
•• more than Alexander and Caesar aooomplished in so 
muoh time, and at an age when even Alexander 'had as yet 
aohieved nothing· · (p. 29). That she aohieved this in 
unor'ithodox ways should not alarm anyone other than a 
taotioal purist. 
7.1.3 VERBAL ABILITY 
~~ere is a seoond area in whioh Joan's skill seems un-
questionable, an area where on the whole the experts 
agree that the average sohizophrenio does not shine. 
Joan's verbal skill was remarkable. Her "inoomparable 
pithiness and direotness are things whioh oarry aoross 
\ the ages, and whioh would in themselves serve to justify 
her apparently undying renown" (;Luoie-Smith, 1976"p. xiv). 
Her suooessful defenoe of herself in the breaoh of prom-
ise suit brought by her suitor before the eoolesiastioal 
tribunal at .Toul bears early testimony, not only to her 
oonfidenoe but to her ability to present her oase oon-
vinoingly and intelligibly. 
"' 
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A few examples of these oomments will suffioe to show 
their pertinenoe and their clarity. 
At the coronation of Charles VII at Rheims, Joan was 
permitted to talce her standard into the cathedral while 
those of the other captains were not allowed. In reply 
to her judges' question about this, she replied, "It had 
borne the burden ••. and it was right that it should 
have the honour" (cited in lucie-Smith, 1976;p. 162). 
Joan was asked, during the trial whether she believed 
she was in a state of grace. This was a trick question 
because, if Joan did not admit she was not in a state of 
grace, she would be claiming to know God's mind on the 
subject. She replied, "If I am not, may God put me in 
it; and if I am may God keep me in it" (cited in Lucie-
Smi th, 1976, p. 239). 
In the end, they took to threatening her. She 
would be burnt, they said, if she perSisted in 
her heresy. She answered - and the olerk wro te 
t he words Superba responsio in the margin of his 
manuscript - 'I will say no more about that. 
Were I to see t he fire, I would still say all that 
I have said, and would not do otherwise.' 
(Saokville-Wes t, 1948, p. 271) 
It is due to Joan's verba l skill that an added dimens ion 
of the health of her GRO oan be established. Bannister's 
theory of thought disorder already mentioned (3.2) is 
that it is a form of loose oon~truing and, beoause it is 
loose, it is inoonsistent. Hence a schizophrenic's 
thought is not only different from normal thinking but 
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also different from his own thinking at another time. 
During the seoond session of the oourt, on 22 February, 
there was an attempt to make a reoord parallel to the 
one made by the offioial notaries. The purpose appears 
to have been to prejudioe the reoords against Joan. 
One of . the notaries, Manohon, reoorded his indignation 
thus: 
At the beginning, by oomnand of LITauohogl the two 
olerios stationed themselves near a window behind 
a ourtain, just by the £laoe where the judges were, 
while LillY fellow notar~ and I were at the foot of 
the judges, in addition to Jean Monnet, seoretary 
to Jean Beaup~re. These two Lbiddeg7 olerks wrote 
while Joan spoke, and they reported what went 
against her and suppressed her exouses. I think 
Master Loiselleur kept himself hidden with them, to 
keep an eye on what they wrote. After dinner there 
was made, in the bishop's house, in the presenoe of 
several dootors, the oollation of our writings. 
But as tbe two olerks reported things differently 
from me, and did not put in what exoused Joan, 
LCauohoiY beoame very angry with me. It was repre-
sented to me tha t others had written differently, 
and people tried to get me to write what tl'ley did. 
But I replied that I had written faithfully and re-
. fused to ohange anything. At the same time, G.S I 
have said, I marked with a Nota the pOints whioh 
were oontroversial, and where the int errogators 
should rebegin. The next day Joan was onoe more 
~uestioned about the doubtful pOints, and her replies 
oonfirmed exaotly what I had written. (oited in 
Luoie-Smith, 1976,p. 236) 
That Joan was able to grasp and appreoiate the attitudes 
of other persons to her and that she was ~nused by these 
is shown in her response to Brother Riohard, when they 
first met: 
It seemed to me that the people of Troyes, fearing 
this was something that did not oome from God, sent 
him to me. And when he oame to me, approaohing, he 
made the sign of the oross, and threw holy water, 
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and I said to him: 'Approach boldly - I will not 
flyaway.' (cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976, p. 151) 
For Joan there was no If crisis of eXllr es sian", • She lack-
ed formal learning and she knew nothing of the subtle-
ties cf the intelleotual crime cf heresy. These were 
what condemned her i n t Ile hands cf her enemies. 
7.1.4 JOAN'S REACTION TO STRESS 
While stress does not oause schizophrenia, there are a 
number of reasons for supposing that the schizollhrenic 
person is badly affected by it and will avoid new sit-
uations and potentially stressful emotional encounters. 
Jaynes sees the schizophrenic as deficient in an enzyme 
that allows the metabolic by-products of stress to be 
evacuated. Venables (3.2) discovered that while schiz-
ophrenics appear less anxious than others, they are, in 
fact more anxious physiologically, the more withdrawn 
they are. 
By no stretch of the imagination can Joan's career be 
described as stress-free. She reacted tc the challenges 
of battle with unvarying courage, where a schizophrenic 
might be expected to react with helplessness because of 
a physiologioal failure tc maintain the GRO. One illus-
tration is enough to mal(e the pOint: 
While she was ut1iering her threat that all the de-
fenders would be killed if the City was stormed, a 
crossbowman was tal(ing aim. 'Shall we, you bloody 
tart?' he yelled, and put his bolt through the 
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fleshy part of her thigh. As she turned away, her 
standard-bearer was shot in tile foot, and then, as 
the unfortunate roan lifted his vis or to examine 
the wound, another bolt oaught him full bet-...,een t h e 
eyes and killed him. Joan dragged h erself to shel-
ter behind the ridge that divided the t wo ditohes 
and here for some time she remained, trying to dir-
eot the bringing up and positioning of the fasoi nes, 
so that the ladders could be l)lanted. (Luoie-Smith, 
1976,p. 178) 
Joan's trial oan be seen as the most stressful period of 
her life. She was subjeoted t o inoessant and inoonsid-
- erate questioning, inoonsiderate because all LJut their 
questions at onoe and did not allow Joan to comi;ilete her 
answers. At the same time she was tormented by her five 
English guards when she was in her oell. In these oir-
cumstanoes, it might be expeoted that Joan's It condition" 
would have beoome worse, her '~13ymptoms" more florid, her 
voioes more intrusive and destructive. Yet for a time 
her voioes left her altogether (Sackville-West, 1948). 
Her reaotions during her trial were in no way di r ferent 
from those of others, that is, she had her moments of 
weakness and despair and terror; yet she acquitted her-
self well and found many sympathisers who tried to ad-
vise her during the rare opportunities available (Luoie-
Smith, 1976). 
A controversial reaotion is her sixty foot leap from the 
tower of the chateau at Beaurevoir. This may well have 
been a rationalised suioide attempt as the prospeot of 
being handed over to the hated English must have been 
distressing and humiliating. Joan, desperate to esoape, 
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was aware of the enormous risk she took in leaping from 
that height. She must have believed the risk worth the 
gain, should she succeed. While it is established that 
schizophrenics have a high suicide rate, it is also true 
that not all suicides are schizophrenics. 
7.1.5 DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR 
A question that must be asked is whether Joan had delus-
ions of grandeur, for the criteria so far discussed are 
particularly appropriate to chronic sohizophrenia, while 
in paranoid schizophrenia the core of the personality is 
much less affected. 
It is true that Joan saw herself as being sent by God 
to rescue the Kingdom of France, that her voices called 
her "daughter of God" (Lucie-Smi th, 1976) and that she 
told her judges that they would be punished for mistreat-
ing her. These ideas have a ring of grandeur which ill-
accords with her humble origins and her human failings. 
Given her identification with the Catholic world view 
and her experiences and her utter ignorance in most other 
fields of worldly knowledge, these utterances beoome 
those of simplicity rather than of madness. In terms of 
her finished life and her fame, the claims become more 
plausible • . Hyperbolic they may sound but this mode of 
expression is not unusual in mystics, who express rap-
turous emotion, or a sense of identity in relation to 
God in extravagant met~phors that have a ring of pride. 
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Compare Joan with the following examples. A man claims 
that he has been apPointed by God to save the world from 
the communists. If he is incapacitated functionally he 
will probably be in a mental hospital. If he is express-
ing this belief in letters to the press or a distribution 
of pamphlets,or addresses on street corners, he will be 
seen as deluded. If he is President of the U.S.A. and 
has indeed tal<en admirable measures to combat the threat 
of communism, he will be seen as a deeply religious man 
with a strong sense of commitment. The pOint is not 
that society discriminates against the lowly. In each 
instance the man is describing his feelings and goals 
in metaphorical terms. In the first, the GRO is inadequ . ..;, 
:ate and his description of himself inept. Narratisation 
and action are not congruent. In the second the man may 
be carrying out an intention whioh he believes is God-
inspired and may be overestimating the importance of his 
contribution. In the presence of a truly healthy GRO 
his effort would be more accurately presented as he would 
see himself more clearly as his fellows would assess him. 
As long as his behaviour is appropriate in other areas 
he will be seen as inoffensive and may even acquire a 
following. In the third instance, the man's assessment 
of his actions and motives will be aooepted because 
aotion and metaphor can be seen to be congruent. The 
difference between this third example and Joan of Arc 
would appear to lie in the difference in their education • 
• 
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Joan was not stupid but as has been stated, in the af-
i fairs ' of the world in which her life ended, she was sim-
plicity itself. The religious myth in which she believ-
ed was inadequate to describe her experience and at the 
same time it was the only frame of reference she had at 
her disposal. Lucie-Smith (1976) argues plausibly that 
Joan was trapped by her own reputation, so that once her 
power as a prophetess was no longer relevant or useful, 
she oould not move into a new oareer like having her own 
oommand in the army. To the oommon people she was a 
saint and they made olaims upon her to interoede for 
them. Her legend effeotively prevented her from devel-
oping new potentials. 
It is true that Joan planned to rescue the Duke of 
Orleans from his imprisonment in England and to emb'ark 
on a crusade. These aspirations may sound deluded but 
may also be interpreted as expressions of intention and 
potential. Joan's ideas of geography were vague. 
If Joan was deluded it is a matter of some surprise to 
find that she did not see herself as a potential martyr 
and saint. For someone fed on the lives of saints it 
would have been an obvious development, even a tempta-
tion, since the common people behaved as if she were one. 
There is evidence to suggest that Jcan rejected ideas of 
her own beatitude. Brother Riohard, Franoe's Billy 
Graham of the time, was disposed to see her in this light. 
, 
191 
In his opinion, she " had as much power to know God's 
seorets as any saint in paradise with St John the Evang-
elist, and ••• she could, if she wanted, make the King's 
army enter over the walls in any way she wanted" (cited 
in Lucie-Smith,1976,p. 153). Joan's action in kneeling 
to Brother Richard as soon as he knelt to her indicated 
that she did not lay olaim to honours . accorded ·to God and 
the saints. ·Daughter of God· was not a declaration of 
rank for Joan. 
Margaret La Touroulde's deposition is even more reveal-
ing: 
I remember that several times women came to the 
house while Joan was staying there, and brought 
rosaries and other objects of piety so that she 
might touch them, which made her laugh and say 
to me: 'Touch them yourself, L5i~ they will be 
as good from your touoh as they will from mipe.' 
(cited in Lucie-Smith, 1976,p.185) 
Joan feared burning and signed her abjuration because she 
saw the exeoutioner's cart, an act of disloyalty to her 
voices that she regretted later. If she had been delud-
ed, apotheosis would have been the obvious route to take, 
for in imprisonment lay only humiliation. Joan finally 
chose to die but she was not motivated by a masochistic 
desire for martyrdom. The conditions of her imprisonment 
were suoh that death was preferable. 
Joan's choice of male clothing has been attributed to 
her need to single herself out as somebody special to 
whom no ordinary rules applied (Lucie-Smith, 1976). 
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There may be some truth in this. Yet, as when the nun 
takes the veil and habit and forswears earthly adorn-
ment, it also expressed symbolically her forgoing of 
womanly characteristios to be a soldier among soldiers, 
in which environment it had the added advantage of play-
ing down any feminine attractions she might possess. 
The puzzle is why Joan refused to adopt woman's clothes 
when her military career came to an end. Sackville-
West (1948) suggests that she feared rape at the hands 
of her ruffianly guards and Luoie-Smith pOints out that, 
when she finally did oonsent to wear woman's olothing, 
there appears to have been a simulated ral>e attempt to 
force her to resume male attire and so relapse once 
more into heresy. 
The relevant point here is that, if Joan's intention in 
wearing masculine clothing was merely to single herself 
out as important, it becomes a mystery why sl1e adopted 
the elegant clothing of the soldiers of fortune with 
whom she later fraternised. To maintain a delusion of 
special election, the simple clothing of her early career 
would have been more useful and approlJriate. The adopt-
ion of the clothing of the military leaders shows that 
she identified with them and laid claim to them as her 
peers, a truly social action out of keeIling with a de-
lusion that required outward singularity for its pro-
jection. The most that can be inferred from Joan's 
attachment to male dress is that she may have been un-
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certain or her sexual identity. 
7.1.6 ASSESSMENT 
Evidence presented thus rar suggests that the GRO pos-
sessed by Joan of Arc was compatible with the social en-
vironment in which she grew up and into which she later 
moved. If love is defined in the broader sense of the 
word. Joan was not deficient in her ability to show love 
(to her king, her country. her comrades, the wretohed 
and her God) and to reoeive love (the adulation of the 
crowds, the admiration and sympathy of her hostesses at 
Beaurevoir). She was unusually competent in manipulat-
ing her environment and in expressing herself to some 
purpose verbally. At the same time she possessed an 
unoompromising simplicity that made her unique. \\hen 
Joan was face to face with the Anglo-Burgundian Cal)tains 
during the negotiations at Troyes, an eye-witness found 
her a disappointing phenomenon: 
• •• 'she was the simI, lest thing he ever saw, and in 
what she did there was neither rhyme nor reason, 
any more than the stupidest thing he ever saw'. 
He thought she was not to be oompared with Madame ' 
d'Or, the female jester of the Duke of Burgundy 
who was famous for her long blond hair. There 
were always a few who took this view of Joan, mis-
tal~ing her simplicity of sl'eech for stupidity. 
(Lucie-Smith, 1976., p. 157) 
It is the contention of this writer that if there had 
been a fifteenth century psychiatrist available, he 
would by these criteria have found that Joan was not a 
schizophrenic. 
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7.2 JOAN AS A MYSTIC 
In this study the mystic has emerged as one who has a 
cosmio experience of a particular type and who slJends 
the rest of his life trying to give expression to this 
insight in whatever medium is available to him. Ac-
cording to Perry.: (4.3), the mystic is sensitive to the 
oollective unrest of others in his culture and is the 
catalyst in the presence of which the required change 
materialises. Since in Wilber's model (1. 4) the con-
tents of the collective unconscious or the cultural 
ethos are located at the level. cf the Transpersonal 
Bands and since the mystic tc be an effective instru-
ment of change must be an autoncmous human being, he 
must possess both transpersonal sensitivity and a fully 
developed and stable GRO to operate at the level of the 
Biosocial Bands. Since in the case of Joan, her vOices 
persisted from about 1424 until her death in 1431, the 
experiences of St Theresa of Avila and St John of the 
Cross, to name only two, are relevant in the study of 
Joan, for they enjoyed the constant mystical experience 
of adepts at contemplation. 
When William Blake was first taken to be apprenticed to 
an engraver, he rejeoted the first ])ossible master be-
cause, he said, he looked like a man who would hang. 
According to BrOno\~ski . (1972); " the fact that this man 
did meet his d.eath on the gallows does not necessarily 
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prove foresight on the part of Blake. In his opinion 
it demonstrates insight into an age. It is upon the 
hypothesis that Joan possessed this insight that the 
case for her being a mystic stands or falls. 
There is a good deal of information available to suggest 
that the emotions of the people of France were particu-
larly turbulent at the time. It has already been ment-
ioned that Domr~my was a microcosm of France ' so that the 
experience of the people of France, exhausted by the de-
predations of armies engaged in the civil war and Hundred 
Years' War, must have been available to a sensitive child. 
Through her mother, Isabeau, Joan carne into contact with 
another collective phenomenon. This was the cult of the 
name of Jesus, of which the Franciscan, Brother Richard, 
was an exponent and which had the support of the anti-
pope Calixtus but not the sanction of Pope hlartin V. 
If conflict is a source of creative energy, here was an-
other schism to stoke the fires of social metamorphosis. 
It is debatable whether Joan was a member of this cult 
but her own unorthodox experiences appear to have been 
influenced by it. She headed her letters to the English 
with the words II , Jhesus Maria", wore a ring inscribed 
'! Jesus Marie '" (in honour of her parents), and also had 
"Jesus Maria" inscribed on her standard. 
The culmination of her mission as she first presented 
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it was the crowning of the king at Rheims. In this goal 
can be seen the coalescenoe of the two sooial forces to 
which Joan responded. Bernard Shaw oalled Joan the 
first nationalist and it is clear from Joan's utterances 
that a sense of nationality, full-blown in the nineteenth 
century, was beBinnin8 to grow. Joan was passionately 
determined to drive out the English and restore France 
to its own people. In the case of the Dauphin Charles, 
a ooronation was not essential to his position. The 
praotice of election to the kingship had long sinoe 
given way to the idea of hereditary right, so t he days 
when the oeremony oreated the king were over. Charles 
had been aooepted as the new king by the lords loyal to 
his cause seven years before on the basis of his und en-
iable heredit ary rieht to the crown (Vale, 1974). It 
was Joan's belief in the effioaoy of the anointing oil 
that made Charles VII's ooronation so important to her 
and to the simple people from whom she had sprung (Luoie-
Smith, 1976). Joan said, "When the l(ing shall be orown-
ed imd conseorated, the power of IJii'i! eneiJ1 ies will 
always be lessened, nor will they ultimately be able to 
harm him or the kingdom" (cited in Vale, 1974,p. 57). 
Sinoe the act of anointing was in the religious sense 
more significant than the orowning and since Joan saw 
France as belonging to God and Charles as His chosen 
steward, it is clear that for her the IJolitical and tI1e 
relisious fervour had coalesoed to what was synonymous 
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with forming God's Kingdom on earth. 
In this context the apparition of St Michael to Joan 
takes on an enriched symbolic significance. The loss 
of the Abbey of Saint Denis and of the royal Oriflamme 
to the enemy; that St Denis had allowed the burial 
place of the kings of France to be profaned and the Eng-
lish to proclaim Henry VI monarch of France and England; 
these occurrences had dealt a severe blow to the morale 
of the French people: 
So deeply penetrated was Christendom by a sense 
of the divine, so perturbed by the thought that 
it might be out of communion with the Creator 
and the tutelary saints, that the desertion fill-
ed the peoule of Franoe with bewilderment and 
despair. tFabre, 1954,p. 31) , 
The Dauphin Charles had miraculously escaped death when 
a floor had collapsed at La Rochelle. He had called up-
on St Michael at the critical moment and had attributed 
his escape to the intervention of the saint. St Michael 
had replaoed St Denis as the national patron saint and, 
signifioantly, the saint who appeared to Joan, instead 
of wearing a bishop's vestments as St Denis had done, 
bore the warrior's sword. It is as though France had 
presented its will to Joan in the symbolic form of a 
sword, and she took upon herself the responsibility of 
wielding it. 
The synthesis of political and religious motifs created 
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by Joan is strongly suggested by a description of her 
army at the height 'of her influence: 
Volunteers came to serve the Maid - it was as though 
a popular preacher had aroused the hearts of the 
soldiery. Her ar:ny, with her banner bearing the 
name of Jesus, her standard bearing the image of 
Christ i~ Judgement, her banner showing Christ Cruci-
fied, with the mendicant friars marching in front of 
the troops, singing hymns and anthems, was like a re-
vivalist meeting in motion. (Vale, 1974, p. 57) 
Joan's fervour then found a ready response in the hearts 
of the people. It was a fervour to which the 90or, espec-
ially the women, were to resrond even after Joan's for-
tunes had declined; and the response since her burning 
has never ~uite faded. 
7.2.1 VISIONS AND VOICES 
It has already been est ablished that voioes and visions 
are not the prerogative of the schizophrenic alone •. Joan 
is unusual in that her "halluc1nations'~ were mainly aud-
itory ( a rarer phenomenon than visual) and tha t she ex-
perienced hallucinations involving more than one s ense. 
One of her rare similarities to religious mystics is that 
her saints s melt very sweet when she embraced them (Lucie-
Smith, 1976). It should not alarm the reader to be3.r that 
Joan's relationship with her saints and the manner of her 
perception of them shows parallels with those familiar 
to specialists today (ibid). It is the contention here 
that such details are irrelevant "in distinguishing a 
schizophrenic from a mystic. They merely tell the student 
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more about the way in which the brain functions. Voices 
and visions in the presence of a healthy GRO can be olas-
sified as social phenomena. And Joan is not alone in 
experiencing prolonged auditory phenomena. St Theresa, 
eminently sane and practioal, heard and obeyed voices she 
believed to come from God (Underhill, 1967). It is inter-
esting to examine an account of her experienoe given by 
Joan to the Dauphin and three others: 
And she answered the Icing tha t she ;wuld, and 
said these words or others like them: that when 
something was not gOing well beoause they would not 
leave it to her to follow the counsel that was sent 
her from God, she would retire apart and pray to 
God, complaining to Him that the men to whom she 
spoke would not readily believe in her. And when 
she had prayed to God, she heard a voice which said 
to her: 'Go, child of God, go, go ~ Go, and I will 
help you.' And when she heard this voioe she felt 
a great joy, and wanted to be in that state always. 
And, what is more, when she thus repeated the words 
of her vOices, she was seized with a marvellous rap-
ture, and raised her eyes to heaven. (cited in Luoie-
Smith, 1976,p. 127)· . 
This acoount has a great deal in common with the prayer 
of any praotising Christian. The difference lies in that 
the reassurance or answer is heard rather than felt. 
There is clearly a moment when Joan experiences suoh r~p-
ture that she finds it diffioult to express except non-
verbally. The voice she hears embodies the authority 
mentioned by Happold as being a ~uality of mystioal ex-
perienoe (4.1). Another pO int which links Joan with the 
mystics is the uncontrolled and conoeited sounding" child 
of God~ . If Charles was embarrassed by this description 
it is because this is an emotive account of the anxieties 
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and raptures of the individual psyohe, a uniquely private 
event. The significance of the similarity between this 
language and that of madness has already been discussed. 
Joan's account of her experience appears to owe nothing 
to art and it is interesting to find it so much like that 
of other mystical experiences. 
Another aspect of Joan's voices that places them within 
the mystical orbit is the ready restitution of the GRO. 
There were occasions when the voices would assert their 
presence with great insistence when her attention was 
s 
fOCUS!:d elsewhere but on the whole Joan needed solitude 
to hear them and the need to use the GRO prevented her 
from understanding them, as did the noise of the prison 
and the guards (Lucie-Smith, 1976). 
Jaynes pOinted out that the social phenomena of posses-
sion and trance are learned behaviour. The element of 
learning in Joan's case is quite strong. The church bells 
at Domremy served to trigger off the VOices' (perhaps 
through de~tomatization) and she heard them especially 
when the bells sounded for Gompline and Matins. Later, 
she was able to consult them at will. 
Wing (1978) .made the distinction that, in the social 
phenomenon, possession enhanced the power of the person 
experiencing it while the intrusion . of thought not his 
,, " 
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own was for the sohizophrenio a distressing and debili-
tating experienoe. While Joan oan hardly be said to 
have been possessed (like St Theresa she demonstrated the 
true bioamerality whioh aooording to Jaynes no longer 
exists), her voioes nevertheless were a souroe of power 
and oomfort to her. They provided the authorisation 
both she and her society needed to accept the validity 
of her mission. Lucie-Smith gives an interesting account 
of what he calls a fugue condition. He sees Joan as be-
ing for a short time disorientated and out of touch with 
reality. In view of the r esult it would seem more appro-
priate to see Joan as expressing herself in a metaphor 
of power. Her sense that she could win and her determin-
ation to do so come out very clearly. The image s eems 
appropriate enough in the circumstances: 
Because of the great number of soldiers in the 
town and its great strength, and also because of 
the r es istance which t he garrison put up , the 
French we re forcibly compelled to retire. At that 
moment I came up. But I had a lready been so 
severely wounded in the heel by an arrow tha t I 
could neither stand nor walk without crutches. I 
saw that the Maid had been left wi th a very sm8.11 
company of her own men and others , and had no doub t 
that harm would ensue. So I mounted a horse and 
rush ed towards her. I asked her what s lle was dOing 
alone there like th at, and why she did not retire 
with the rest. After t aking her 11elmet from her 
head, she ans wered that she was not alone, th at she 
still had 50 000 men in her company, and that she 
would not leave tllat spot until she had taken the 
town. 
At th a t moment, whatever she mi ght say , she had no 
more than four or five men with her, which I know 
for certain, as do several others who a lso saw her. 
Therefore I told her out of hand to go away and re-
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tire like the rest. She told me, however, to send 
for faggots and withies to make a bridge over the 
moat so that it might be possible to get near. And 
when she had said this she shouted: 'Faggots and 
withies, everybody, so that we oan mai<e a bridge~' 
And they were immediately brought and put in pos-
ition. The whole thing utterly astonished me, for 
the town was immediately talcen by assault, and at 
that time there was no great resistance. (cited in 
Lucie-Smith, 1976,pp. 188 - 189) 
A criticism of Joan's voices frequently tendered,isthat 
they often expressed Joan's own wishes and opinions. An 
examination of two eXamlJles will illustrate what is meant. 
Joan stated at Rouen that she had given the king a sign 
which had made him believe in her. She refused to re-
veal what it was: 
At one moment she claimed that she had promised 
St Catherine and St Margaret to remain silent on 
the subjeot, but 'without their requiring it. 
And Joan made this promise at her own request, for 
too many people would have asked her about it, had 
she not made this promise to the saints aforesaid.' 
(Luoie-Smith, 1976,p. 61) 
Most people debate with themselves mentally. The first 
point here is that Joan's internal debates were drama-
tised. Clearly too, she took refuge in her saints when 
she was being defensive or evasive. She used them to 
rationalise her own actions. 
The second example 1s taken from a reoord of what Joan 
said to Cauohon on the Monday after her abjuration: 
We asked her if, since Thursday, she had heard the 
voices of St Catherine and St Margare!. She replied 
that she had. Asked what they said,Lsh§7 replied 
that God had told her, through St Catherine and St 
Margaret, of the great pity of this Signal treason 
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to whioh she, Joan, had oonsented in making the 
abjuration and reoantation in order to save her 
life. She said tllc"'t, before Thursday, her voioes 
had told her what she would do that day, and she 
had then done it. She said, in additton that her 
voioes told her, when she was on the soaffold, be-
fore the people, that she would reply boldly to the 
preaoher who was then preao11ing. And Joan said be 
was a false pree.oher who said tllat she did several 
things whioh she had not done. She said that, if 
she deolared God had not sent her, she woul,j de::ln 
herself, and that God had in truth sent her. She 
said that her voices had told her, sinoe Thursd ay, 
that, she had oO'llmitted a great orime in oonfessing 
that what she had done was not well done. (oited 
in Luoie-Smith, 1976"pp. 271 - 272) 
One of the most striking aspeots of this pas'3age is the 
integrity it reveals in the religious oore of Joan's be-
ing. She is utterly sino ere in her belief in her voioes 
and with regard to her divinely inspired mission she 
does not, as she so easily oould have done, use them to 
rationalise an esoape from the fire whioh she feared 
very great ly. She aooepts responsibility for tl1e guilt 
of this aotion (the abjuration). Looked at from a 
slightly different angle, the passage suggests that, if 
Joan knew nothing of what the abjuration oeremony en-
tailed, t11e voioes were the repository of her olairvoyanoe 
or preoognition; and, if she did know what to expeot, 
that she attributed to St Catherine and St Margaret her 
own resolutions as to how she would oomport herself. 
Clearly also, the voioes were partly the voioes of her 
own oonsoienoe when she had had time to refleot on her 
disloyalty to God through oowardioe. 
Over and above the initial and oontinuing inspiration of 
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the voioeEl,Joan olearly needed them for another reason; 
and the olue to her need would seem to lie in the [ :lot 
that she attributed to her saints muoh of the intelligenoe 
and imagination and oommon sense that a modern woman would 
attribute to herself. Part of the ans wer tben Day li e 
in the position of Joan as a woman in the fifteenth oen-
tury. The roles for ber as a f emale were very muoh oir-
oumsoribed and, moreover, the roles for her as a peasant 
woman were more oiroumsoribed still. If Joan were a 
woman of genius (and her oareer hints that she had abil-
ity of no mean order) trapped in a world whioh had no use 
for suob talent; and if the religion of whioh spe was an 
ardent devotee supported this view of the plaoe of a 
woman in sooiety, Joan would need authoris ation of an un-
usual type to allow her to give rein to her energies and 
talents. Her voioes and visions would be authorisation 
fqr her oompatriots to aooept her, and for Joan herself 
to take a giant leap out or her niohe in the God-ordained 
order of sooiety. 
That she oonfused the voioes of her saints with her own 
tboughts or with promptings from dissooiated parts of 
her own self is neither oulpable, damning nor surprising 
for another reason. St Theresa of Avila and St J O!1n of 
the Cross were aware of the dang c=r (5.2.1). They were 
aooomplished in subtle self-examination. There seems 
very little to suggest that Joan was the self-analytioal 
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type. 
7.2.2 JOAN AS A PROPHETESS 
In the oreative oontinuum postulated earlier, mystioism 
and propheoy are olosely allied. There is a good deal 
of evidenoe to suggest that Joan's powers of olairvoy-
anoe and preoognition were highly developed. ~,~oss' s 
oo~ment has already been mentioned (1.). Joan foresaw 
the relief of the siege at Orleans and the ooronation 
of Charles VII at Rheims. She also foresaw that she 
would be wounded in battle, one of the best attested of 
her propheoies. On the other hand, she predioted that 
the Frenoh would soore a ma jor viotory over the English 
in the next seven years. In this prediotion she was 
wrong. In the world of the psyohio sensit ive, the like-
lihood of a mistake is par for the oourse, whioh may be 
why oritios suggest with some truth that, if enough pre-
diotions are made, some will inevitably oome true. Expo-
nents of ESP engaged in oooupations where they are forced 
to perform at will are also foroed to oheat, oonsoiously 
or unoonsoiously. Yet there is a suggestion that meaning 
somehow invalidates statistios. 
What Luoie-Smith oalls Joan's unoonsoious myth-m~(ing 
may be seen as an example of this tendenoy. Joan had to 
oonvinoe herself as wel l as others and so, in her self-
narratisation, the story she told herself and the world, 
206 
she saw as supernatural and presented as supernatural, 
events which could be explained in natural ways. Her 
ability to recognise the king in a crowd of people when 
the court played a trick on her is one such occurrence. 
Joan must have been fa~iliar with the king's appearance 
from description. Features like bandy legs and pendulous 
noses are Quite distinctive (Fabre, 1954). Similarly, 
she sent a message for a sword to be dug up from behind 
the altar in the Church of Sainte Catherine-de-Fierbois. 
The sword was f ound, apparently miraculously, but as 
Lucie-Smith (1976) states, if she spent time in the 
chapel on the way to Chinon, she may have noted the pre-
sence of the sword subliminally. Weapons of war and arm-
our were frequently brought to and left in the chapel. 
She also saved the Duke of Al en90n's life by warning him 
to move just before a cannon ball struclc the spot where 
he had been standing. TIlis can be attributed to a Quick 
eye and Quick reflexes. Joan had promised to return the 
Duke safely to his family, so the event would have gain-
ed in significanoe in such a context. Much of what man 
experiences as supernatural or amazing beyond the usual 
sphere can be explained in terms of the re:rlarkable brain. 
he possesses. By the same token it can be suggested that 
man's influence on the train of events is perceptible (he 
is constructing what he will see and what he will allow 
to happen); and also that supernatural events so far 
207 
defying explanation in terms of man's soientifio para-
digm may be no less the produot of man's remarkable brain 
and no less real. 
That some of Joan's apparent powers oan be explained in 
terms of what psyohologists know is possible should not, 
therefore, detraot from the fasoination of those that oan-
not. Joan on several oooasions mentioned that she would 
last only a year. Her aotive oareer oan be seen as stret ch-
ing from 25 April 1429, when she set off for Orleans, to 
23 May 1430, when she was oaptured. The phenomenal ego 
that was Joan did not behave like one doomed to destruo-
tion or to obsourity after a year. She was full of enthus-
iastio plans for wielding her sword for Franoe and Chris-
tendom. Tilis statement about lasting only a year would 
appear to argue for a souroe of knowledge and purpose 
with origins other than Joan herself; or other than an 
unoonsoious mind limited in extent of its knowledge to 
the experienoe of t he person possessing it. Mor eover, 
Joan's voioes spoke of the siege of Orleans long before 
it began and Joan was very definite that she had to be 
with the Dauphin before mid-Lent, sugges ting that she was 
following a timetable beY0:1d the phenomenal awareness of 
any single human being. This oluster of events is not 
easily explioable and to label it as ooinoidenoe is to 
refuse to deal with it in its full oomplexity. Joan was 
not solely responsible for many of what have been seen as 
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her triumphs and the twenty-four years following 
Charles VII's coronation hardly suggest that Joan's al-
leged purpose in cro 'Nning him was totally valid in its 
assumptions (Vale, 1974). Yet, some collective upsurge 
of emotion and configuration of events with Joan at 
their centre are inesoapably suggested. Synchronicity, 
an a-oausal principle, formative cause - the terms are 
there to be used, though they explain nothing. To be a 
mystio it is not neoessary to be either righ t or perma-
nent in influenoe. 
7.2.3 CONCLUDING Cm" MENT 
The evidence seleoted for this study indioates that Joan 
possessed a healthy GRO oapable of absorbing oreative in-
sights into and formulating oreative solutions for the 
SOCiety of whioh she was a member. If it is assumed that 
she was not a fraud, it follows that she was a mystio who 
spontaneously and consistently experienced "ha lluoir.:3.tiol1s" 
oombining ideation, and sensory and transcendent qualit:i.es. 
Luoie-Smi thcomments tha t in our own day Jo an would be 
considered deranged as those around her viould not as 
readily tolera te the oourses of aotion she would be ferced 
to try to impose on her fellows. If the prir.oiple o! tte 
GRO is aocepted it beoomes olear that, sinoe J oan was 
able to develop and maintain it oompetently, sh e oould 
not be a product of any other age but ber own. The human 
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unlike the seed, is not programmed to cert~in courses of 
action at birth. A healthy person will be suitably in-
flue:lCed by his environment, "sui tably~ here representing 
a wide latitude of choice. Born into the twentieth cen-
tury, Joan would have founu other outlets for her t a lents. 
Lightbody (1961) comments that psychiatrists give one 
reason to believe that, had Joan lived, her condition 
would have ' deteriorated. Again the student is faced 
with a sweeping and unscientific statement. The theory 
of psychopathology gains nothing from studying what did 
not happen. Theorists are begging the question by as-
suming abnormality before it has been proved. They as-
sume that Joan was simply lucky in that she !!let with no 
obstacles. It has already been mentioned that Joan was 
probably handicapped in her further adjustment by h'er 
reputation as a prophet, so that even when she had ap-
parently settled into a career as a soldier, she was 
forced back to the old image by requests that required 
her as an intermediary with God. To suggest tha t this 
would have precipitated her into schizophrenia is to go 
too far. T~ough she spoke nosta lgically of her hO!!le, 
it is unlikely that she would have wished to return there. 
She herself gave the clue as to where her future endeav-
ours would lie. She wished to liberate the Dulce of 
Orleans, a prisoner in England; she wished to ~xpel the 
English from F.rance; she wished to lead a crusade. 
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Though Joan's wishes and the King 's diplomatic interests 
were in oonflict, there is no indication that he intend -
ed to curtail her activities and there is also some evi-
dence that, contrary to the traditional vi ew , he did 
try to purchase her back from her captors (Vale, 1974; 
Lightbody, 1961). In fact it was in his interests to 
do so. 
Joan's career was a dangerous one, as not only was she 
at the forefront of the political staGe but also of the 
ecclesiastical stage. Her enemies would have been 
indefatigable in their attempts to destroy her. She 
lived with passion, a protagonist on two battlefronts -
French/English; good/evil. The schizophrenic is destrcy-
ed by paSSion, the mystic a master of it. 
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sm.'IMARY 
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio 
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy. ' 
Shakespeare 
In an exploration of the relationship between mystioism 
and sohizophrenia it seemed olear at the outset that 
the reason why a mystio oan be labelled sohizophrenio 
by the psyohologist or psyohiatrist is that he exper-
ienoes voioes and visions and other phenomena with a 
superfioial similarity to some of the symptoms oharao-
teristio of this oondi tion. TIle reason for the oonfus-
ion is that the prevailing view of the universe and of 
man has for a long time exoluded the possibility that 
there oould be a good deal more to the phenomenon of 
life than is immediately evidenoed. 
As a oorrective, a "brief review was presented of tIle 
growing dissatisfaction with the picture of man and 
his environment promulgated by behaviourism, logioal 
positivism and the mechanistic view of the universe. 
Since the status of the material world has become par-
lous in the light of insights originating in quantum 
physics and since there is mounting evidence to suggest 
that the phenomena studied in parapsychology cannot be 
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dismissed as mere self-delusion, it would seem logical 
for psychologists to adopt a model of man capable of 
absorbing insights at levels of interaction between man 
and his milieu, ranging through all the gradations be-
tween 'I physical" and" spiri tual ll • Wilber's Spec trum of 
Consciousness (1.4) was seen as the most useful in this 
respect. Because of cultural and time gaps in using 
Joan of Arc as a test case, it was necessary to explic-
ate mysticism and schizophrenia in terms of a relation-
ship to culture, independent of cultural norms and 
consensually validated structuring of reality. Man's 
view of the world is deterr.:ined by the ways in which 
he perceives:; for all practical purposes, the world as 
he knows it exists only by virtue of his brain's abil-
ity to build up and maintain a surrogate of reality 
based on an interaction between memory and input; " witt] 
its aid he operates as an autonomous human being in the 
phenomenal world. For this reason, consciousness and 
altered states of consciousness were seen as essential 
areas of discussion for the elucidation of the relat-
ionship in question. Shor's concept of the Genera.lised 
Reality-Or'ienta tion -' GRO- (2.1) was seen as the most 
useful concept to emerge from this area of research. 
The GRO is a highly flexible tool at the aisposal of 
a man or woman, comprising the multiplicity of learning 
skills,cultur&.l relationships and behavicural norms 
essential for efficient and appropriate interaction 
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within the sooial milieu. This struoture, though it 
may differ in oontent, is one whioh frc,m a physiologi-
oal point of view, modern persons have in oomrr.on with 
persons of the fifteenth oentury. Jaynes's theory of 
the origin of oonsoiousness in the bioamera l mir.d (2.3) 
was also disoussed beoause of its parallels with the 
GRO and beoause Jaynes usefully inoorporates theories 
of sohizophrenia and mystioism whioh tend to support 
the argument. 
The GRO is the tool without whioh a person is unable 
first to define himself as having distinot identity 
within a oulture and seoond to operate effeotively in 
the spheres of life relevant to him. As ttle sohizo-
phrenio is notoriously defeotive in his ability to ao-
oomplish either of these two things, it is logioal to 
suggest that the malfunotion lies in an inability to 
maintain the GRO at optimal level for a reason or rea-
sons unknown. The result is a oumulh tive defioit in 
oompetenoe and sooial skills at any level of oultural 
interaotion. The implioation is that sohizophrenia as 
we know it is not the disease but the oultural ffianifes-
tation (or logioal outoome, given the human condition) 
of years of physiological or psychic handicap. The 
lesion (and this writer favours a theory of schizophre-
nia with a disea:;e theory at its oentre) may not be only 
one malfunotion. A variety of bioohemical or neurolog-
214 
ical deficits could each lead to the mode of being in 
the world that society calls schizophrenia. The cru-
cial pOint for the argument is that in times of even 
minimal stress in some cases, the schizophrenic fails 
to maintain the brain state which comprises the GRO of 
the normal, waking adult. The frustration of his help-
lessness could be the reason for his more florid attacks 
of nmadness~. He ha s not at his disposal the more usu-
al ways of expressing anger. Because he cannot operate 
autonomously in his world, having failed to acquire the 
necessary skills or the structures to canalise his 
drives, he is seen as standing in a nega tive relation-
ship to his culture. 
The mystic, on the other hand,has an experience of such 
startling intellectual and emotional (and/or sensory) 
impact that he has not the categories of thought and 
language available to do it justice. The r esult may be 
confused with schizophrenic symptoms because of inescap-
able semantic similarities in persons of the same cult-
ure. The crucial difference lies in the fact that the 
GRO is readily re-established (may in fact be simply in 
abeyance rather than shattered during the mystic exper-
ience). Instead of having a crippling effect on the 
percipient, the mystic d-ASC, especially when learned 
and repeated, can lead to a sense of power and an in-
creased capacity for positive interaction along the 
• 
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parameters of homonomy and autonomy. Evidenoe garnered 
from transpersonal psyohology and experiments in hallu-
cinogenio drugssuggests , ~hat nOt only ' is the mystio 
experienoe explicable in terms of, and potentially 
available to persons with, normal brain funotioning and 
oultural adjustment, but also that this d-ASC may well 
have a profound positive effect on the person having it, 
given the right oiroumstanoes. There is,a strong sug-
gestioD that the mystic experience and creative activity 
are correlated, leading to innovation in all spheres of 
human activity. The mystic then could be seen to stand 
in a positive relationship not only to his culture but 
to the purposeful collective consciousness whioh, for 
want of a better term, could be oalled metaoulture. 
Unlike the sohizophrenio, the mystio has a GRO whioh 
allows him to operate oompetently in everyday life. 
The life of Joan of Aro has been disoussed with a view 
to establishing whether or not she possessed a healthy 
GRO. The rationale is that the relationship to sooiety 
would be the same in the fifteenth oentury, for both 
the schizophrenic and the mystic, even though the fif-
teenth was more sympathetio to phenomena like voioes 
and visions than is the twentieth century. In this 
writer's opinion there is more evidence to suggest that 
Joan possessed a healthy GRO than there is evidenoe to 
the contrary, given the premises stated. It must be 
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admitted that the selection of detail plays an import-
ant role in any assessment of this kind; yet, making 
allowance for this, the evidence is still very strong 
that Joan was a mystic and not a schizophrenic. She 
was confident, competent and immune to stress to a de-
gree unimaginable in a chronic schizophrenic. The mere 
establishment of the fact that the picture changes de-
pending on the selection of the evidence is of value, 
since persons who argue the other way fall into the 
same trap. Much is accomplished if this can be acknow-
ledged. The label of schizophrenia is relevant only 
when a person ceases to function and comes within the 
aegis of a psychiatrist. The range of normal human ex-
perience, so severely narrowed by the narrowness of the 
prevailing behaviouristic paradigm, is potentially very 
wide. The meaning of man's existence is still open-ended. 
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